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Abstract
This PhD thesis explores the determinants and impact of University-
Industry (U-I) knowledge transfer. It focuses on the UK as well as a number
of European regions and aims at filling several gaps in the literature.
Firstly, I examine the role of scientific (i.e. university) and market (i.e.
customers, competitors, suppliers) knowledge for patent inventors work-
ing inside firms. I use data from an original survey of industry inventors
combined with patent data from the European Patent Office and I employ
an econometric strategy rarely applied at inventor’s level (i.e. productivity
approach). My finding is that the amount and quality of patents invented
increase when inventors draw their knowledge jointly from a wide set of
knowledge sources, rather than from only one of these.
Secondly, I investigate the impact of U-I research collaborations on UK
firms’ R&D activities. The data consists of a set of publicly funded U-I
partnerships combined with firm-level data available from the UK Office
for National Statistics. I combine propensity score matching with OLS
regression to select an ad-hoc control group and obtain a reliable estimate
of the impact of U-I collaboration on firms. My finding is that treated
firms’ R&D expenditure and share of R&D employment both increase after
participation to U-I partnerships.
Thirdly, I explore the role of research quality as a determinant of UK
university departments’ engagement in U-I collaboration. I use data on
publicly funded U-I collaboration combined with data on UK universities
and I employ OLS regression. My finding is that academic quality displays
a mixture of negative and positive relationship with the volume of private
funding for U-I collaboration, and that this is interdependent with the level
of academia’s past experience in U-I collaboration.
11
Together, these chapters make important contributions to a vast but still
puzzled literature on U-I knowledge transfer activities.
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Introduction
I Overview
This thesis explores the determinants and impact of University-Industry (U-
I) knowledge transfer, focusing on the UK as well as a number of European
regions. U-I knowledge transfer is a widespread and well-documented
economic phenomenon, vastly promoted and fostered by public policy,
but also occurring on a voluntary basis. However, the existing empirical
evidence is still partial and inconclusive with regards to a number of
aspects, hence calling for further research. The thesis aims to fill some of
these gaps; it includes the present introductory chapter and three empirical
papers, which form the following three chapters of the thesis.
The aim of the introductory chapter is to provide an overarching con-
ceptual framework for the thesis, illustrate the aim of the thesis and present
a synthesis of each of the three chapters. I begin with a discussion of some
basic concepts providing the background and motivation for my research.
Next, I define U-I knowledge transfer activities more in detail, along with
their historical trends and geographical dimension. I then illustrate the aim,
structure and approach of the thesis, before providing brief summaries of
each chapter’s objective, results and original contribution, and some final
concluding remarks.
II Conceptual framework
II.1 Innovation and knowledge
The importance of University-Industry (U-I) knowledge interactions can
be traced back to the characteristics of innovation and knowledge, and
how these evolved over time. In fact, the level of understanding of the
13
innovation process and of the process of knowledge generation have
changed dramatically during the second half of the twentieth century.
In order to understand innovation, an important distinction is usually
made between invention and innovation, as argued by Jan Fagerberg in the
introductory chapter of The Oxford Handbook of Innovation (Fagerberg
et al., 2006, pag. 4). Invention is the occurrence for the first time of an idea
for a new product or process, whereas innovation is the first attempt to put
that into practice. However, it is often difficult to make a clear distinction
between the two, since they are closely linked to each other. Undoubtedly,
both represent continuous processes. Speaking of the innovation process
in their influential paper from 1986, Stephen Kline and Nathan Rosenberg
characterised it by clearly pointing out what it is not (Kline and Rosenberg,
1986): they used the so-called ‘linear model of innovation’, according to
which the innovation process follows a mechanistic sequence from research
to the market, to describe a widespread, but according to them erroneous
interpretation of innovation (Fagerberg et al., 2006).1 The overcoming of
the linear model of innovation envisaged by Kline and Rosenberg (1986)
was an important landmark in the evolution of the concept of innovation.
The linear model has been found to be inadequate for two main
reasons: firstly, it implies a chain of causation from science (research), to
development, and finally production and marketing, that only holds for a
minority of innovations; secondly, it ignores the many feedbacks and loops
that normally occur between the different stages of the process (Kline and
Rosenberg, 1986). Instead, innovation has been increasingly regarded as
a non-linear and interactive process between firms and their environment
(Kline and Rosenberg, 1986; Dosi et al., 1988; Malecki, 1997; Nelson and
Winter, 2002). Firstly, non-linearity implies that innovation is not only
influenced and determined by engineers and scientists working in R&D or
by the top management, but also by actors and sources of information both
inside and outside the firm. Secondly, the innovation process is defined
interactive since a wide set of collaborations may affect the innovation ca-
pacity of firms. These are both intra-firm interactions between departments
1The exact source of the linear model is unknown, having never been fully documented.
However, as reported by Godin (2006), a number of authors argue that it comes directly
from Vannevar Bush The Endless Frontier (Bush, 1945). See e.g. Freeman (1996); Hounshell
(1996); Mowery (1997); Stokes (1997).
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and extra firm collaborations with other firms, knowledge providers such
as universities and research centres, public agencies and others.
Similarly, the debate on the economics of knowledge has evolved
through different stages, depending on the characteristics assigned to
knowledge across time. On the basis of the seminal works of Arrow
(1962) and Nelson (1959), knowledge was firstly considered a public good.
Accordingly, its properties include the fact that it may spill over (mainly
from universities) and it is freely available (mainly to firms). Afterwards,
a quasi-proprietary feature has been attached to knowledge (Nelson and
Winter, 1982), emphasizing its stickiness, or, in other words, the inability or
difficulties to transfer it (Foray, 2004). In this view, the firm is considered
the privileged place where knowledge is created and accumulated. Finally,
several more recent contributions have brought a shift towards the concept
of knowledge as a collective process (see e.g. Kauffman, 1993; Weitzman,
1998), centered on (the role of) external knowledge generated by interac-
tions among various economic agents (see a.g. David, 1992; Griliches, 1992;
Cooke et al., 2002).2
At the core of the collective knowledge approach is that knowledge gen-
eration and utilisation can be viewed as the outcome of a recombination
process, according to which innovations stem either from the combination
of brand new components or from the combination of existing components
in new ways (see e.g. Kauffman, 1993; Weitzman, 1998).3 In particular, in
this view, firms are regarded as dynamic and creative agents in search for
knowledge in the local environment. Interactions among firms, universities
and research centres are hence considered fundamental for the generation,
diffusion and absorption of new knowledge. Knowledge can be transferred
and disseminated among agents in the economic system and the spillovers
hence generated bear positive externalities to firms by stimulating innov-
ation activities and productivity. According to this approach, universities
2The idea that innovation and particularly, inventions are produced collectively has
also been put forward by Allen (1983): on the basis of the historical examination of the
British blast furnaces industry in the nineteenth century, he proposes that inventions take
place in a collection of firms whose interactions would collectively invent.
3In his seminal works, Schumpeter (1912, 1942) proposed to view innovation as the
outcome of a recombination process, arguing that most innovations stem from the recom-
binations of existing elements in new ways; however, the contributions by Weitzman (1998,
1996) represent the former attempt to draw upon such assumptions (Krafft and Quatraro,
2011).
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that are able to participate into the flows of knowledge interactions are cru-
cial sources of external knowledge to firms (Cassia et al., 2009).
II.2 Systemic approaches to innovation
The non-linear and interactive characteristics of the innovation process, to-
gether with its systemic nature, have been fully acknowledged in a number
of theoretical and conceptual frameworks that explain how innovation is
created. The well known ‘innovation systems’ or ‘systems of innovation’
(SI) approach, introduced by evolutionary economists of technological
change in the late 1980s (see e.g. Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988, 1992), is
based on the argument that what appears as innovation at the macro level is
the result of an interactive process that involves several actors at the micro
level. Initially, although this approach had nothing inherently spatial, the
set of firms, organisations and institutions involved in such process formed
in many cases a sort of ‘national’ community, so to talk about national
systems of innovation (NSI) (Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993; Nelson and
Rosenberg, 1993; Edquist, 1997). The prolific literature on NSI argues that
the performance of national economies cannot be explained only in terms
of the strategies and performance of firms, but other factors and actors
play crucial roles in favouring the generation and diffusion of knowledge,
including: inter-organisation networks, financial and legal institutions (e.g.
intellectual property rights), technical agencies and research infrastructures,
education and training systems, governance structures, innovation policies
(Iammarino, 2005).
The NSI approach has later branched out into two directions. Firstly,
it has been recognised that the borders defining the set of relevant actors
and interactions may have a smaller scale than the national one, notably
a regional dimension, and thus it is possible to identify different regional
systems of innovation (RSI) (Autio, 1998; Braczyk et al., 1998; Cooke, 2001;
Asheim and Isaksen, 2002; Asheim et al., 2011). An RSI can be defined as
the ‘localised network of actors and institutions in the public and private
sectors whose activities and interactions generate, import, modify and
diffuse new technologies, within and outside the region’ (Archibugi et al.,
1999; Evangelista et al., 2002). Similarly, several other units of analysis have
become popular, including ‘milieux innovateurs’ (Aydalot, 1986), ‘new
industrial districts’ (Becattini, 1987), ‘technological districts’ (Markusen,
16
1985; Storper, 1992; Markusen, 1996), ‘learning regions’ (Asheim, 1996;
Morgan, 2007). Focusing on the sub-national model allows to appreci-
ate the importance of contextual elements and the presence of systemic
interactions in the process of generation and diffusion of innovation as
key determinants of regional or, more generally, local technological and
economic performance (Iammarino, 2005).
Secondly, it has also been suggested that both the actors in the system
and how these are connected to each other may significantly vary across
sectors so that innovation systems also have a sectoral dimension (Breschi
and Malerba, 1997; Malerba, 2002, 2004). Accordingly, a sectoral SI is
made up of a set of new and established products for specific uses along
with the set of actors that carry out market and non-market interactions
for the creation, production and sale of those products (Malerba, 2002).
Organisations involved include firms, as well as non-firm organisations
(e.g. universities, government agencies, financial and technical institutions).
The idea of knowledge and innovation as interactive phenomena is also
at the core of the so called Triple Helix model (TH) (Leydesdorff and Et-
zkowitz, 1996, 1998; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997, 2000), based on the
argument that the university plays an enhanced role in innovation, espe-
cially in increasingly knowledge-based economies. According to the TH
model, the ‘entrepreneurial university’ is at the centre of a triadic relation-
ship with industry and government in that it takes a pro-active stance in
putting knowledge to use and in creating new knowledge. In its more com-
plete formulation, the TH approach considers an overlapping knowledge
infrastructure where each of the three actors takes the role of the other (Et-
zkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000). Similarly to the SI approach, in the ori-
ginal formulation of the TH model there was no or little attention to spatial
dimensions other than the national one. However, at a later stage, such
national bias has been overcome introducing more fine-grained geography
(Iammarino, 2005). Hence, the primary role of universities became very
much related to the localities in which they are embedded.
II.3 The role of university
The concept of the ‘entrepreneurial’ university has been put forward by
Etzkowitz (1983). In his study of American entrepreneurial universities in
17
the 1980s, Etzkowitz (1983) noted that in that period of increasing costs
and static government funds, universities were beginning to consider the
possibility to source additional funding from patenting the discoveries
made by academic scientists, from the sale of results of research carrried
out under contracts with companies, and from engaging into partnership
with businesses. In other words, universities were taking on an ‘entre-
preneurial’ attitude. The importance of academic research to industry and
to society as a whole has gained novel appreciation since then. Similar
trends were taking place in Europe as well, as illustrated by Clark (1998)
in his study of five European universities: in fact, among the ingredients
of success in each institution he noted an integrated entrepreneurial culture.
In addition, universities across the world, and mainly in developed
countries, have received increasing calls to incorporate regional economic
development in their traditional mission (Fayolle and Redford, 2014). As
a response, many universities embraced a new entrepreneurial role under
which they not only intensified their efforts to generate revenues from
research there conducted, but they also become engines of local economic
growth (Charles, 2003; Goldstein, 2009).
The idea that universities can contribute to the development of a territ-
ory, including its innovative performance, rests upon two key assumptions:
in the first place, universities increase the production of knowledge by
supplying new skilled workforce (university first mission) and the results
of scientific research (university second mission); secondly, the presence of
universities in a territory can lead to U-I knowledge transfer and exchange
(university third mission) (Veugelers and Del Rey, 2014). Therefore, the
ways for universities to contribute to local development are the provi-
sion of excellence in education, in research and in knowledge transfer.
Furthermore, the paradigm of the entrepreneurial university (Etzkowitz
et al., 2000) and the shift towards the knowledge based model of economic
development, legitimate universities to pursue their own profits, aside
acting as a central agent in the process of knowledge production and
generation (Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen, 2006).
Turning to a more evidence-based perspective and in line with the idea
of the entrepreneurial university at the core of the TH model, there are
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four not mutually exclusive reasons for why universities have such a key
territorial role, particularly in U-I linkages (Lawton Smith, 2007). Firstly,
there is evidence that agents involved in innovation activities are geograph-
ically concentrated in the early stages of some industries’ life cycle (such as
biotechnology) (Breschi and Malerba, 1997; Audretsch, 1998) and, on the
contrary, they tend to be more dispersed at later stages of the life cycle:
firms can access and absorb knowledge more easily when located close to
each other and close to the scientific community through interaction and
face-to-face communication. Secondly, firms locate around universities in
order to take advantage of localised knowledge spillovers. These, defined
as flows of ideas between agents at less than the original cost (Griliches,
1992), are externalities that are bounded in space and thus represent an
incentive for firms’ co-location. Thirdly, there are cost advantages to a firm
being near to a university. This is because the concentration of innovative
firms results in agglomeration economies (Scott, 1988). Fourth, in line
with the previous assumptions (Veugelers and Del Rey, 2014), the major
contribution of universities to territorial development is through the supply
of knowledge in the form of skilled people, which in turn can absorb
knowledge (Dankbaar, 2004).
Against this background, it is clear that interactions between actors in
a system are fundamental for the realisation of successful innovation pro-
cesses. Moreover, whether we take the stance of the innovation system or
triple helix or any other similar approach, it appears that industry and uni-
versities are at the core of the innovation process. Therefore, U-I know-
ledge interaction becomes a fundamental driver of innovative performance
of knowledge-based economies (OECD, 1998, 2002a), particularly of localit-
ies.
III U-I knowledge transfer activities in context
III.1 Definition and historical trends
Nowadays U-I knowledge transfer is commonly understood as a broad
concept identifying a wide set of interactions between firms and univer-
sities that are aimed at the exchange of knowledge related to research,
science and technology (OECD, 1998, 2002a; Agrawal, 2001). These include
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employment channels, such as temporary personnel exchanges between
university and industry or recruitment of graduates; intellectual property
rights related interactions, such as patent ownership agreement and li-
censing; research collaboration, indicating U-I collaborative R&D research
projects (research partnerships, consultancy project and research consortia);
and informal direct/indirect contacts such as publications, conferences and
informal meetings (see e.g. Geuna and Rossi, 2013; Rossi and Rosli, 2013).
U-I linkages emerged as a distinctive and growing phenomenon in most
advanced countries from the 1980s onwards (Geuna and Muscio, 2009).
Before that, particularly in the aftermath of the Second World War, industry
in developed economies relied on universities mainly for the provision of
highly skilled personnel for own R&D laboratories. The latter represented
the main responsibility for universities together with that of publishing
scientific results of their research activity (OECD, 1998). To some extent,
academic scientists had developed networks of interactions with firms and
government, but mainly acting on personal basis without any involvement
of the university, and industry had supported university research, usually
through endowments and gifts rather than specific projects and contracts.
For instance, in both the United States and Europe, large companies with
R&D laboratories dedicated to basic research played a special role, and
academic researchers often collaborated with company scientists (Geuna
and Muscio, 2009).
However, U-I interactions in their more general definition of public-
private partnerships were not an entirely new phenomenon. In fact,
collaboration between public research and industry has characterised
the German research system since the nineteenth century. In the United
Kingdom, collaboration between university departments in science and
engineering and industry was not uncommon at the beginning of the
twentieth century and often involved academics working as consultants
to industry, although this type of interaction was later replaced with the
development of industrial laboratories (OECD, 1998). In post-war Japan,
public-private partnerships have been an integral part of large industrial
technology programmes sponsored by the government with the aim to
help Japan catch up in specific sectors. In the United States, university
engagement with business can be traced back to the second half of the
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nineteenth century, when land grant universities pursuing ‘more practical
research strategies’ have been created, aside the foundation of liberal arts
universities oriented toward pure research (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff,
2000). However, it was not until the Cold War that changes in government
policy, led by heightened defence spending on R&D, resulted in increased
collaboration between public research and industry. By the early 1980s,
the success of Japanese collaborative R&D and growing competition in
global technology markets led to a paradigm shift in the United States,
with public-private partnerships becoming a key tool of federal technology
policy for improving national competitiveness (OECD, 1998).
Increasing globalisation and competition, together with a stronger
emphasis on innovation from the 1980s onwards, brought about many
changes in the relationship between university and industry. Firstly, views
changed regarding the role of universities in the economy: from being
seen as ‘ivory towers’ where academics mainly performed research in
isolation, universities became an economic organisation actively engaged
with external stakeholders (Freitas et al., 2011). In particular, universities
in developed countries became more interested in collaborating with com-
panies because of the decrease of government research funding for military
purposes and, more generally, reduction of government intervention in the
economy (Geuna and Muscio, 2009).4 Moreover, many governments began
to introduce incentives for university to engage in activities with industry,
on the basis of the assumption that U-I interaction increases the rate of
innovation in the overall economy (Spencer, 2001).
Secondly, due to competition pressures and increasing speed and com-
plexity of knowledge processes, as well as declining profits and increas-
ing costs of research, companies needed to get closer to external sources of
knowledge in order to innovate. As a consequence, industry became in-
creasingly interested in university research as well as highly skilled person-
nel to create and exploit new knowledge (Freitas et al., 2011). As it was
the case for university, many governments in advanced economies imple-
mented innovation policies with the aim to support companies’ interaction
with universities. As a matter of fact, the scale and scope of university-
4For the United States, especially, the fall of the Berlin Wall meant a significant reduc-
tion in military spending in universities, although this trend was already underway (Geuna
and Muscio, 2009).
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industry knowledge transfer activities have increased over time (see e.g.
OECD, 1998, 2002a; Geuna and Muscio, 2009; Rossi, 2010; Freitas et al., 2011;
OECD, 2013), as shown by the growing number of university-assigned pat-
ents, academic papers co-authored with industry, income from royalties,
and industry funding for academic research.
III.2 Motivations for U-I knowledge transfer
From a theoretical standpoint, firms engage into U-I activities to overcome
market failures that result from uncertainty of the R&D process, resource
constraints and the inability to internalise significant spillovers (see e.g.
Dasgupta and David, 1994; Martin and Scott, 2000; Salter and Martin,
2001). Therefore, U-I interaction is a market response to market failures that
prevent firms from conducting the socially optimal level of R&D. Similarly,
public support of U-I initiatives is a policy response to market failures that
are not overcome by the market alone.
Empirically, it has been shown that firms’ motivation for U-I knowledge
transfer include accessing research infrastructure, accessing expertise,
finding support for renewal of firm’s technology, gaining access to potential
employees, expanding contacts for corporate laboratories, increasing
pre-competitive research, leveraging internal research capabilities, redu-
cing and sharing research costs (see e.g. Hagedoorn, 1993; Steurs, 1995;
Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Lope´z, 2008; Bruneel et al., 2009).
Universities, on the other hand, are pushed towards engagement in U-I
activities as a consequence of budgetary constraints faced by governments
and their impact on patterns of funding of university research, as well as
the higher costs of research in general (Geuna and Muscio, 2009). Therefore,
universities’ motivation for U-I knowledge transfer include obtaining fin-
ancial support for their mission, broadening the study and research experi-
ence of students and faculty, identifying interesting and significant research
problems, increasing employment opportunities, enhancing local economic
development (Larsen, 2011; Geuna and Rossi, 2013; Perkmann et al., 2013).
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IV Recent literature on U-I interaction and exist-
ing gaps
IV.1 Empirical evidence
U-I linkages emerged as a specific and consolidated field of study around
three decades ago. This was spurred on the one hand, by the rapid growth
of published research adopting a ‘system of innovation’ perspective, or
other types of network views, towards the organisation of higher education,
research and industrial innovation and, on the other hand, by an increased
policy emphasis on the commercialisation of research and the creation of a
closer relationship between basic research and society (Gulbrandsen et al.,
2011). In fact, from the mid 1980s onwards many countries encouraged
greater interaction between universities and firms by changing the legisla-
tion and creating ad-hoc support mechanisms.
Research on U-I knowledge transfer has been categorised into at least
four groups (Agrawal, 2001), depending on the focus of the research, being
this on firms, universities, the geography of interaction or the channels of
knowledge transfer. In addition, within each category it is also possible to
distinguish studies that mainly look at the determinants of U-I knowledge
transfer, and those that look at its impact.
Firstly, there are studies on firms’ characteristics, that focus on issues
related to the firm side of U-I interaction, especially the characteristics
that influence firms’ ability to utilise externally generated knowledge,
such as internal organisation, resource allocation and partnerships (see e.g.
Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Ziedonis, 1999;
Audretsch, 2000; Zucker et al., 2000), but also the impact of U-I interaction
on firms’ R&D and innovation activities (see e.g. Becker, 2003; Fritsch and
Franke, 2004; Arvanitis et al., 2008; Lo¨o¨f and Brostro¨m, 2008).
Secondly, there are studies that investigate the university side, thus
focusing on issues that include the characteristics that influence universit-
ies’ ability to interact with firms, university policies regarding intellectual
property rights, licensing strategies employed by university technology
licensing offices, and characteristics of the actual inventor-professors,
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as well as the impact of U-I interaction on academic research (see e.g.
Henderson et al., 1998; Feldman et al., 2002; Thursby and Thursby, 2002;
Di Gregorio and Shane, 2003; Larsen, 2011).
A third stream of literature has developed around the geography of
U-I interaction in terms of localized knowledge spillovers, considering the
spatial relationship between firms and universities relative to performance
in terms of knowledge transfer success (see e.g. Jaffe, 1989; Jaffe et al., 1993;
Audretsch and Feldman, 1996; Zucker et al., 1998). Papers in this literature5
often point to the role of geographical proximity for U-I interaction and to
the factors that influence location decisions both from private and public
perspectives (Agrawal, 2001).
Lastly, there are studies on the channels of knowledge transfer, that ex-
amine the relative importance of various transfer channels between univer-
sities and businesses, such as publications, patents, consulting, recruiting,
joint ventures, research contracts, and informal meetings (see e.g. Cohen
et al., 1998, 2002; Agrawal and Henderson, 2002; Colyvas et al., 2002; Shane,
2002; D’Este and Patel, 2007; D’Este and Perkmann, 2011).
IV.2 U-I interaction and geography
The literature on university-industry knowledge transfer has devoted a
great deal of attention to the geography of interactions, particularly to
the role of geographical proximity. The argument commonly held is that
spatial proximity to universities provides an advantage for firms that are
willing to keep abreast of scientific developments, as it facilitates personal
interactions and exchange, and face-to-face contacts (see e.g. Jaffe, 1989;
Feldman, 1994; Henderson et al., 1998; Mansfield, 1995; Anselin et al., 1997;
Cooke, 2001; Arundel and Geuna, 2004; Abramovsky et al., 2007; Fritsch
and Slavtchev, 2007; D’Este and Iammarino, 2010; D’Este et al., 2013).
Accordingly, firms located nearby universities are more likely to interact
with universities and thus to benefit from knowledge spillovers.
The underlying assumption is one about knowledge and geography:
5More recent contributions include e.g. Arundel and Geuna (2004); Abramovsky et al.
(2007); Fritsch and Slavtchev (2007); D’Este and Iammarino (2010); Laursen et al. (2011);
D’Este et al. (2013). See section IV.2.
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companies located nearby universities are more likely to benefit from know-
ledge externalities from academic research, as spatial proximity facilitates
the interactions and face-to-face contacts necessary for the transmission of
the tacit component of knowledge. In fact, while the codified component of
knowledge is transferred among firms and universities through knowledge
codified in journal publications and seminars, the tacit component spills
over in oral conversation and face-to-face contacts, hence facilitated by
spatial proximity (Cassia et al., 2009).6 In other words, knowledge that
spills over from academia can be defined as a public but also local good
(Breschi and Lissoni, 2001).
In addition, two other mechanisms have been proposed as conducive to
academic knowledge spillovers. Firstly, knowledge flows from academia
to the economic system and generates new market opportunities for firms.
In accordance with the Knowledge Spillover Theory of Entrepreneurship
proposed by Audretsch (1995), this mechanism entails the creation of a
new firm from the knowledge producing entity. New entrepreneurial
opportunities are generated from new knowledge left uncommercialised,
which spills over from academia, research centres and other firms (Cassia
et al., 2009). Secondly, mobility of human capital is another mechanisms
through which knowledge can be transferred. In fact, it has been shown
that the availability of skilled labour force from universities has a positive
effect on knowledge transfer (see e.g. Powers, 2003; O’Shea et al., 2005;
Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005).
Although geographical proximity is frequently claimed to be beneficial
for successful collaboration and knowledge exchange, in many cases such
localised interaction is only implicitly assumed rather than explicitly
scrutinised. For this reason, several works have theoretically questioned
the importance of geographical proximity per se for collaboration and
knowledge exchange (see e.g. Breschi and Lissoni, 2001; Howells, 2002;
Gertler, 2003; Torre and Rallet, 2005; Boschma, 2005). The main argument is
6The concept of tacit knowledge was first introduced by Polanyi (1966), who explains
that tacit knowledge cannot be expressed outside the action of the person who has it. Its
distinctive characteristic is its incorporation in thoughts, and its invisibility, even for those
who possess it and use it ‘automatically’ (Foray, 2004): it follows that tacit knowledge is
difficult to transfer. Instead, codified knowledge, or explicit knowledge, is highly codified,
as in blueprints, manuals, recipes, or in the form of training: therefore, it is relatively easy
to transfer (Fagerberg et al., 2006).
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that ‘simple’ co-location is ‘neither a prerequisite nor a sufficient condition’
for collaboration (Boschma, 2005, pag. 71). Other forms of proximity (e.g.
cognitive or technological, organisational, institutional, social) may well be
at least as important as geographical proximity for interaction and know-
ledge exchange. Also, geographical proximity may compensate for the lack
of other forms of proximity (and vice versa). For instance, co-location can
positively influence the building of mutual trust due to frequent face-to-face
contacts, hence helping to overcome organisational differences (e.g. uni-
versity versus firms) (Boschma, 2005), as much as institutional proximity
can facilitate interactions over long geographical distances (Ponds et al.,
2007) and technological proximity can play a moderating role on physical
distance (Quatraro and Usai, 2014).7 In sum, studies of various forms of
proximity tend to point to a relatively indirect role for the spatial dimension
in fostering knowledge creation and diffusion (D’Este et al., 2013): accord-
ingly, geographical proximity may rather act as a bridging and reinforcing
factor for other forms of proximity (see e.g Kirat and Lung, 1999; Noote-
boom, 1999; Torre and Gilly, 2000; Boschma, 2005; Torre and Rallet, 2005;
Ponds et al., 2007; Vicente et al., 2007; Balconi et al., 2011; D’Este et al., 2013).
In addition, it is worth noting that research on the geographical dimen-
sion of university-industry collaborations shows that these linkages are
not limited to the local/regional level, as they often occur on the national
or even the international scale (see e.g. McKelvey et al., 2003; Ponds et al.,
2007; Hoekman et al., 2009). These findings are in line with the increasing
attention to the non-regional dimension of knowledge flows (Bunnell
and Coe, 2001; Faulconbridge, 2006; Ponds et al., 2010). It follows that
knowledge spillovers are expected to occur over long distances. If and
when this may be the case, it is unlikely that the relationship between
academic knowledge spillovers and regional innovation is fully captured
by taking only the regional dimension of spillovers into account (Ponds
et al., 2010).
7Organisational proximity is defined by Boschma (2005) as the extent to which relations
are shared in an organisational arrangement, either between or within organisations. Insti-
tutional proximity can be defined as the set of common habits, routines, established prac-
tices, rules, or laws that regulate the relations and interactions between individuals and
groups (Edquist, 1997). Technological or cognitive proximity refers to the cognitive base
of actors and organisations and, thus, their absorptive capacity and potential for learning
(Boschma, 2005).
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One reason for the great attention devoted by scholars to the role of
geography for U-I interaction and, more generally, to localised knowledge
spillovers from academic research, is due to the direct policy implications
that works in this area of inquiry are likely to have. In fact, extant re-
search points at factors that influence firms location choices (e.g. location of
universities), as well as factors that the government should consider when
allocating university research funding. Given the intrinsically tacit com-
ponent of knowledge spillovers, policy decisions regarding the allocation
of research funding across space may have significant impacts on local eco-
nomies (Belenzon and Schankerman, 2013). Nonetheless, recent work point
out that the analysis of the geographical factor itself may not be enough
to fully understand knowledge spillovers, as they also occur over long dis-
tances. Indeed, as envisaged by Agrawal in his overview of unanswered
questions on U-I knowledge transfer from 2001 (Agrawal, 2001), current ef-
fort is being directed towards border effects on spatial relationships and
knowledge spillovers (see e.g. Ponds et al., 2010; Belenzon and Schanker-
man, 2013; Quatraro and Usai, 2014).
IV.3 Some gaps in the literature
Within the innovation literature there are plenty of contributions looking
at U-I interaction from the standpoint of firms, universities and local-
ities. Instead, there is only scant evidence on individual knowledge
users/producers inside companies, such as patent inventors. However,
innovation is not just the product of firms and other organisations (e.g.
universities, public and private research centres) because it ultimately
requires individual creativity (Huber, 1998). As a matter of fact, empirical
evidence about university inventors is vast, partly because of a large
amount of information publicly available, whereas evidence on industrial
inventors is rather limited and not conclusive yet. The focus of research has
only recently moved down to the level of individual inventor inside the
firm (see e.g. Giuri et al., 2007; Hoisl, 2007; Mariani and Romanelli, 2007;
Weck and Blomqvist, 2008; Schneider, 2009; Pasquini et al., 2012), thus
scholars have, so far, only partly answered questions concerned with the
role of U-I knowledge transfer for private inventors. This is a relevant issue
in light of the fact that private R&D activities still remain, to some extent, a
black box and the individual perspective might shed some new lights on
that. With the aim to fill this gap and add to a small but growing literature,
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in the first chapter of my thesis I consider patent inventors employed by
companies located in three European regions and investigate the role of a
wide set of knowledge sources for their inventive activity.
Secondly, although the study of the impact of scientific knowledge and
U-I knowledge transfer on firms’ performance has attracted much attention
from different strands of the academic literature (see e.g. Criscuolo and
Haskel, 2003; Belderbos et al., 2004; Faems et al., 2005; Cassiman and
Veugelers, 2006; Frenz and Ietto-Gillies, 2009), evidence is still mixed. To
some extent, there seems to be convergence towards the conclusion that U-I
interaction positively affects firms’ R&D and productivity, but this is far
from being unquestionable. In addition, the motivations for evaluating the
impact on firms’ overall economic performance or innovative activities (or
both), remain often unclear. In other words, it is still an open issue whether
U-I interaction’s effects should be searched on firms’ R&D input (e.g. R&D
expenditure) or output (e.g. patents) or overall performance (e.g. labour
productivity). This calls for further research that has considerable academic
as well as policy interest. I attempt to shed new light on the effect of U-I
knowledge transfer activities on firms in the second chapter of my thesis,
in which I carry out a policy evaluation study to investigate the impact of
publicly funded U-I collaborative partnerships on UK firms’ R&D activities.
Thirdly, as far as universities are concerned, the role of individual-level
factors is well explored within the literature on the determinants of U-I in-
teraction, whereas evidence is scant when it comes to the organisational
context in which academic engagement occurs. This is especially the case
with respect to the characteristics of university departments involved in U-I
interaction (Perkmann et al., 2013). Moreover, there is an extensive empir-
ical evidence on the determinants of U-I collaboration (see e.g. Schartinger
et al., 2002; D’Este and Patel, 2007; D’Este and Iammarino, 2010; D’Este and
Perkmann, 2011; D’Este et al., 2013), but only rarely is the volume of finan-
cial resources (both private and public) at stake accounted for. Instead, the
income that universities receive from public agencies as well as companies
for their knowledge transfer activities may mirror the value that external
partners place on the knowledge they receive from universities (Rossi and
Rosli, 2013). Therefore, in my third chapter I attempt to overcome these
limitations by considering the flows of private, as well as public, financial
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resources involved in U-I partnerships with the aim to bring new evidence
on the role of organisation level determinants for U-I knowledge transfer. In
particular, I take the case of publicly funded U-I collaboration in the UK to
study the relationship between academic quality and the flows of financial
resources involved.
V Thesis objectives and approach
V.1 Aim of the thesis
This thesis investigates a number of aspects of U-I knowledge transfer
from the standpoint of both firms and universities, which are related to
its economic impact and determinants. The aim is to fill some important
gaps in the literature, underlined in the previous section and that will be
thoroughly illustrated in the following of the thesis. This thesis contributes
to the innovation literature on science-business links and, particularly, on
different strands of studies that touch upon this topic, including economics
of innovation, management of innovation, and science and innovation
policy studies.
In the first place, this thesis addresses the innovative activity of patent
inventors employed by companies in three European regions (West and
East Midlands, United Kingdom; Piedmont, Italy; Catalonia, Spain), with
the objective to shed new light on the drivers of innovation at individual
level and the role of university knowledge as compared to other sources
of knowledge. In particular, the research question that the first chapter
answers is ‘Do industrial inventors that use various sources of knowledge in
their inventive activity display higher performances that those who do not?’.
The hypothesis tested is that inventors’ performance does benefit from
the joint use of a wide set of knowledge sources, including knowledge
from universities, public research centres, competing firms, suppliers and
consultancy. The findings of this chapter contribute to the literature on
the management of technology and innovation, particularly of inventive
processes.
The second chapter of the thesis examines the effect of U-I knowledge
transfer on firms’ R&D activities, with the aim to shed new light on the
29
impact of science and innovation policy on private R&D. The research
question addressed in this chapter is ‘What is the impact of publicly funded
U-I collaboration on firms’ R&D activities in the UK?’ In order to answer
this question, a policy evaluation study is carried out and the hypotheses
that publicly funded U-I research collaborations have a positive impact
on firms’ R&D expenditure and R&D employment are empirically tested.
This chapter adds to the innovation literature that is concerned with the
evaluation of science, technology and innovation policy.
Lastly, I investigate the university determinants of U-I knowledge trans-
fer, with the goal of uncovering the role of research quality together with
other factors for academic engagement with industry in the UK. The driv-
ing question of the third chapter of the thesis is ‘What is the role of department
level characteristics for UK universities’ engagement in U-I collaboration?’. I test
the hypotheses that research quality negatively affects U-I engagement and
that this relationship is influenced by academia’s past experience in U-I col-
laboration. This chapter contributes to the literature on science policy and
management of innovation.
V.2 Structure and approach of the thesis
Each of the three research questions and related hypotheses illustrated
above is tested in an empirical paper. Each of them forms a chapter of
the thesis and includes introduction, literature review and hypotheses
development, presentation of data and methodology, followed by the
discussion of the results and concluding remarks.
My approach builds on economics of innovation concepts and frame-
works. The research draws on quantitative methods, particularly econo-
metric analysis. I apply a number of econometric techniques on newly
created micro-level datasets that result from the combination of brand new
data sources as well as existing raw datasets with several other micro data
sources. In particular, I use a novel survey of patent inventors combined
with patent data from the European Patent Office, an existing dataset of U-I
collaboration combined with firm-level data provided by the UK Office for
National Statistics, and the above-mentioned dataset of U-I collaboration
combined with university information gathered from the UK Higher
Education Funding Councils.
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In spite of the fact that the investigation of U-I knowledge linkages is
very often intertwined with spatial issues, the role of geography in this
thesis is relatively limited, although this differs across the three empirical
papers. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the use of geographical data
has been constrained by lack of data and data limitations. Secondly, from
the reviews of the literature carried out in each chapter, it emerged that
issues related to the impact of U-I interaction on firms and its determinants
at the level of academia, were among the most relevant unresolved as
well as debated ones. These are complex issues per se, hence needing a
great attention in order to grasp their profound link with U-I interaction.
Adding layers of complexity by including the spatial dimension, or by
considering other aspects such as the role of various channels of knowledge
transmission may have led to less precise answers to the research questions
addressed. Therefore, in order to properly investigate the determinants
and impacts of U-I knowledge transfer activities, a limited role has been
given to other relevant factors, including that of geography. Future research
stemming from this thesis will certainly take those into account.8
Nonetheless, the spatial dimension, particularly the regional one, is
relevant in the first chapter, as this addresses regional inventive activities
and it relies on a survey administered at regional level. In particular, the
study highlights different regional patterns as far as the production of
patents in concerned, whereas no significant differences emerge as far as
patent quality is concerned. In the second chapter, the focus is on U-I
interaction in the United Kingdom, particularly those funded by a specific
national-level policy program, hence the geographical standpoint is limited
to the national scale. Nonetheless, a great deal of attention is dedicated
to the formulation of the empirical strategy, in which the spatial unit of
analysis employed to perform the chosen methodology has a key role for
the outcome of the analysis. The third chapter, similarly to the second
one, investigates national U-I collaborations, with a special attention to
the relationship with academic quality. Although the role of geography
is limited to the employment of region-level dummies in the empirical
analysis, the findings of this paper are highly related to policy issues such
as the allocation of research funds to universities. This, as underlined in
8See section VII.
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paragraph IV.2, is likely to have significant impacts on local pattern of
growth and development.
In the next section I provide short summaries of the three chapters, in
which I underline their aims, findings, data and methods employed, and
provide details on their contributions to the literature. These chapters also
provides some insights for policy, which will be underlined in the conclud-
ing section of the present chapter.
VI Summary of the chapters
VI.1 The role of scientific and market knowledge in the in-
ventive process
The first chapter of the thesis investigates U-I knowledge transfer activities
in three European regions by looking at industry inventors’ patterns of
interaction with organisations (both firms and non-firms) that are external
to the company where they are employed. The aim of this chapter is
to study the relationship between U-I - as well as Industry-Industry -
knowledge transfer and patenting activity. In particular, I compare the role
of knowledge from university and other research organisations (‘scientific
knowledge’) with that of knowledge from market sources (‘market know-
ledge’, e.g. from clients and customers, direct competitors, or suppliers) for
the inventive activities carried out by inventors working within firms: I hy-
pothesise that the joint use of scientific knowledge and market knowledge
has a higher impact on the inventors’ performance than the separate use of
each of the two knowledge sources.
The empirical analysis is based on an original survey of industrial
inventors9 that provides new insights about the demand of knowledge
expressed by the actors directly involved in the innovative process in their
regional systems of innovation. By combining the data obtained from the
survey with patent-level information from the European Patent Office, I
create a novel cross-section dataset of inventors’ data that allow to test
my hypothesis and control for a number of individual and patent level
characteristics.
9PICK-ME Survey, Grant agreement n. SSH-CT-2010-266959.
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To analyse the role of different knowledge sources for inventors’
performance, I employ the so-called productivity approach (Cassiman
and Veugelers, 2006), in which inventors’ knowledge sourcing strategies
are used as explanatory factors for inventors’ performance. To the best
of my knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to apply this approach
at the inventor’s level. My finding is that the amount and, to a lesser
extent, the quality of patents invented by industry inventors in the selected
European regions increase when inventors draw their knowledge jointly
from scientific and market sources, rather than from only one of these.
Heterogeneity exists across mobile and non-mobile inventors, especially as
far as the quality of inventions is concerned; furthermore, the results show
that inventors’ performance, notably in terms of quantity of patents, differs
across different regions.
The findings of this chapter offer several contributions to the literature.
While previous evidence has mainly looked at the role of organisational-
level factors and patent features in explaining the outcomes of innovative
activities (see e.g. Hall et al., 2005; Harhoff et al., 1999; Pasquini et al., 2012;
Suzuki, 2011), the focus of this chapter is on the individual who is primar-
ily responsible for the inventive activity. Therefore, inventors’ decisions are
taken into account as fundamental drivers of individual outcomes. Exist-
ing evidence shows that inventors rely on different sources of knowledge to
increase the chances of patent commercialisation (Pasquini et al., 2012), al-
though the opposite holds for the value of patented inventions (Schneider,
2009). This study adds that quantity as well as quality of inventors’ patents
benefit from the recombination of different sources of external knowledge.
This is a relevant result because it supports the idea that knowledge ex-
change across organisations should be adequately backed up, not only at
organisation level (i.e. the firm) but also at individual level.
VI.2 University-Industry collaboration and firms’ R&D ef-
fort
The aim of the second chapter of the thesis is to investigate the impact of
U-I knowledge transfer on firms’ R&D efforts. To do that, I carry out a
policy evaluation study to assess the impact of U-I collaboration on UK
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firms’ R&D intramural expenditure per employee and the share of R&D
personnel. In particular, the empirical analysis assesses the impact of a set
of university-business research partnerships funded by the Engineering
and Physical Science Research Council (EPSRC), which is one of the major
research councils in the UK.
After a review of the related literature and analysis of policy documents,
I argue that the impact of the EPSRC U-I research projects should be
searched on firms’ R&D inputs, because of their pre-competitive nature. I
focus on both R&D intramural expenditure and the share of R&D employ-
ment, since the former may capture differences in equipment and/or costs,
whereas the latter may mirror a human capital component of R&D that
is usually more permanent (Busom, 2000), and I expect that both of them
increase after participation to the projects.
The empirical analysis of this chapter relies on a unique micro-level
dataset, resulting from the combination of a dataset of EPSRC U-I partner-
ships funded between 1998 and 2007 with firm-level data gathered from
two databases provided by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS): the
Business Structure Database (BSD), which provides basic information about
firms, and the Business Expenditure on R&D database (BERD), providing
R&D data collected through an annual survey carried out by the ONS.
In order to assess the impact of U-I research projects on particip-
ating firms, I select a control group of untreated firms on the basis of
pre-treatment characteristics via propensity score matching and then
compare the performance of treated and untreated firms via ordinary least
squares regression. For the development of the methodology of this study,
especially for the estimation of the probability that firms participate to
U-I projects, a number of factors are fundamental. These include firms’
characteristics and geographical factors. Notably, the latter allow to match
treated firms with non-treated ones that are located in the same area, hence
to assume that they are subject to similar external factors and benefit from
the presence of the same universities and other organisations.
My finding is that EPSRC U-I collaborations funded between 1998 and
2007 have a positive impact on both outcome variables three years after
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the beginning of U-I projects and the figures are very similar across several
matching methods employed for the selection of the control group. This is
an important result as it proves the relevance of public research for business
R&D activities and, more generally, the role of university as a driver of
innovation through its third mission.
This study provides a number of contributions to the academic literat-
ure. Existing evidence is contradictory with respect to whether the impact
of research collaboration, and more generally, U-I interaction, is to be traced
on innovative activities or on the overall productivity of firms. I argue that,
due to the pre-competitive nature of the funded projects under study, it is on
the former, and in particular on the R&D input side, that an impact should
be searched. In fact, the EPSRC partnerships are aimed at contributing to
upstream and basic research that is far from industrial application, hence
far from producing R&D outputs. Moreover, I add to the existing empirical
evidence on the case of EPSRC-funded partnerships by examining their im-
pact: in fact, while evidence on their determinants, channels, and barriers is
vast (see e.g. D’Este and Patel, 2007; D’Este and Fontana, 2007; Ambos et al.,
2008; Bruneel et al., 2009, 2010; D’Este and Iammarino, 2010; Bishop et al.,
2011; Crespi et al., 2011; D’Este et al., 2012, 2013), it is rather scant as far as
their impact on firms is concerned.
VI.3 Organisational-level determinants of academic en-
gagement with industry
The third chapter focuses on the role of academic quality for university
engagement with businesses in the form of U-I collaboration in the UK.
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the determinants of U-I knowledge
transfer activities from the standpoint of academia. In particular, I examine
to what extent past research quality, together with other factors, explains
the volume of funds that university departments raise from companies
when participating to EPSRC funded research collaboration.
I hypothesise that a negative relationship between quality and U-I
interaction exists, on the basis of the argument that a relatively low de-
gree of resource availability at lower quality universities may motivate
top academics in these schools to seek industry collaboration in order
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to acquire research funds (Perkmann et al., 2011). Moreover, I expect
that this relationship is influenced by academia’s past experience in U-I
interaction, which I measure with the amount of public funding received
by departments for past U-I collaboration.
The empirical analysis is based on data on U-I partnerships funded
in the UK by the EPSRC (cfr. supra) combined with information on de-
partments and universities gathered from the 2001 and 2008 UK Research
Assessment Exercises (RAE). This is an evaluation exercise carried out
approximately every 5 years that provides ratings of research quality to
be used by the UK government in funding allocation. In the empirical
analysis I estimate a model in which the amount of private funds raised
by university departments depends upon a number of department-level
characteristics, including past research quality and past experience. Control
variables for departments’ scientific disciplines and geographical location
are also included in the regression analysis in order to capture further
patterns in U-I collaboration.
According to the results of the empirical analysis, research quality
does not display a neat relationship with the volume of funding for U-I
collaboration raised from businesses partners, since a mixture of positive
and negative relationships emerge. However, the effect of quality clearly
depends on the level of departments’ past experience with the funding
agency (i.e. past public funding for U-I collaboration). In particular, for low
level of past experience, low quality departments receive higher industry
funds than top quality ones, whereas the opposite happens for high levels
of past experience.
This chapter provides new evidence on U-I knowledge transfer activities
and on their value by measuring them with the volume of industry funding
rather than simply quantifying them with the number of instances and/or
their occurrences. In addition, it focuses on the role of organisation-level de-
terminants for academic engagement by looking at university departments
and their characteristics. My results only partly support the argument that
there may be a negative relationship between research quality and academic
engagement. However, it clearly emerges that quality is interdependent
with past experience, since the latter may represent a signal for companies
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that boosts the effect of quality on the amount of resources raised from com-
panies. This is a relevant result that provides the basis for further research
on the role of academia’s past experience in U-I interaction. In fact, whereas
some evidence exists on the link between universities’ past experience and
academic engagement (Boardman, 2009; Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009;
Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007; Lee and Bozeman, 2005; Link et al., 2007),
evidence on past experience as a moderating or enhancing factor of aca-
demic quality at department level is rather scant.
VII Concluding remarks
This PhD thesis aims at providing an original and comprehensive analysis
of U-I knowledge transfer activities. It is original because it examines
in new ways the link between knowledge transfer and private as well
as public R&D and innovation activities. It makes use of original data
sources, methods and measures, and provides new empirical findings. It
is comprehensive because it considers both the determinants and impact
of U-I interaction, as well as their geographical dimension, and it looks
at these issues both from the standpoint of companies and universities.
The three chapters are indeed complementary in that they explore various
aspects of the same economic phenomenon.
The findings of the first chapter shows that there is a positive and signi-
ficant relation between quantity of inventors’ patents and the joint use of
scientific and market knowledge, whereas the results are slightly less neat
as far as patent quality is concerned because a relationship with the joint
use of scientific and market knowledge does not always hold. Moreover,
the sole use of knowledge from market sources is also significantly related
to the quality of inventors in some of the estimations. In addition, mobile
inventors benefit more than non-mobile ones from external knowledge.
These findings are in line with existing evidence suggesting that external-
to-the-firm knowledge is beneficial for firms’ patents (Schneider, 2009;
Pasquini et al., 2012), and add that quantity as well as quality of industry
inventors’ patents benefit from the recombination of various sources of
external knowledge.
The first chapter has some limitations, which include primarily the
37
fact that by administering the survey questionnaire to patent inventors
only, non-patenting inventors have been automatically excluded from
the sample. Therefore nothing is known about the knowledge sourcing
strategies of the latter group. Moreover, the cross-sectional nature of the
data does not allow to properly control for time-invariant factors, and
forward citations, although being widely acknowledged as one of the best
proxies for patent quality, have some empirical limitations. Nonetheless,
this chapter of the thesis offers some contributions to the literature, as
previously underlined, but also for policy.
In particular, the evidence of a complementarity relationship between
different sources of knowledge for the inventive process supports the
well-known argument that knowledge exchange across a wide range of
organisations - both academic and non-academic - is beneficial to the
innovation performance and the competitiveness of regions. This is partic-
ularly true with respect to universities, given that the latter often appears
to be among the less important sources of external knowledge, notably
if compared to firms (Giuri et al., 2007). In particular, since our study
addresses individual innovativeness, it is arguable that knowledge sharing
between firms’ employees and universities or public research centres, as
well as other market actors, require constant effort and investment in
establishing relationships. Policies that creates incentives for information
and idea sharing with external agents, as well as across firms’ departments,
could be beneficial to improve the overall organisational innovative process
and, in turn, the innovation performance of regions.
The findings of the second chapter of the thesis show that EPSRC U-I
collaborations funded between 1998 and 2007 have a positive impact on
participating firms’ intramural R&D expenditure per employee and share
of R&D personnel employed, three years after the beginning of U-I projects.
This result is very similar across several matching methods employed for
the selection of the control group. Moreover, these findings are in line with
those of previous empirical studies (see e.g. Becker and Peters, 2000; Becker,
2003; Lo¨o¨f and Brostro¨m, 2008), as well as with a survey based study of
ESPRC collaborations illustrated in Bruneel et al. (2009).
The results of this study should be interpreted with caution due to some
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empirical limitations. Firstly, this study focuses on the impact of only the
first project entered by a firm, hence not considering following projects;
besides, it has not investigated whether the results and their magnitude
differ across firms and time. Secondly, only UK businesses’ engagement in
U-I partnerships funded by the EPSRC is considered, but it is well known
that firms generally receive funds for research and innovation activities
from a wide range of funding agencies. Therefore, the results of the analysis
may only provide a snapshot of the whole story.
Nonetheless, the findings of the second chapter contribute to the
literature and policy debate. In particular, they support the argument
that universities are an integral part of the supply chain to firms and
are fundamental for business growth and economic prosperity. This was
particularly emphasised in the UK policy discourse from the late 1990s
onwards (Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen, 2006) and has been recently
reaffirmed by the UK Wilson Review of Business-University Collaboration
(Wilson, 2012). In particular, our result of a positive effect of U-I projects on
firms’ R&D employment is in line with Bruneel et al. (2009), who report that
firms declared collaborating with university mostly to gain the opportunity
to recruit appropriately trained staff. This leads to an important implication
for science, technology and innovation policy. It appears that firms go
to university for knowledge and technology as well as for highly skilled
people. In other words, universities are a ’top locational factor’ for firms,
not only for accessing information directly, but also - and often mainly - to
access scientific and human capital (Lawton Smith, 2007). Therefore, it is
important to create comprehensive mechanisms that promote both critical
aspects, for instance supporting the use of university research as a means
to recruit highly skilled personnel.
Finally, the findings of the third chapter, although not showing a clear
picture as far as the relationship between academic quality and U-I col-
laboration is concerned, highlight the role of university departments’ past
experience with the funding agency as a driving factor of U-I interaction.
In fact, it emerges that past experience, measured with the past volume of
EPSRC grants for U-I collaboration, is positively and significantly linked to
collaboration with industry, indicating that universities’ ability to mobilise
public resources represents a signal for businesses.
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Although the third chapter has some limitations, including the pos-
sibility that some relevant factors remained omitted in the econometric
specification and that the measure employed for research quality is an
imperfect proxy, it contributes to the literature because it explores new
aspects within the debate on U-I links, as underlined in the previous
section. Also, its findings suggests that public policy should substantially
support university knowledge transfer, especially in light of the increasing
costs of research for universities and companies, so to allow the best match
of resources by both sides. Moreover, policy-makers could consider a di-
vision of labour among universities whereby some specialize in advanced
research and others in business engagement (Perkmann et al., 2011).
The three chapters that form this thesis contribute to our understanding
of U-I knowledge transfer: to sum up, this work shows that academic
knowledge is a fundamental driver of industrial research and innovation,
especially when combined with other sources of knowledge; it shows
that knowledge transfer between university and companies has a positive
impact on firms’ R&D inputs, and, finally, that U-I interaction strongly
depends upon university’s past experience, notably with public agencies,
and existing networks of collaboration. Overall, this study highlights the
systemic and interactive nature of innovation by showing that interaction
among innovators and knowledge producers is a fundamental mechanism
to bring research and science forward.
To conclude, this thesis represents a comprehensive and original work,
whose limitations pave the way for further research on the topic of U-I
knowledge transfer activities. In particular, this thesis focuses on some
of the many channels of interaction between academia and businesses.
Channels other than patents and U-I collaboration, including both formal
(e.g. joint ventures, research contracts, faculty consulting) and informal
(e.g. informal meetings, personal exchange) should also be accounted for
in empirical analyses aimed at uncovering new aspect of U-I knowledge
transfer. Secondly, the adoption of more fine-grained geographical units
in some cases would be of help in uncovering new aspects of the role of
universities in their territories. This is both the case of publicly supported
U-I collaboration in which universities act as ‘principal investigator’, thus
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having a key territorial role for the establishment of U-I linkages, and of
patent inventors who exploit knowledge sources available outside their
company, typically in the local environment.
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Chapter 1
The role of scientific and market
knowledge in the inventive
process: Evidence from a survey of
industrial inventors
1.1 Introduction
It is nowadays well established that knowledge that is internal to the firms,
though essential, is not sufficient for the creation of innovation. In order to
successfully produce innovation and stay competitive on the market, firms
have to tap into knowledge that rests outside their boundaries (see e.g.
Allen and Cohen, 1969; Allen, 1977; Arora and Gambardella, 1990; Tijssen,
2002; Chesbrough, 2003; Krafft and Quatraro, 2011; Antonelli, 2013). Firms
exploit knowledge from different sources, hence combining knowledge
from the individuals that are part of the organisation with knowledge
from actors that are external to the firm. This is particularly relevant at
the local level, since the presence of systemic interactions in the process of
generation and diffusion of innovation are nowadays recognised as key
drivers of regional technological and economic performance (Iammarino,
2005).
External-to-the-firm knowledge is supplied by a wide range of actors
with different characteristics - hence providing different types of know-
ledge. It is possible to distinguish scientific knowledge, supplied by
scientific actors, such as universities and research centres, and technical
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knowledge, supplied by market actors - and for this reason referred to as
market knowledge - such as competitor firms, suppliers and customers (see
e.g. Von Hippel, 1988). Scientific knowledge is usually disconnected from
the market and its purpose is to foster technological progress (Fleming and
Sorenson, 2004), whereas market knowledge is more applicative because it
aims at addressing specific users’ problems and is, by definition, market-
oriented (Cohen et al., 2002). As a consequence, scientific knowledge is seen
as fundamental for the idea-generation phase of the innovation process,
whereas market knowledge is essential for the technical realisation of a
given innovation (see e.g. Utterback, 1971; Hagedoorn, 1993; Tijssen, 2002;
Aghion et al., 2008; Frenz and Ietto-Gillies, 2009).
The empirical evidence on the relation between firms’ knowledge
sourcing strategies and the creation of innovation is vast, though not fully
conclusive yet (see e.g. Arora and Gambardella, 1990, 1994; Cassiman and
Veugelers, 2006, 2007; Frenz and Ietto-Gillies, 2009). Both complementarity
and substitutability between internal and external knowledge, as well as
between different types of external knowledge (e.g. scientific and market
knowledge), have been documented. This is suggestive of the need to get a
closer look at the role of knowledge by exploiting a finer unit of analysis,
such as the individuals inside firms. Recently, the empirical literature has
looked at the role of knowledge for the individual who is responsible of the
innovative process, i.e. the inventor. By exploiting information available
from patent documents and surveys of inventors, a number of papers
uncovered some of the factors that influence the inventor’s patenting
activity, including individual characteristics (e.g. education, age, mobility)
and knowledge flows (see e.g. Giuri et al., 2007; Hoisl, 2007; Mariani and
Romanelli, 2007; Schneider, 2009). However, the relevance of different
sources of knowledge and how these combine has been rarely addressed at
the micro level of the individual inventor.
This paper focuses on the individuals that are primarily responsible
for the inventive activity inside companies, i.e. patent inventors, based on
the consideration that innovation is a product of firms and organisations
that also requires individual creativity. Patents are commonly recognised
as creative output (Huber, 1998), thus they represent the right innovative
outcome to look at. The aim of this paper is to show that scientific and mar-
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ket knowledge sources are complementary for the patenting performance
of inventors, by testing the hypothesis that the joint use of scientific and
market knowledge has a higher impact on the inventor’s performance than
the separate use of each of the two knowledge sources.
In the empirical analysis, three measures of inventors’ performance in
terms of quantity and quality of their patents will be estimated as a function
of scientific and market knowledge sourcing strategies, controlling for
individual-level characteristics as well as patent- and firm- level determin-
ants. This is also known as the productivity (or direct) approach (Cassiman
and Veugelers, 2006), which has been widely used in the management liter-
ature to analyse the relevance of knowledge flows for firms and, to the best
of our knowledge, it is one of the first attempts to apply it at the inventor’s
level. Ordinary least squares regression with robust standard errors will
be employed. Together with the baseline regressions, the breakdown by
inventor’s job mobility will be shown along with a robustness check.
The novelty of the present study lies, in the first place, in the focus on
the individual innovator as unit of analysis, instead of the firm, which
is the typical unit of analysis for these types of studies. In addition, the
paper exploits an original data source that combines a survey of industrial
inventors carried out in three European regions with patent data from the
European Patent Office (EPO). Whereas previous literature has mainly
relied on proxies for the knowledge linkages of inventors to knowledge
sources, the survey data here presented is likely to provide a better indic-
ator since inventors were explicitly asked questions on the use of different
knowledge sources in the inventive process.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 1.2 provides
a review of the literature leading to the hypothesis of the paper; in sections
1.3 and 1.4 we present the method and the data used for the empirical ana-
lysis; the empirical results are presented and commented in sections 1.5 and
1.6 and finally, the last section concludes the paper by summing up and
discussing the empirical findings.
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1.2 Literature and hypothesis development
1.2.1 The role of scientific and market knowledge for firms
External knowledge acquisition is necessary for innovation activities car-
ried out by firms, especially in the current context of market globalisation
and rapid technological change. Both the early literature on technological
change (see e.g. Allen and Cohen, 1969; Allen, 1977) and the more recent
studies on the knowledge sourcing strategies of firms (see e.g. Arora
and Gambardella, 1990, 1994; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006, 2007; Frenz
and Ietto-Gillies, 2009) assert that firms cannot rely only on their internal
resources and have to tap into knowledge outside their boundaries in order
to successfully produce innovation.
The evolutionary economics framework of technological change clearly
establishes that, due to the systemic and non-linear nature of innovation,
interactions between innovative agents represent a key mechanism for
the purpose of innovative activities (see e.g. Kline and Rosenberg, 1986;
Dosi et al., 1988; Malecki, 1997; Nelson and Winter, 2002). Accordingly,
innovation is not only influenced and determined by engineers and sci-
entists working in R&D departments or by the top management inside
companies, but also by many sources of information and actors both inside
and outside the firm, the latter including firms, knowledge providers such
as universities and research centres, public agencies and others.
Moreover, as suggested by a growing body of literature within the
economics of innovation, knowledge production can be viewed as the out-
come of a recombination process (see e.g. Kauffman, 1993; Weitzman, 1998).
Accordingly, innovation results from the combination of new knowledge
or from the combination of existing knowledge in new ways. With this
respect, knowledge is also viewed as the outcome of a collective process of
recombination of bits of knowledge that are dispersed among innovative
agents (Krafft and Quatraro, 2011), thus supporting the argument that
innovation stems from interactions between those agents.
The long-standing debate on the nature of technological change and
localised knowledge spillovers arising from that has evolved around the
distinction between market knowledge and scientific knowledge. The
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seminal works of e.g. Griliches (1987); Jaffe (1989); Adams (1990), have
uncovered the role of external knowledge from academia - often referred
to as scientific knowledge - for innovation activities of firms and, more
generally, economic development. For instance, Jaffe (1989) shows that
there is a significant effect of university research on local firms’ patenting
activity. Since then, the literature on firm-university links grew signific-
antly and complemented those seminal studies (see e.g. Mansfield, 1995;
Mansfield and Lee, 1996; Cohen et al., 2002), providing evidence of that
fact that firms exploit scientific knowledge in order to produce innovations
and stay competitive on the market. Also, firms seek and exploit technical
knowledge from external agents that are close to the market in order to
reduce the uncertainty associated with innovation (Hagedoorn, 1993),
that is, to find new ideas, or address technical issues that arise during the
innovation process. Close-to-the-market actors include customers, direct
competitors and suppliers (see e.g. Von Hippel, 1988). The literature refers
to the technical knowledge provided by these actors as market knowledge
in order to stress its source, as opposed to scientific knowledge that comes
from actors belonging to the scientific community.
The theoretical literature has further underlined how various typologies
of knowledge originating from different sources are useful at different
stages of the research process. In his seminal work on the process of
technological innovation, Utterback (1971) distinguishes three overlapping
stages through which an innovation is realised. The first is the idea-
generation phase, which results in the origination of a technical proposal
or design concept; the second is the problem-solving phase, resulting in an
invention or an original technical solution; the third stage consists of the
implementation and market introduction, culminating in the diffusion of
the innovation.1 Specifically referring to external knowledge, Utterback
states that ’The greater the degree of communication between the firm and its
environment at each stage of the process of innovation (. . . ), the more effective
the firm will be in generating, developing and implementing new technology’
(Utterback, 1971, pag. 85), thus suggesting that external knowledge is
beneficial to the whole innovation process, from the idea-generation phase,
to the implementation and commercialisation of an innovation.
1The latter is not strictly considered as part of the process of innovation since it partly
occurs outside the firm, hence the literature generally considers the first two (overlapping)
phases as the main ones (Weck and Blomqvist, 2008).
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Similarly, Machlup (1962) provides a very interesting discussion of
the flows of ideas through four sequential stages: research, invention,
development and application. In this classification, scientific knowledge
is listed among the intangible inputs of the initial research and invention
stages, as well as the development phase, and technology is among the
intangibles that are fundamental to the invention and development stages.
Finally, of great importance to the application stage is what Machlup (1962)
refers to as ‘business acumen’ and ‘enterprise (venturing)’.
In addition, a recent theoretical contribution investigating the advant-
ages and disadvantages of academic and private research, shows that
academia is most useful in the early stages of the research process, whereas
the private sector tends be more useful in the later stages (Aghion et al.,
2008). The reasons lie behind the different systems of incentives within
academia and within firms. Academia, because of its commitment to
leaving creative controls in the hands of scientists, can be indispensable
for early stage research aimed at fostering new research lines; on the other
hand, the private sector’s focus on higher payoff activities makes it more
useful for later-stage research, aimed at producing profitable innovations
and introducing them to the market. Therefore, the literature suggests that
external knowledge is fundamental to the innovation process, but also that
different sources of knowledge must be accounted for, because potentially
having different effects on the different stages of the innovation process.
Besides, the empirical literature shows that firms adopt and use
knowledge from different sources, often combining internal and external
knowledge acquisition strategies (see e.g. Arora and Gambardella, 1990,
1994; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998). In this respect, the seminal work of
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) on the concept of absorptive capacity, defined
as the capacity of a firm to recognize, assimilate and exploit external know-
ledge, particularly stresses the co-existence of different types of knowledge
inputs and their contribution to the firm’s innovative activities.
Among others, Cassiman and Veugelers (2006) show that internal R&D
and external knowledge acquisition are complementary innovation activit-
ies, while the same authors finds evidence of substitution effect between
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embodied and disembodied technology acquisition strategies (Cassiman
and Veugelers, 2007). Criscuolo et al. (2005) and Crespi et al. (2008) use
firm-level data and estimate a knowledge production function to study the
contribution of different knowledge flows to firm-level productivity: the
former show that globally engaged firms innovate more thanks to the intra-
firm worldwide pool of information as well as from suppliers, customers
and universities, whereas the latter particularly stress the importance of cli-
ents, among the knowledge flows. Although existing evidence is mixed, it
seems clear that external knowledge contributes to the innovation process
and that different typologies of knowledge flowing from a wide range of
different actors matter.
1.2.2 The role of scientific and market knowledge for in-
ventors
The existing evidence on the the role of external knowledge for innova-
tion mainly takes the firm and its innovative activities (e.g. commercial
activities, inventions, sales of innovative products) as the unit of analysis.
However, the attention has recently moved down to a finer level of analysis,
that is the individual inventor inside the firm (see e.g. Giuri et al., 2007;
Hoisl, 2007; Mariani and Romanelli, 2007; Weck and Blomqvist, 2008;
Schneider, 2009; Pasquini et al., 2012). The interest in the inventor as the
main unit of analysis is justified by the fact that innovation is not simply the
product of firms and organisations. It ultimately requires individual effort
and creativity and patents are, indeed, commonly recognised as creative
output (Huber, 1998). Therefore, individual inventors arguably represent
an interesting unit of observation to consider in order to inquire into firms’
innovation activities. Moreover, the empirical evidence about university
inventors is vast, partly because of a large amount of information publicly
available, whereas evidence on industrial inventors is rather limited and
not conclusive yet.
Extant research confirms that patent productivity among private invent-
ors is skewed, similarly to that of academic inventors - i.e. few inventors
produce a high number of innovations whereas the vast majority display
a low invention rate - but, because of the lack of information at individual
level, it is hard to identify the reasons behind this behaviour (Mariani and
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Romanelli, 2007; Menon, 2011). Furthermore, it has been shown that both
inventor’s factors and characteristics of the employers affect the inventor’s
performance (Giuri et al., 2007).
As mentioned above, more recently there have been attempts to address
the role of knowledge flows for inventors. Previous studies show that
scientific sources of knowledge are often the least important for inventors
(and more generally, for firms) and market sources of knowledge are
instead the most important ones (Eurostat, 2007; Giuri et al., 2007). This
is not surprising, since the distance between purely scientific knowledge
and technical knowledge stemming from market channels is quite large.
Notwithstanding, only recently the interdependence of the two for the
inventive process has been investigated in the literature. On the one
hand, it has been shown that scientific and market sources of knowledge
display a subadditive relationship for the monetary value of the inventions
(Schneider, 2009). On the other hand, it has been uncovered a positive and
significant contribution of external-to-the-firm knowledge to the probab-
ility that a patent is commercialised (Pasquini et al., 2012). Moreover, a
qualitative case study on the inter-organisational relationships developed
by inventors within a company, shows that patent competitiveness benefits
more from buyer-seller relationships than from R&D consortia (Weck and
Blomqvist, 2008).
The evidence on the role of knowledge for industrial inventors and their
performance is, therefore, still scant and not yet conclusive. In addition, the
existing studies, though accounting for the inventors’ use of knowledge,
exploits patents as the ultimate outcome measure, instead of the inventor.
The present study intends to fill these gaps by focusing on the relationship
between industrial inventors’ knowledge sourcing strategy and their pat-
enting activity. In order to shed new light on the role of different knowledge
sourcing strategies for inventors’ performance, the research question that
will be addressed in this paper is ’Do industrial inventors that use various
sources of knowledge in their inventive activity display higher performances that
those who do not?’. In other words, we will ask whether inventors who
combine the use of both scientific and market sources of knowledge display
a higher number of patents and produce higher quality inventions than
inventors who use only one or none of them.
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As previous studies suggest, scientific and market knowledge produce
different effects on the inventive process, due to their very different nature.
Scientific knowledge is usually disconnected from the market and its
purpose is to foster technological progress (Fleming and Sorenson, 2004),
whereas market knowledge is more applicative, aims at addressing specific
users’ problems and is, by definition, market-oriented (Cohen et al., 2002).
These differences are evocative of very different impacts on the inventors’
innovation activity, suggesting that inventors who merely use scientific
knowledge might have radical ideas but create innovations that are far from
the market or hard to commercialise, while inventors who prefer market
knowledge might not focus on breakthrough innovation but instead create
close-to-the-market and more profitable innovations. In reality, inventors
often combine these sources of knowledge, which suggests that there could
be a complementarity relationship between the two and this might have
consequences on the inventors’ performance.
In line with the discussion proposed earlier in this paper on how
knowledge originating from different sources is useful at different stages
of the research process (Machlup, 1962; Utterback, 1971; Aghion et al.,
2008), we expect that inventors drawing upon a higher number of external
knowledge sources display a better performance than inventors who do
not. Hence, we argue that knowledge produced in and sourced from
science-related channels (university and public research centres) display
a complementarity relationship with knowledge from market-related
actors (suppliers, customers, competitors, consultants) for the inventors’
performance in terms of patent count and patent quality. The argument
is that, by combining these two types of knowledge, inventors exploit
different characteristics of the latter that fulfill different needs throughout
the inventive process: in other words, inventors would be merging the tech-
nological and innovative potential that derives from scientific knowledge
with the market potential that derives from market knowledge (Pasquini
et al., 2012). Hence, we put forward the following hypothesis:
Hp: The joint use of scientific knowledge and market knowledge has a higher
impact on the inventors’ performance than the separate use of each of the two
knowledge sources.
50
In order to test this hypothesis, the inventors’ knowledge sourcing
strategies will be measured and used as explanatory variables for the in-
ventors’ patenting activity, by exploiting the so-called productivity ap-
proach (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). In the next section the data sources
are first described, followed by the empirical strategy and the construction
of the variables employed in the analysis, along with their descriptive stat-
istics.
1.3 Data and method
1.3.1 The Survey of inventors and the EPO data
This paper makes use of a survey of industrial inventors that has been
carried out under the umbrella of a European Commission Seventh Frame-
work Program funded project (PICK-ME2), with the aim of exploring the
inventive process inside regions. The motivations for this survey primarily
stem from the need to shed new light on the the drivers of inventive activit-
ies inside companies within territories. In fact, over the last two decades it
became increasingly accepted in economic literature as well among policy
makers that countries’ competitiveness and innovative performances are
especially determined at the local levels, primarily at the regional level
(OECD, 2001; Doloreux and Parto, 2004). Since then, it has been extensively
documented that the localised network of actors and institutions in the
public and private sectors facilitates innovation (Iammarino, 2005).
Indeed, as underlined in the introductory chapter of the thesis, the
theoretical approaches that developed from the 1980s onwards on the basis
of the interactive and non-linear definition innovation - e.g. Systems of
Innovation and Triple Helix Models (see e.g. Freeman, 1987; Lundvall, 1988,
1992; Nelson, 1993; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1993; Edquist, 1997; Leydesdorff
and Etzkowitz, 1996, 1998; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1997, 2000) - were
soon extended to the regional level. This is particularly the case of Regional
Systems of Innovation (see e.g. Autio, 1998; Braczyk et al., 1998; Cooke,
2001; Asheim and Isaksen, 2002; Asheim et al., 2011), defined as networks
of actors and institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities
2Grant agreement n. SSH-CT-2010-266959.
51
and interactions generate and diffuse new technologies, within and outside
the region.
The survey of inventors here presented was administered between
2011 and 2012 in three European regions, namely, Catalonia (Spain),
East and West Midlands (United Kingdom) and Piedmont (Italy), with
the objective of obtaining new insights about the demand of knowledge
expressed by the actors directly involved in the innovative process inside
their regional systems of innovation. In addition, the survey aimed at
gathering individual-level information that are not usually available in
patent documents, such as their age, gender, education and occupation. In
the empirical analysis of this paper, the final dataset consists of the sur-
vey data combined with patent data from the European Patent Office (EPO).
The survey questionnaire was sent to industrial inventors who filed one
or more patent applications between 2000 and 2006 and whose residential
address was in one of those regions. Information on the inventors’ names
and home address was extracted from the CRIOS-Bocconi Patstat database.3
The selection of regions was based on a number of factors and compar-
ability issues. On the one hand, the aim was to choose non-core regional
innovation systems, particularly non-capital regions which, because of
the presence of national research institutions and/or other core research
organisations, would display peculiar characteristics in terms of knowledge
linkages. Indeed, according to the 2012 and 2009 European Commission
Regional Innovation Scoreboards, none of the regions in our sample
was part of the group showing the highest innovation performance (i.e.
‘high innovators’ or ‘innovation leaders’) in the years pre-2006.4 On the
other hand, regions displaying similar innovation performances were
to be chosen; in fact, as of 2006, the three regions were categorised in
the same group in terms of innovation performance, namely, ‘average to
3The EPO Patstat (PATent STATistical) database is a patent statistics raw database, held
by the EPO and developed in cooperation with the World Intellectual Property Organisa-
tion (WIPO), the OECD and Eurostat. A clean version of the raw data was provided by
CRIOS-Bocconi (http://ricercaweb.unibocconi.it/criospatstatdb/).
4http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/
ris-2012_en.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/ris-2009_
en.pdf
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medium-high innovators’ or ‘innovation followers’ on the basis of several
indicators. The latter include regional enabling factors (education level and
public R&D expenditure), firm activities (business investments in R&D,
knowledge linkages in entrepreneurship, intellectual assets), and outputs
(product/process/organisational business innovation, innovative sales,
R&D employment). Innovation followers are characterised by a balanced
performance structure in terms of all indicators.5
The survey includes a question on the use of different sources of know-
ledge, split into internal sources (colleagues inside the firm and other busi-
ness unites/departments) and external sources, i.e. customers, competit-
ors, suppliers, consultancy, universities and public research centres. The
question asks to the inventor to rank the relevance of each source from 0
(not used) to 4 (very important). The sample of respondents includes 225
inventors from Catalonia (response rate 14%), 117 inventors from the Mid-
lands (response rate 13%) and 533 inventors from Piedmont (response rate
45%). These have been matched to the CRIOS-Bocconi Patstat database via
inventor’s identifier. It has been possible to retrieve all patent information
for each inventor, including the number of patent applications, the status
of each application - whether a patent has been granted or not -, patent
technological classes (reclassified into 7 macro-classes), number of forward
citations of each patent, assignee of the patents (i.e. the owner).
1.3.2 Empirical strategy
The estimation strategy follows the so-called productivity (or direct)
approach (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006), in which measures of inventors’
patenting activity are estimated as a function of the inventors’ knowledge
sourcing strategies, as well as a number of control variables to account for
individual characteristics, patent features and firm factors. The knowledge
sourcing strategies have been created as exclusive dummies that indicate
whether inventors declared using only scientific knowledge or only market
knowledge, or both, or none of them. The model will be estimated with
ordinary least squared regressions with robust standard errors, to account
for potential heteroskedasticity of the error terms (Angrist and Pischke,
2008).
5Ibid.
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In order to test our hypothesis we estimate a model in which the depend-
ent variables (Yi) - fully explained in the next section - lNpat (log of number
of patent applications per inventor), Meanfcc (average quality of inventions
per inventor) and Maxfcc (quality of the best inventions per inventor), are
regressed on the inventors’ knowledge strategies plus a vector of control
variables (Xi):
Yi = α+ β1scionlyi + β2mktonlyi + β3scimkti + γXi + ei (1.1)
Where (1) scionly is a dummy variable taking value 1 for inventors
who use only scientific knowledge, (2) mktonly is a dummy variable taking
value 1 for inventors who use only market knowledge, (3) scimkt is a
dummy variable taking value 1 for inventors who use both scientific and
market knowledge, and (4) noscimkt, excluded from the regression to avoid
multicollinearity, takes value 1 for inventors who do not use any external
source of knowledge.
The econometric analysis will be performed on the full sample as well
as on the subsamples of mobile and non-mobile inventors. In addition, a
robustness check for the quality measure will be carried out, in which a
weighted measure of quality will be used.
1.4 Measures
1.4.1 Dependent variables
1.4.1.1 Inventors’ patent count
The variables of interests for the analysis are quantity and quality of inven-
tions at inventor’s level. In the patent literature, patent count is usually
used as a measure of inventor’s production of patents (see e.g. Hoisl,
2007; Mariani and Romanelli, 2007). Patents suffer from one limitation
with this respect, that is, they do not capture non-patented inventions.6
6More generally, the measurement of innovation using patent data suffers from at least
three limitations, as pointed out by De Rassenfosse et al. (2014): firstly, not all inventions
are patentable and not all patentable inventions are patented; secondly, the value of pat-
ents varies widely and the majority of patents is worthless; thirdly, the common practice to
count patents at a single patent office often results in selection bias, since applicants have
the option of filing patents anywhere in the world. The latter may particularly apply to
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By accounting only for inventions that successfully reached the market,
one neglects the relevance of other inventions whose patent applications
are still under evaluation by the EPO, but that nonetheless represent the
outcome of innovative activity. Since the EPO dataset keeps track of all
patent applications, it is possible to mitigate this bias by taking into account
both granted patent and patent applications. The latter capture inventions
that have the potential to be patented and thus have been sent out for
application at the EPO, but, at present, have not been granted a patent (yet).
Therefore, we include in the patent count measure (Npat, used in log in the
regression) both patent applications and granted patents between 2000 and
2006.
Due to the short time span, only a truncated measure of inventors’ patent
count can be observed. As a consequence, we would be treating inventors
who started patenting before 2000 the same as inventors who start later or
after 2000, hence not taking into account the past patenting activity (if any).
This bias, known as truncation bias, can be mitigated by controlling for the
age of inventors and for the year in which each inventor enters the sample.
In particular, the aim of the latter control is to compare inventors with those
that are part of the same cohort, namely those who ’start’ patenting in the
same year.
1.4.1.2 Quality of inventions
The second variable of interest is the quality of each inventor’s patents and
is measured with the forward citations received by each patent. Each patent
has to cite the prior art on which it builds on, and the forward citations
count is the number of times the patent is cited by other patents after it has
been granted.7 Previous empirical evidence shows that forward citations
are highly correlated with the value of inventions (see e.g. Trajtenberg,
1990; Harhoff et al., 1999; Hall et al., 2001; Lanjouw and Schankerman,
2004; Hall et al., 2005). Therefore, the more forward citations a patent
receives, the higher is the quality of the patent. This relationship relies on
our sample of EPO patents, since in Europe two overlapping patent offices coexist: applic-
ants may file patents directly at their national patent office or they may take the European
route by filing patents at the European Patent Office (EPO). Moreover, they may file their
patents at other jurisdictions, including the World Intellectual Property Office (WIPO), the
US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and the Japan Patent Office (JPO).
7Forward citations differ from backward citations, which are the past patents cited in
patent applications.
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the assumption that a highly cited patent represents an important invention
that will constitute relevant prior art for future patents. Although forward
citations may represent an imperfect measure, due to a number of draw-
backs including truncation, self-citations, variation across technological
classes (Hall et al., 2001), they are still considered a valuable proxy for
the quality of a given patent because they mirror its technological value
(Nagaoka et al., 2010).
Based on the number of forward citations received by each inventor’s
patents, two measures of quality are created. Following inter alia Hoisl
(2007) and Mariani and Romanelli (2007), in order to measure the patent
quality at inventor’s level, we use the average number of forward citations
across each inventor’s patent during 2000-2006 and the highest number of
forward citations among each inventor’s patents in the same period. The
former (Meanfcc) measures the average quality of inventors, whereas the
second (Maxfcc) accounts for the ‘best’ invention among those produced by
each inventor and thus measures the highest technological success of the
inventor during the time span under consideration.8
Table 1.1 summarises the descriptive statistics of the dependent vari-
ables in the whole sample as well as split by region of residence. The
variables are Npat (number of patent applications)9, Meanfcc (average
number of forward citations) and Maxfcc (highest number of forward
citations).
The average number of patent applications per head in the whole
sample of 875 inventors is 1.82. In line with previous evidence (Giuri et al.,
2007; Menon, 2011), the variable is highly skewed, since the maximum
number of patent applications per head is 27. The histogram in figure
1.1 shows the distribution of this variable: 67% of inventors applied for
a patent only once between 2000 and 2006, while only 6% of the sample
8Patent citations take time and only a small number of citations occur for younger pat-
ents. In order to deal with this problem, usually only the number of forward citations
received within 5 years (or so) from the publication is taken into account, based on the
evidence that more than 50% of citations received occur within this period (Nagaoka et al.,
2010). However, because of the characteristics of our data, applying this correction would
lead to a very small sample of observations.
9This variable will be used in log in the regression. It is reported in levels in in order to
provide an easily readable measure of how many patents each inventor produces.
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did it more than five times. From these figures it could be argued that
the majority of inventors in the sample are occasional inventors, because
patenting only once. However, because of the short time span under
analysis, this hypothesis cannot be tested. The average number of patent
applications in Catalonia and the Midlands is the same (1.57) and below
the average, while it is above the average (1.98) in Piedmont.
Looking at the quality measures, the average number of forward
citations across each inventor’s patents is 2.21 and, similarly to the absolute
number of patent applications, this variable is highly skewed. Turning on
the inventions with the highest number of citations, 3.21 is the average,
meaning that, on average, the best invention has been cited 3.21 times by
other patents. However, this figure goes up to 114, hence showing that
there is a high variation across inventors. Finally, Piedmont’s inventors
show higher performances than Catalonia and the Midlands’ inventors in
terms of both mean citations and highest number of citations, as it was the
case for the number of patents applications.
The differences in the performance of inventors located in Piedmont
with respect to those located in Catalonia and the Midlands confirms over-
all differentials in innovation performance among these regions. As of
2007, EPO patent applications per billion of regional gross domestic product
amount to 0.53 in Piedmont, 0.46 in Catalonia, and 0.49 and 0.48 in East and
West Midlands respectively.10
1.4.2 Explanatory variables
1.4.2.1 Knowledge sources
In order to build the independent variables we use one question of the
survey that asks to the inventors to rank the importance of a number
of sources of knowledge, from 0 (not applicable because not used) to 4
(very important). The question specifically states ‘Please indicate whether
interactions with any of the following actors have been important to get relevant
information and knowledge for the work related to your patenting activity during
the period 2000-2006’. Both internal and external-to-the-firm actors are listed.
10http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/
ris-2012_en.pdf
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However, the focus of this paper is on the role of external organisations,
which are (as listed in the question): suppliers, clients and customers,
competitors and consultancy/private R&D laboratories; universities and
public research centres (see table 1.2).
Firstly, from the respondents’ answers, we build a measure of the use
of each knowledge source, hence six dummies indicating that the inventor
used each given source if she answered 1 to 4, and not used it if she
answered 0. In order to create the scientific and market knowledge meas-
ures, universities and public research centres are aggregated under the cat-
egory ’scientific knowledge’ and all the others under the category ’market
knowledge’. Therefore, the dummy variable that indicates whether the in-
ventor used scientific knowledge (SCIKnow) has value 1 if she used either
knowledge from universities or from public research centres (or both), while
the variable indicating the use of market knowledge (MKTKnow) takes value
1 if the inventor used at least one (or more) of the market sources. Table 1.3
shows the descriptive statistics of each knowledge source, as well as their
aggregation into scientific and market sources. The share of inventors who
used at least one scientific source is 62% and the correlation between the
use of universities and that of public research centres is quite high, 0.62,
supporting their aggregation. Almost every inventor used at least one of
the market sources (91%), although it ranges from 54% of inventors exploit-
ing knowledge from consultants to 71% of inventors using knowledge from
clients and customers. As for the correlation among them, it is worth no-
ticing that the figures are all above 0.30, with the highest being the correl-
ation between knowledge from suppliers and knowledge from customers
(0.43). Finally, the correlation between scientific knowledge and market
knowledge is 0.2 and it is significant at the 5% level, suggesting that there is
a positive link between the two.
1.4.2.2 Inventors’ knowledge sourcing strategies
In order to apply our chosen methodology, inventors’ knowledge sourcing
strategies have been derived from the above mentioned knowledge categor-
ies for scientific and market sources. Hence, we create the following mutu-
ally exclusive dummies:
1. scionly: taking value 1 for inventors who use only scientific knowledge
(SCIKnow=1 and MKTKnow=0);
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2. mktonly: taking value 1 for inventors who use only market knowledge
(SCIKnow=0 and MKTKnow=1);
3. scimkt: taking value 1 for inventors who use both scientific and market
knowledge (SCIKnow=1 and MKTKnow=1);
4. noscimkt: taking value 1 for inventors who use none of them
(SCIKnow=0 and MKTKnow=0).
By using this approach we intend to compare the performance of
inventors who used both scientific and market knowledge, with that of
inventors who used only scientific or market knowledge or none of them.
Table 1.4 shows the frequencies of the exclusive dummies along with their
means and correlation with the dependent variables, for each sub-group of
inventors.
The most widespread strategy is that of both using scientific and mar-
ket knowledge sources (59% of inventors), followed by the use of market
sources only (31.25%). Very few inventors used only scientific sources and
none of the knowledge sources (3.06% and 6.65% respectively). The break-
down of the dependent variables by knowledge sourcing strategy shows
that inventors using both scientific and market knowledge have the highest
performance in terms of number of patent applications (Npat) (1.98), and
best invention (Maxfcc) (3.51). Inventors who only use market sources have
the highest number of average citations across patents (2.42), therefore the
highest average quality of inventions (Meanfcc). The groups of inventors
using only scientific knowledge and none of the sources have the lowest
performance. These figures, although only descriptive, seems to tell that
inventors who combine the two sources of knowledge benefit more than
inventors who do not combine them, therefore suggesting the existence of
a complementarity relationship between scientific and market knowledge.
The correlation values shows that there is a positive - although weak - cor-
relation between the joint use of scientific and market knowledge and the
performance measures. Inventors’ quality is also positively correlated with
the use of market knowledge.
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1.4.3 Control variables
Control variables have been created at inventors’ level. These are: indi-
vidual characteristics derived from the survey, patent features extracted
from the patent data, and employer information provided by the inventors
in the survey responses. As for individual characteristics, we control for
inventor’s gender, age and age squared, assuming that age might display
a quadratic relationship with inventor’s performance, and education level,
by using 4 dummies indicating the highest education level attained by
the inventors (Secondary school degree, Bachelor degree, Master degree,
Doctoral studies). Furthermore, from the survey it was possible to extract
information on inventors’ mobility between jobs and job position inside
the firm (e.g. R&D department, sales, marketing, etc.). We also control
for whether the inventor retired during the period under analysis. Finally,
dummies for inventors’ region of residence are introduced. These allow
to control for region specific factors that may affect inventors’ patenting
performance, including the presence and reputation of local universities
and research centers, as well as local government institutions and the
regional industrial structure. As for patent characteristics, we control for
whether inventors ever realised patents jointly with other inventors, and
for the share of foreign-owned patents, calculated as the share of patents
whose owner is not located in the inventors’ country of residence. Both
variables measures the inventors ’openness’ towards external knowledge
(Hoisl, 2007).
In order to mitigate the truncation bias arising from using a short time
span, we control for the year in which each inventor enters the sample.
To do so we use the year indicated in the priority date of the first patent
application (for each inventor) during the time frame under investigation.
The priority date is the date of filing of an earlier (or the first) application for
which priority is claimed. The aim of this control is to compare inventors
that are part of the same cohort, namely those who start patenting in the
same year. Finally, in order to account for variation across technological
classes, we control for seven patent technological macro classes, follow-
ing the reclassification of the International Patent Classification system
developed by the french Observatoire des Sciences et des Techniques
(OST). These are Electrical Engineering and Electronics (ost1), Instruments
(ost2), Chemicals and Materials (ost3), Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology
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(ost4), Industrial Processes (ost5), Mechanical Engineering, Machines and
Transport (ost6), and Civil Engineering and Consumer goods (ost7).
As for employer’s characteristics, we control for the international
exposure of the most recent employer listed by the inventor, with a dummy
that equals one if it is a multinational company.11 This variable accounts
for firms’ ’openness’, assuming that more internationalised firms also tend
to co-operate with external actors and hence widen the pool of knowledge
where inventors can tap into. We also include firm fixed effects to control
for the fact that some firms employ more than one inventor in our sample.
A set of firm dummies has been hence created, including both those that
employ only one inventor and those that employ more than one of them.
By including these dummies, we aim at isolating unobservable drivers of
inventors’ performance that are explained by employers’ characteristics.
The average age of inventors in the sample (table 1.512) is 44 years old,
40% of them have a Bachelor Degree, while 18% also hold a PhD. Quite a
large share of inventors (68%) changed job at least once during the period
2000-2006 and around 44% of the whole sample work in R&D-related job
positions inside the firm. As for their patenting behaviour, most of them
(70%) have co-invented at least one of their patents. On average, 16% of an
inventor’s patents is owned by an organisation located abroad with respect
to the inventor’s country of residence. Furthermore, the majority of invent-
ors apply for patents classified in the technological classes of mechanical
engineering (37%) and electrical engineering (28%), while pharmaceutical
has the lowest frequency of patents applied for (11%). Finally, almost half
of the inventors are employed by a multinational firm and around half of
the inventors work in a firm where at least another inventor of the sample is
employed too. The cross tabulation of the variables mne and co-employment
shows that 38% of the inventors that are co-workers are employed by a mul-
tinational company.
11This variable has been created by checking companies’ webpages and/or their ac-
counts. For every company, we checked whether it has any facilities and other assets in at
least one country other than its home country.
12The figures in table 1.5 are based on a sample of 710 observations, corresponding to
the sample used in the regressions. Descriptive statistics for the full sample are provided
in table 1.12 in the Appendix. In addition, the full list of variables used in the regression
analysis is provided in the Appendix as well (table 1.13).
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1.5 Results
1.5.1 Inventors’ performance: quantity of patents
Table 1.6 shows the results of the OLS regression of inventors’ patent count,
measured as the number of patent applications filed between 2000 and
2006 (in log).13 The joint use of scientific and market knowledge (scimkt)
is always positive and significant as well as stable in magnitude across
different estimations, while the sole use of scientific (scionly) or market
(mktonly) knowledge is never significant. This indicates that inventors
who jointly use knowledge from market sources and from university or
research centres have a higher number of patent applications than those
who do not use any of them (the baseline is noscimkt) as well as than
those who use only market or scientific knowledge. This suggests that,
as hypothesised, inventors performing better are those who combine into
their inventions the technological and scientific potential of knowledge
sourced from university and research centres with the market potential of
knowledge coming from market actors.
Along with inventors’ knowledge sourcing strategies, their individual
characteristics are first introduced (column (1)), followed by dummies for
the region of residence, job characteristics and year dummies (column
(2)); then patent features are added (column (3)) and finally firm factors -
dummy for MNEs and firm dummies - are controlled for (column (4)). The
coefficient of age has the expected positive sign and is significant at 10%
level, showing that older inventors have more patents, but this disappears
once we introduce year dummies to control for when inventors started
patenting. Inventors with a PhD degree patent less (coefficient negative
and significant at 5% level in column (1)) than inventors who just hold a
high school diploma (baseline), which could be explained by the fact that
the latter group enters the job market right after secondary education (or
most likely after the university degree), hence start patenting earlier, but
this relationship disappears once other factors are controlled for.
13We report the results of this model estimated through a count data regression (table
1.14 in the Appendix). Due to over-dispersion of the variable Npat (mean 1.82 and variance
4.14) we estimate a negative binomial regression: the results are very similar to those ob-
tained via OLS, particularly with respect to the relationship between scimkt and the number
of patents per inventor, with the only exception of Model (4), where the coefficient of scimkt
is not significant.
62
The dummy for co-inventorship is always significant, showing that
inventors who cooperate with other inventors (which are in fact the vast
majority - 70% of the sample) are also more productive. Finally, the region
dummies tell that, with respect to the baseline category (inventors from
Piedmont), Catalan inventors display a significantly lower performance in
every estimated model, except for the last one. However, this is not the case
for inventors from the Midlands. Therefore, ceteris paribus, inventors from
Piedmont display the highest productivity in terms of number of patent
applications.
The R squared in column (4) rises up to 0.7 once the firm dummies are
introduced in the regression. These help controlling for firms’ unobservable
factors that it is not otherwise possible to control for, and show that employ-
ers’ characteristics might play a role in individual decisions. Hence, it can
be argued that inventors’ production of patents is related to some extent to
firms’ decisions aside individuals’ ones. However, it should be noted that
the joint use of scientific and market knowledge - although less significant
than in the other estimations - still represents a driving factor of patenting
activity, with a coefficient for scimkt of 0.198, corresponding to an increase in
the number of patents per inventor by 21.8%.14 In conclusion, it can be said
that the joint use of scientific knowledge and market knowledge systemat-
ically shows a positive relationship with the number of inventors’ patent
applications, and that it is also quite stable when controlling for individual
characteristics, patent features and firm factors.
1.5.2 Inventors’ performance: average quality and top in-
vention
Table 1.7 displays the OLS regression results for inventors’ quality, meas-
ured as the average number of citations across each inventor’s patents -
Meanfcc - (columns (1) to (4)) and the highest number of citations per patent
obtained by each inventor - Maxfcc - (column (5) to (8)). The coefficient
for the joint use of scientific and market knowledge (scimkt) is positive
and significant until we do not control for employers’ factors. In fact, the
14The interpretation of the estimated coefficient of a dummy variable in a log-linear
regression is calculated by taking the anti-log of the coefficient and subtracting 1 to that, so
to find the estimated % change in the outcome variable (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980).
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introduction of a control for MNEs and the firm dummies soaks up part of
the explanatory power (apart for the coefficient for co-inventor that is still
positively and significantly correlated to the highest number of citations
received). Therefore, once controlling for firm factors, the hypothesis of
complementarity between scientific and market sources seems to have
no support. In addition, the coefficient for scimkt is very similar to that
for mktonly, indicating that the joint use of different knowledge sources
is not systematically better than the separate use of market knowledge
for the quality of inventions. This is suggestive of the fact that inventors’
interactions with market actors (i.e. other firms mainly) only may have a
positive impact on the quality of the inventions, whereas this was not the
case for the quantity of patents applied for.
As for inventors’ characteristics, it is worth noticing the existence of
an inverted-U shape relationship between age of inventors and quality of
their inventions: in columns (1) and (5) the coefficient of age is positive and
significant and that of age squared (agesq) is negative and significant, both
at 5% level, but it loses significance once other factors are controlled for. As
the inventors grow older, they tend to produce inventions of higher quality,
but after a threshold the relationship becomes negative, meaning that
after a certain age (around 45 years old for both average quality and best
invention), the quality of inventions decreases. This is in line with previous
evidence showing that scientists’ productivity may first increase and then
decline with age (Mariani and Romanelli, 2007), following scientists’ career
path.
As expected, inventors working in an R&D department, rather than in
other departments (e.g. marketing or sales), produce inventions of higher
quality, since the coefficient of R&Djob is positive and significant in model
(2), (3), (6) and (7). Similarly to the case of inventors’ patent count, the
dummy variable for co-inventors has a positive and significant coefficient
in almost every model, but it is particularly important for the quality of
the best invention. This could be explained by the fact that working in
teams of inventors, rather than working alone, increases the chances to
develop a technological hit as well as the quality of the latter. Finally, the
region dummies are never significant, thus nothing can be argued about
differentials in the quality of inventions of inventors located in different
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regions.
The knowledge variables lose any significance in models (4) and (8) once
firm factors are accounted for, which brings to the argument that there
might be some firms’ unobservable factors that drive inventors’ perform-
ance, as well as their decision to use any external source of knowledge. To
sum up, there is a positive relationship between the joint use of different
sources of knowledge and inventor’s quality but this is less neat than it was
for inventors’ number of patents. This is partly because the use of know-
ledge from market channels is almost equally relevant for the quality of in-
ventions, and it is particularly true when employers’ factors are accounted
for.
1.5.3 Inventors’ mobility and the use of scientific and mar-
ket knowledge
The literature on inventors’ performance has underlined that one of the
influencing factors of inventors’ patenting activity is their job mobility
pattern. Trajtenberg (2005) is among the first scholars who studied the
link between mobility and productivity and shows that the former has a
positive impact on innovative output. In particular, mobile inventors have
more valuable patents, that is, more cited patents. Hoisl (2007) studies
a sample of German inventors and shows that those who change job are
more productive than those who do not, although increases in productivity
decrease the probability of observing a move. Since 67.4% of inventors in
our sample changed job at least once during the years 2000-06, it is inter-
esting to look for any heterogeneity of the results across the two groups of
mobile and non-mobile inventors. In order to do so, the sample of inventors
is split into mobile and non-mobile inventors, by exploiting the dummy
jobmobility, that has been constructed from the information provided by the
survey respondents. Mobile inventors are those who moved from one job
to another between 2000 and 2006. Non-mobile inventors are those who
did not change job in 2000-2006 (but may have done so earlier or later). The
decision to observe mobility in this time frame is motivated by the fact that
the key variables of interests are observed during that time period.
Table 1.8 shows the OLS results obtained by regressing inventors’ patent
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count (lNpat) against their knowledge sourcing strategies, their individual
characteristics and patent factors, for the subsample of mobile inventors
(67% of the sample) in the left panel and for non-mobile inventors (33%
of the sample) in the right panel. Table 1.9 displays the same regressions
results but on the measures of quality, both average forward citations
(Meanfcc) and highest number of citations (Maxfcc). In both tables only the
coefficients for the knowledge sourcing strategies are reported.15
While there is not a striking difference between mobile and non-mobile
inventors in terms of their number of patent applications (the coefficients
for scimkt are very similar, though slightly higher for non-mobile inventors),
the same cannot be said for the quality of their inventions, which instead
displays some variation across the two sub-samples. In particular, the
coefficients for the knowledge sourcing strategies in the sub-sample of
non-mobile inventors are never significant. If we consider job mobility
as a proxy for openness, this result can be interpreted as that non-mobile
inventors are less open to external knowledge and when they use it, this
does not impact the quality of their inventions.
Instead, the joint use of scientific and market knowledge is positively
and significantly related to both average quality of inventions and quality
of the best inventions for mobile inventors. Mobile inventors may have de-
veloped connections with other (external) organisations due to their job ex-
perience and have, hence, the ability to exploit external knowledge, which,
in turns improves the quality of their inventions.
1.6 Robustness check for the quality of inventors
The empirical results discussed so far suggest that inventors’ quality
display more variation than quantity with respect to the use of external-
to-the-firm sources of knowledge. It is thus worth it to check whether the
results hold, by carrying out a robustness check. As mentioned before,
the employment of the number of forward citations received by a patent,
though a widely used proxy for inventors and inventions’ quality, raises
a number of concerns with respect to its reliability. Among other things,
15In tables 1.8 and 1.9 firm dummies are never introduced due to the small number of
observations, especially in the sub-sample of non-mobile inventors.
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different technological classes might display quite large differences in
terms of number of inventions and number of forward citations received
by patents (see e.g. Hall et al., 2001). As shown in figure 1.2, there is quite
a high variation in the total number of forward citations per technological
class, ranging from around 4000 citations received by patents classified
into civil engineering to more than 9000 citations received by patents
into mechanical engineering. The mean value (number of total citations
weighted for the number of patents) varies much less, with the most cited
patents into chemicals (3) and the lowest into civil engineering (1.6). From
figure 1.3 it is possible to notice that there is even more variation across
both regions and technological classes if we consider the mean number of
forward citations. In fact, it appears that citations to patents, especially
in electrical engineering (ost1), instruments (ost2), chemicals (ost3) and
pharmaceuticals (ost4), display quite a high variation across regions, with
the Midlands having the highest figures. As far as intra-regional patterns
are concerned, Catalonia and Piedmont display rather homogeneous
figures, whereas the Midlands show a bias towards the above mentioned
technological classes.
While differences between regions clearly depend on the sectoral com-
position of regions, it is hard to say whether differences across technological
classes just depend on different citations practices, hence are somehow
artifactual, or reflect a ’real’ phenomenon. In particular, these can be due
to some technological areas being more innovative and characterised by
innovation breakthroughs - hence by a higher rate of patenting and more
citations - whereas some others are less innovative and mainly produce
incremental innovation - hence less patenting activity and lower citations
(Hall et al., 2001). When such differences exist, the use of the mean number
of citations across each inventor’s patent might not capture this heterogen-
eity.
Therefore, as a robustness check for the estimation of inventor’s quality,
we employ a different dependent variable with the dual aim of correcting
for the potential bias and checking whether the main results are confirmed.
The new dependent variable is a weighted average of forward citations at
inventor level in which the number of citations received by each patent
is firstly weighted for the average number of citations received by all
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patents in the same technological class (i.e.: for each patent, its weighted
quality is calculated). The first step is done by region of residence of the
inventor, so that each patent is compared to the average number of forward
citations received by patents in the same class within the same region.16
This is done to account for variation across both regions and technological
classes and follows the rationale proposed by Hall et al. (2001), according
to which, in order to remove all sources of variation in citation intensities,
it is necessary to re-scale citation counts by dividing them for the average
citation count of a group of patents to which the patent of interest belongs.17
Secondly, the weighted quality of each patent is used to create the
measure of inventor quality, by calculating the mean across each inventor’s
patents, similarly to what has been done for the variable Meanfcc.18
Table 1.10 displays the mean values of the newly created variable Mean-
fcc weighted: the figures show that there is still some variation across
regions, but less so across technological classes (within regions), which is
what the new measure was thought for.19
The econometric analysis follows the same model employed in the pre-
vious estimations: inventors’ quality is estimated as a function of the three
knowledge sourcing strategies plus the usual vector of control variables.
The OLS results in table 1.11 shows that the findings are generally consistent
with the main estimation in table 1.7, hence partially confirming the posit-
ive relationship between the joint use of scientific and market knowledge
and the performance of industrial inventors. In addition, similarly to the
previous estimates, the sole use of market knowledge is also significantly
related to inventors’ quality. The coefficient for mktonly is indeed higher or
very similar to that for scimkt. Therefore, it is arguable that the develop-
ment of market channels is per se an influencing factor of the quality of the
16The total count and average of forward citations per technological class are calculated
from the full patent sample in each region - thus not only on the sub-sample of respondents’
patents.
17Hall et al. (2001) use the patent year as reference group for each patent, hence they
weight the citation counts by the average citation count of patents granted in the same
year.
18When a patent is classified into more than one technological class, its number of cita-
tions is weighted for the mean value of the average quality of each class.
19Note that the data in table 1.10 cannot be compared with those displayed in the histo-
grams because the former are at inventor level whereas the diagrams display data at patent
level.
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inventors’ patents, and thus, it is not possible to fully confirm that the joint
use of market and scientific knowledge has systematically a higher impact
on quality than the separate use of either scientific or market knowledge.
Furthermore, the introduction of controls at firm level causes the variables
of interest to lose significance, which may be due to firm-level factors that
are unobserved. Overall, by using a better measure of inventors’ quality it is
possible to confirm the main findings, hence to conclude that inventors’ per-
formance is influenced by the use of external knowledge; however, it is not
possible to conclude that the joint use of scientific and market knowledge
has a stronger effect than the use of each of the sources separately.
1.7 Discussion and conclusion
This paper has investigated the role of scientific and market knowledge
in the inventive process inside firms located in three European regions.
We asked whether industrial patent inventors who exploit both types of
knowledge at the same time display higher performance than those who
use them separately. By applying an empirical framework only rarely
employed at individual level, we estimate a model where the inventor’s
performance depends upon her knowledge sourcing strategies (using only
scientific knowledge, using only market knowledge, using both of them)
as well as a number of other individual, patent and firm level factors. The
data comes from an original survey of private inventors who reside in
Piedmont, Catalonia and the Midlands, combined with patent data from
the European Patent Office.
Our findings show that there is a positive and significant relation
between quantity of inventors’ patents and the joint use of scientific and
market knowledge. As far as quality of inventions is concerned, the results
are slightly less neat because a relationship with the joint use of scientific
and market knowledge does not always hold. Moreover, the sole use of
knowledge from market sources is also significantly related to the quality of
inventors in some of the estimations. In addition, mobile inventors benefit
more than non-mobile ones from external knowledge, most likely because
of their greater openness towards external-to-the-firm organisations. The
robustness check carried out in the last section further shows that, when
accounting for the uneven distribution of forward citations across different
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patent technological classes, the findings are consistent with the previous
estimates. Finally, it is worth noticing that scientific knowledge seems to
be never effective if used alone since the coefficient for the corresponding
knowledge sourcing strategy never turns significant, and that some drivers
of inventors’ performance at firm-level may have remained unobserved,
since the coefficients of interest lose significance once employer’s factors
are controlled for.
This paper has focused on three European regions, chosen as study
cases because of their similar innovation performance, being all defined
’innovation followers’ by the European Commission during the period of
time that pertain the survey of inventors. The three regions display some
differences in terms of patenting patterns, in that Piedmont shows higher
figures than the other two regions. This emerges both from our study and
from more comprehensive analyses, such as the European Commission Re-
gional Innovation Scoreboard. From our estimates it appears that inventors
residing in the Midlands produce less inventions for which they then apply
for a patent at the EPO, than Piedmontese inventors, whereas no specific
trends emerge with respect to Catalonia. However, no clear patterns
emerge as fas as the quality of the inventions is concerned. Therefore, it
seems arguable that, similarly to the overall results, the quantity of patents
is clearly dependent upon knowledge sourcing strategies and, to a certain
extent, to regional traits, whereas the driving factors of the quality of
inventions still remain partly unobserved.
Before underlying the potential implications of this study, it is worth
noticing that a number of limitations emerged. In first place, by admin-
istering the survey questionnaire to patent inventors only, non-patenting
inventors have been automatically excluded from the sample, therefore
nothing is known about the knowledge sourcing strategies of the latter
group. This bias is partly overcome by taking into account both granted
and not-yet granted patents. Moreover, the cross-sectional nature of the
data does not allow to properly control for time-invariant factors. Finally,
although forward citations are widely acknowledged as being among the
best proxies for patent quality, it is also well-known that these have some
limitations. In the attempt to improve it, we created a weighted count of
forward citations.
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Yet, the findings of this study offer some contributions to the literature.
Firstly, the focus of this paper is on the individual who is primarily respons-
ible for the inventive activity behind patents, this being justified by the fact
that innovation is not simply the product of firms and organisations, but it
also requires individual creativity. Whereas previous evidence has extens-
ively focused on the role of organisational-level factors and/or intrinsic
patent features in explaining the outcomes of innovative activities (see e.g.
Hall et al., 2005; Harhoff et al., 1999; Pasquini et al., 2012; Suzuki, 2011),
in this paper individual decisions are taken into account as fundamental
drivers of individual outcomes.
Existing evidence suggests that inventors should rely on different
sources of knowledge to increase the chances of patent commercialisations
(Pasquini et al., 2012), though it seems that the opposite is true for the value
of patented inventions (Schneider, 2009). This study adds that quantity
as well as quality of inventors’ patents benefit from the recombination of
different sources of external knowledge. In addition, in order to analyse
the role of inventors’ knowledge sourcing strategies, the empirical analysis
makes use of an original data source: the PICK-ME survey of industrial
inventors in fact provides brand new insights about the demand of know-
ledge expressed by the actors directly involved in the innovative process
within regions and also provides a number of information at individual
level, including biographical information, that are not available from patent
applications.
This study also offers some implications for innovation policies. In par-
ticular, the evidence of a complementarity relationship between different
sources of knowledge for the inventive process supports the well-known
argument that knowledge exchange across a wide range of organisations
- both academic and non-academic - is beneficial to the innovation per-
formance and the competitiveness of regions. This is particularly true with
respect to universities, given that the latter often appears to be among
the less important sources of external knowledge, notably if compared to
firms (Giuri et al., 2007). In particular, since our study addresses individual
innovativeness, it is arguable that knowledge sharing between firms’ em-
ployees and universities or public research centres, as well as other market
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actors, require constant effort and investment in establishing relationships.
Policies that creates incentives for information and idea sharing with
external agents, as well as across firms’ departments, could be beneficial
to improve the overall organisational innovative process and, in turn, the
innovation performance of regions.
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1.8 Tables
Npat Meanfcc Maxfcc
Obs. Mean Min Max Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
CATALONIA 225 1.57 1 15 2.04 0 25 2.81 0 39
MIDLANDS 117 1.57 1 8 2.06 0 17 3.02 0 35
PIEMONTE 533 1.98 1 27 2.32 0 45.33 3.42 0 114
FULL SAMPLE 875 1.82 1 27 2.21 0 45.33 3.21 0 114
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables
Sources of knowledge Types of knowledge
Suppliers of equipment/materials
Clients and customers MARKET KNOWLEDGE
Competitors
Consultants and private R&D laboratories
Universities SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
Public research institutes
Table 1.2: Sources of knowledge
Variable Obs. Mean 1 1a 1b 2 2a 2b 2c 2d
1 Scientific Know. 765 0.62 1
1a University Know. 764 0.61 0.97 1
1b Public research centres Know. 744 0.40 0.65 0.62 1
2 Market Know. 783 0.91 0.20 0.21 0.23 1
2a Clients Know. 761 0.71 0.16 0.15 0.22 0.52 1
2b Competitors Know. 748 0.68 0.29 0.30 0.37 0.48 0.40 1
2c Suppliers Know. 757 0.70 0.22 0.22 0.27 0.51 0.43 0.32 1
2d Consultants Know. 745 0.54 0.46 0.46 0.48 0.36 0.31 0.33 0.31 1
Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics of the knowledge sources
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Means Corr.
Strategy Freq. Percent Npat Meanfcc Maxfcc Npat Meanfcc Maxfcc
1 scionly 23 3.06 1.57 1.92 2.30 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
2 mktonly 235 31.25 1.70 2.42 3.31 -0.05 0.03 0.00
3 scimkt 444 59.04 1.98 2.30 3.51 0.09 0.01 0.04
4 noscimkt 50 6.65 1.34 1.56 1.92 -0.07 -0.05 -0.06
Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics of the independent variables
Variable Description Obs. Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Female Dummy equal to 1 for female inventors 710 0.1014 0.3020 0 1
Age Age of the inventor in 2006 710 44.4 10.212 22 79
Agesq Age squared 710 2075.5 971.34 484 6241
HiSc Secondary school degree 710 0.2225 0.4162 0 1
BSc Bachelor degree 710 0.4014 0.4905 0 1
MSc Master degree 710 0.1845 0.3881 0 1
PhD Doctoral studies 710 0.1802 0.3846 0 1
Jobmobility Dummy 1/0 for inventors who changed job at 710 0.6831 0.4656 0 1
least once in 2000-06
R&Djob Dummy 1/0 for inventors working in an R&D 710 0.4436 0.4971 0 1
department
Retired Dummy 1/0 for inventors who retired in 2000-06 710 0.0760 0.2652 0 1
Piedmont Dummy 1/0 for inventors from Piedmont 710 0.5957 0.4911 0 1
Catalonia Dummy 1/0 for inventors from Catalonia 710 0.2464 0.4312 0 1
Midlands Dummy 1/0 for inventors from the Midlands 710 0.1577 0.3647 0 1
ost1 Electrical Engineering; Electronics 710 0.2802 0.4494 0 1
ost2 Instruments 710 0.1746 0.3794 0 1
ost3 Chemicals; Materials 710 0.1746 0.3799 0 1
ost4 Pharmaceuticals; Biotechnology 710 0.1183 0.3232 0 1
ost5 Industrial Processes 710 0.1915 0.3937 0 1
ost6 Mechanical Engineering; Machines; Transport 710 0.3704 0.4832 0 1
ost7 Civil Engineering; Consumer goods 710 0.1225 0.3281 0 1
Co-inventor Dummy 1/0 for whether the inventor has ever 710 0.7056 0.4561 0 1
co-invented a patent
Foreign pats Share of inventors’ patents owned by firms 710 0.1608 0.3637 0 1
located abroad
Mne Dummy 1/0 for whether the firm is 710 0.5169 0.5000 0 1
a multinational company
Co-employment Dummy 1/0 for inventors employed by 710 0.4985 0.5003 0 1
the same firm
Table 1.5: Descriptive statistics of the control variables
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES lNpat lNpat lNpat lNpat
scionly -0.0287 -0.0397 -0.0274 -0.0234
(0.125) (0.147) (0.133) (0.210)
mktonly 0.0983 0.0583 0.0147 0.0943
(0.0649) (0.0657) (0.0634) (0.134)
scimkt 0.211*** 0.181*** 0.147** 0.198*
(0.0620) (0.0628) (0.0600) (0.118)
female -0.004 -0.0027 -0.0348 0.110
(0.0588) (0.0590) (0.0646) (0.139)
age 0.0239* 0.0096 0.0104 0.0288
(0.0136) (0.0146) (0.0139) (0.0345)
agesq -0.0002 -7.17e-05 -7.95e-05 -0.0003
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0003)
BSc -0.0342 0.0340 0.0356 -0.0072
(0.0603) (0.0641) (0.0568) (0.127)
MSc -0.107 -0.0459 -0.0342 -0.0319
(0.0681) (0.0728) (0.0665) (0.152)
PhD -0.147** -0.0380 -0.0296 0.188
(0.0723) (0.0766) (0.0770) (0.266)
jobmobility 0.0084 -0.0150 -0.0704
(0.0461) (0.0427) (0.0937)
R&Djob 0.0451 0.0218 -0.0318
(0.0482) (0.0450) (0.103)
retired -0.0334 -0.0288 0.147
(0.0990) (0.0858) (0.478)
coinventor 0.109** 0.258**
(0.0463) (0.104)
share foreign pat 0.0080 0.0010
(0.0479) (0.174)
mne 0.0217
(0.424)
Catalonia -0.1349*** -0.1947*** -0.0657
0.0515 0.0476 0.2463
Midlands 0.1050* 0.0934 0.2453
0.0630 0.0575 0.4357
Constant -0.332 0.0835 -0.480 -1.040
(0.323) (0.358) (0.357) (1.106)
Year dummies - Yes Yes Yes
Patent techn. classes - - Yes Yes
Firm dummies - - - Yes
F-test (scionly, F(3,731)=5.02 F(3,689)=4.10 F(3,680)=4.08 F(3,298)=1.27
mktonly, scimkt) Pr>F=0.0019 Pr>F=0.0068 Pr>F=0.0069 Pr>F=0.2851
Observations 741 710 710 710
R-squared 0.027 0.111 0.278 0.699
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.6: OLS regression. Dependent variable: log of Npat
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Mobile inventors Non-mobile inventors
VARIABLES lNpat lNpat lNpat lNpat
scionly 0.0428 -0.0187 -0.132 -0.188
(0.181) (0.177) (0.0888) (0.125)
mktonly 0.0675 -0.0161 0.154 0.0747
(0.0919) (0.0887) (0.0951) (0.0937)
scimkt 0.202** 0.146* 0.257*** 0.168*
(0.0914) (0.0865) (0.0912) (0.0876)
Constant -0.252 -0.300 -0.274 -0.483
(0.445) (0.509) (0.522) (0.519)
Region dummies - Yes - Yes
Year dummies - Yes - Yes
Patent techn. classes - Yes - Yes
Firm dummies - - - -
F-test (scionly, F(3,475)=2.58 F(3,456)=3.45 F(3,216)=11.62 F(3,196)=3.41
mktonly, scimkt) Pr>F=0.0532 Pr>F=0.0165 Pr>F=0.0000 Pr>F=0.0185
Observations 485 485 225 225
R-squared 0.038 0.280 0.044 0.351
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.8: OLS regression. Dependent variable: log of Npat, breakdown by
inventors’ mobility
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CATALONIA MIDLANDS PIEDMONT
electrical eng 1.25 1.15 0.95
instruments 1.09 0.51 1.27
chemicals 0.88 0.41 0.83
pharmaceuticals 0.88 0.23 0.97
industrial eng 0.95 1.20 1.10
mechanical eng 1.22 0.74 1.31
civil eng 1.20 0.89 0.73
Table 1.10: Mean values of Meanfcc weighted, breakdown by technological class
and region
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES Meanfcc w Meanfcc w Meanfcc w Meanfcc w Meanfcc w
scionly 0.290 0.284 0.423 0.476 0.660
(0.418) (0.434) (0.482) (0.498) (1.377)
mktonly 0.410** 0.357** 0.319* 0.257 0.323
(0.176) (0.177) (0.167) (0.171) (0.465)
scimkt 0.359** 0.335** 0.340** 0.306* 0.273
(0.165) (0.168) (0.161) (0.167) (0.426)
Constant 0.714*** -0.709 1.059 0.808 -1.914
(0.138) (0.893) (0.808) (0.860) (3.680)
Personal charact. - Yes Yes Yes Yes
Reg. & year dummies - - Yes Yes Yes
Pat. techn. classes - - - Yes Yes
Firm dummies - - - - Yes
F-test (scionly, F(3,741)=2.06 F(3,728)=1.63 F(3,686)=1.67 F(3,677)=1.20 F(3,297)=0.20
mktonly, scimkt) Pr>F=0.1045 Pr>F=0.1805 Pr>F=0.1726 Pr>F=0.3072 Pr>F=0.8984
Observations 745 738 707 707 707
R-squared 0.003 0.010 0.140 0.157 0.560
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.11: OLS regression. Dependent variable: Mean f cc weighted
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1.9 Figures
Figure 1.1: Distribution of patent applications per inventors
Figure 1.2: Forward citations of all patents by technological class
Figure 1.3: Mean forward citations by technological class and region
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1.10 Appendix
Variable Obs. Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Female 881 0.1044 0.3059 0 1
Age 870 44.72 10.390 22 79
Agesq 870 2107.67 990.83 484 6241
HiSc 881 0.2315 0.4220 0 1
BSc 881 0.3904 0.4881 0 1
MSc 881 0.1702 0.3760 0 1
PhD 881 0.1634 0.3699 0 1
Jobmobility 807 0.6741 0.4690 0 1
R&D 832 0.4290 0.4952 0 1
Retired 831 0.0746 0.2629 0 1
Piedmont 881 0.6118 0.4876 0 1
Catalonia 881 0.2554 0.4363 0 1
Midlands 881 0.1328 0.3395 0 1
ost1 875 0.272 0.4452 0 1
ost2 875 0.1782 0.383 0 1
ost3 875 0.1748 0.3800 0 1
ost4 875 0.1154 0.3197 0 1
ost5 875 0.192 0.3941 0 1
ost6 875 0.3782 0.4852 0 1
ost7 875 0.1291 0.3355 0 1
Co-inventor 875 0.7085 0.4546 0 1
Foreign pats 875 0.1652 0.3677 0 1
Mne 881 0.4892 0.5001 0 1
Co-employment 881 0.4687 0.4993 0 1
Table 1.12: Descriptive statistics of the control variables, full sample
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Npat Npat Npat Npat
scionly 0.214 0.241 0.186 0.207
(0.237) (0.238) (0.228) (0.312)
mktonly 0.214 0.130 0.0578 0.138
(0.150) (0.150) (0.144) (0.210)
scimkt 0.406*** 0.347** 0.274** 0.316
(0.145) (0.145) (0.139) (0.204)
female -0.102 -0.104 -0.155 0.0431
(0.111) (0.114) (0.112) (0.155)
age2006 0.0407* 0.0189 0.0259 0.0530
(0.0247) (0.0252) (0.0246) (0.0421)
age06 2 -0.000376 -0.000131 -0.000213 -0.000595
(0.000258) (0.000266) (0.000258) (0.000459)
BSc -0.0317 0.0470 0.0350 -0.0815
(0.0820) (0.0855) (0.0830) (0.127)
MSc -0.175* -0.0826 -0.0901 -0.0582
(0.105) (0.109) (0.105) (0.156)
PhD -0.162 -0.0282 -0.0467 0.314
(0.106) (0.124) (0.128) (0.219)
job m 0.0193 0.00555 -0.116
(0.0726) (0.0692) (0.1000)
r d 0.0580 0.00847 -0.0716
(0.0685) (0.0657) (0.107)
retired -0.134 -0.108 0.309
(0.152) (0.144) (1.413)
coinventor 0.123* 0.374**
(0.0727) (0.150)
share foreign pat -0.0420 -0.0149
(0.0950) (0.217)
mne 0.0817
(1.316)
Constant -0.664 0.126 -0.671 -1.891
(0.589) (0.608) (0.607) (1.451)
Year dummies - Yes Yes Yes
Patent techn. classes - - Yes Yes
Firm dummies - - - Yes
Likelihood-ratio χ¯2 = 82.78 χ¯2 = 50.44 χ¯2 = 13.37 χ¯2 = 0
test of alpha = 0 Pr ≥ χ¯2 = 0 Pr ≥ χ¯2 = 0 Pr ≥ χ¯2 = 0 Pr ≥ χ¯2 = 1
Observations 741 710 710 710
Pseudo R2 0.0101 0.0397 0.0914 0.2345
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.14: Negative binomial regression. Dependent variable: Npat
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Chapter 2
University-Industry collaboration
and firms’ R&D effort
2.1 Introduction
Nowadays firms are embedded in networks of strategic alliances through-
out which they gain competitive advantage from continuous scientific and
technical interactions (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004). In particular, firms
need to find and use new sources of knowledge in order to innovate and
grow and universities are often the main repository of such knowledge.
The exchange of knowledge between academia and industry is therefore an
essential mechanism to bring science to the market and foster innovation
and economic growth (OECD, 1998, 2002a).
University-industry knowledge transfer is a broad concept identifying
a wide set of interactions between firms and universities. In particular,
university-industry research collaboration is a specific channel of inter-
organisational knowledge flows and potential spillovers from (and to)
academic research aimed at carrying out specific R&D projects, particularly
involving pre-competitive and basic research (OECD, 1998, 2002a; D’Este
and Fontana, 2007; D’Este and Iammarino, 2010; D’Este et al., 2013).
Cooperative research partnerships are among the most typical forms of U-I
research collaborations, followed by contract research, research consortia,
consulting and founding of co-operative research centres (OECD, 1998;
Fontana et al., 2006). The relevance of this typology of interaction channel
is shown by the fact that it represents one of the most frequent policy
instruments put in place by local and national policy-makers to foster
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pre-competitive research and firms’ innovation activities (OECD, 1998,
2002a; Fisher et al., 2009; D’Este and Iammarino, 2010).
U-I cooperative R&D projects can be seen as a voluntary (or intended)
and reciprocal information mechanism that enhances learning processes
and performance of the partnering organisations (Feldman and Kelley,
2006). For this reason U-I R&D cooperation is considered a valid proxy for
explaining knowledge generation associated with knowledge spillovers
(see e.g. Cincera et al., 2003). However, the innovation literature has been,
so far, only partly conclusive with regards to the impact that these activities
have on firms’ performance. Following the perspective that R&D coopera-
tion can be seen as a vehicle for voluntary knowledge transfer, the present
study intends to fill this gap by assessing the effect of publicly funded U-I
R&D projects on firms’ R&D effort. By relying on a novel dataset of U-I
partnerships combined with firm-level data and by employing propensity
score matching to select a control group of untreated firms, we investigate
the impact of U-I R&D projects on firms’ R&D expenditure per employee
and share of R&D employment.
This paper contributes to the literature on university-industry know-
ledge transfer by bringing new evidence on the impact that the publicly
funded voluntary exchange of knowledge between university and firms
has on firms’ internal effort on R&D. We do so by analysing the case of
U-I partnerships funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council, on which only limited empirical evidence exists as far
their impact on firms is concerned. Our data on U-I partnerships provides
information on firms involved in a full range of projects funded during a 10
years time span; hence, by matching this with firm-level data, we create a
new and original dataset that allows us to carry out an evaluation study of
a specific U-I R&D programme. Moreover, the employment of propensity
score matching helps us to tackle the issue of selection bias typically
arising in quasi-experimental settings and provides a useful tool to work
out a sensible control group of non-participating firms to be compared to
participating firms.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in section 2.2 we
provide a review of the literature, which, together with an overview of the
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programme under study, leads to the hypotheses of the paper; in section 2.3
we describe our data and illustrate the construction of the dataset; section
2.4 is dedicated to the illustration of the methodology; in section 2.5 we
describe the outcome variables and present the empirical results; finally, we
conclude the paper by summing up and discussing our findings in section
2.6.
2.2 Literature and hypotheses development
2.2.1 U-I knowledge interaction
External knowledge acquisition is necessary for innovation activities car-
ried out by firms, especially in the current context of market globalisation
and rapid technological change. Both the early literature on technological
change (see e.g. Allen and Cohen, 1969; Allen, 1977) and the more recent
studies on the knowledge sourcing strategies of firms (see e.g. Arora
and Gambardella, 1990, 1994; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006, 2007; Frenz
and Ietto-Gillies, 2009) assert that firms cannot rely only on their internal
resources and have to tap into knowledge outside their boundaries in order
to successfully produce innovation. In particular, the seminal works of
e.g. Griliches (1987), Jaffe (1989) and Adams (1990), have uncovered the
role of knowledge from universities for innovation activities of firms and
for economic development more in general. Since then, the literature on
university-industry knowledge interaction has grown substantially (see
e.g. Mansfield, 1995; Mansfield and Lee, 1996; Cohen et al., 2002), showing
that firms exploit university knowledge in order to produce innovations
and stay competitive on the market.
U-I knowledge transfer is a broad concept identifying a wide set of
interactions between firms and universities that are aimed at the exchange
of knowledge related to research, science and technology. In particular,
U-I research collaboration include research partnerships, contract research,
research consortia, consulting and founding of co-operative research
centres. In this paper we study publicly funded U-I cooperative R&D
partnerships, which are aimed at carrying out specific R&D projects,
particularly involving pre-competitive and basic research. These typically
involve formal agreements that entail cash and in-kind contributions by
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both sides, so that university and firms share not only their knowledge
and competencies but also their R&D facilities and personnel (D’Este et al.,
2013).
The Systems of Innovation (SI) literature, particularly the national in-
novation systems (NSI) concept, rooted in the seminal work of Freeman
(1987), recognises that proper government policies are needed to ensure
timely access by innovators to stocks of knowledge held in firms and insti-
tutions, thus allowing the development of those technical capabilities that
lie at the core of countries’ competitiveness (David and Foray, 1995; Grupp,
1995). Governments have the responsibility to set rules and create institu-
tional frameworks that provide the right incentives for interactions (Boze-
man, 2000). As a matter of fact, research collaborations between universities
and businesses are among the most frequent policy instruments put in place
by local and national policy-makers to foster pre-competitive research and
firms’ innovation activities (OECD, 1998, 2002a; Fisher et al., 2009; D’Este
and Iammarino, 2010).
2.2.2 U-I research collaboration and firms’ performance
The relationship between U-I research collaboration and firm-level perform-
ance has been addressed by different strands of the empirical literature. It
is mostly within the literature on R&D cooperation, knowledge spillovers
and productivity - in which U-I collaboration is considered a typology of
R&D cooperation - that this issue is addressed. In addition, within the
innovation literature that specifically looks at technology and knowledge
transfer, the attention has recently extended to the effects of U-I activities.
The literature on R&D cooperation, knowledge spillovers and pro-
ductivity investigates firms’ R&D interactions with external organisations
(including universities) and predicts that firms engage into cooperat-
ive R&D because this enables them to internalise knowledge spillovers
and eliminate the disincentive effect of spillovers on R&D (Steurs, 1995;
De Bondt, 1997; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2002; Belderbos et al., 2004;
Schmidt, 2005; Lope´z, 2008). Firms engage into joint R&D also because it
allows the acquisition and utilization of external resources for their own
purposes directly and systematically (Hagedoorn, 1993; Scott, 1996; Hite
and Hesterly, 2001; Caloghirou et al., 2003) and sharing costs and risks
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among partners (Sakakibara, 1997; Beath et al., 1998). Hence, the benefits
associated to R&D cooperation can be attributed to: reducing uncertainty;
joint financing of R&D; realizing cost-savings; realizing economies of scale
and scope (Camagni, 1993; Robertson and Langlois, 1995; Becker and Dietz,
2004). Accordingly, scholars have been searching for the impact of R&D
cooperation at the level of both firms’ innovation activities (input and
output) and firm productivity.
A positive impact of engaging in R&D cooperation has been tracked
down on the innovation performance (innovation output) of firms, such
as sales of innovative products (see e.g. Klomp and Van Leeuwen, 2001;
Lo¨o¨f and Heshmati, 2002; Criscuolo and Haskel, 2003; Faems et al., 2005),
patenting (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2002), and sales growth (Cincera et al.,
2003). Some of these studies also examine the effect of different cooperation
typologies, but have produced ambiguous results. Faems et al. (2005) used
cross-section data from the Belgian CIS survey in 1992 and found a positive
association between university cooperation and the share in firm sales
of innovative products new to the market, while an aggregate measure
of other cooperation typologies was positively associated with the share
in firm sales of innovative products new to the firm (but not new to the
market).
Monjon and Waelbroeck (2003) regressed innovative sales levels of firms
in a French CIS survey on a range of collaboration and incoming knowledge
spillover variables and found a mixture of negative and positive effects of
R&D cooperation and spillovers. Belderbos et al. (2004), using the Dutch
CIS, distinguish between four typologies of cooperation and find that
R&D collaboration with competitors and universities has a significant and
positive impact on the growth of innovative sales, but has no significant
impact on labour productivity.
Furthermore, a number of studies look at R&D cooperation supported
by public funding, particularly EU funding: for instance, Benfratello and
Sembenelli (2002) show that firms’ participation to the EUREKA research
joint ventures programme experienced an improvement in their economic
performance, while firms participating to the third and fourth Framework
Program (FP) showed no clear impact; Barajas et al. (2011), using data on
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Spanish participants to the EU FP research joint ventures, confirm that R&D
cooperation has a positive effect on the technological capacity of firms,
which is found to be positively related to productivity.
Some of these studies are based on one or more waves of innovation
surveys, hence relying on self-reported measures and, often, cross-sectional
data, which could explain the reason for such a high variation in the results.
In addition, there may be unobservable firm characteristics that affect both
the innovation or productivity outcome and, at the same time, the decision
to engage into cooperative research, that are only rarely accounted for.
The innovation literature on technology and knowledge transfer has
extensively looked at the determinants, characteristics and barriers of U-I
knowledge transfer activities. More recently, the focus has moved on the
effects of these activities. Similarly to the literature on firms’ R&D cooper-
ation, empirical studies in this strand of literature distinguish between the
impact of knowledge transfer on firms’ innovative activities and the impact
on overall firms’ economic performance. Most of the studies that exploit
direct measures of knowledge interactions, such as U-I R&D cooperation,
or the use of university as an external knowledge source, find positive
effects on firms’ innovative activities, including R&D intensity (innovation
input), the propensity to register new patents as well as the introduction
and sales of new products (innovation output) (see e.g. Becker, 2003; Fritsch
and Franke, 2004; Arvanitis et al., 2008; Lo¨o¨f and Brostro¨m, 2008).
On the contrary, studies that investigate the impact of university
knowledge on the overall economic performance of firms (i.e. labour pro-
ductivity, total factor productivity) show contradicting evidence: Medda
et al. (2006) found no significant effect of collaborative research undertaken
by Italian manufacturing firms and universities on the growth of total factor
productivity, whereas other studies found a positive effect on different
measures of labour productivity, sales productivity or sales growth (see
e.g. Belderbos et al., 2004; Branstetter and Ogura, 2005). The observed
differences among the findings of these studies can be partly traced back
to the nature of the investigation (cross-section versus longitudinal), but
also to differences with respect to the industrial sectors covered by these
studies.
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To sum up, this overview of the literature on the impact of U-I collabor-
ation on firms shows that, even though this subject has attracted attention
from different strands of the literature, evidence is still quite mixed, hence
calling for further research. To some extent, there seems to be convergence
towards a positive impact on firms, but this is far from being unquestion-
able. In addition, the motivations for evaluating the impact on firms’ per-
formance or rather on innovative activities (or both) - and, in the latter case,
whether it is more appropriate to look at innovation input or output meas-
ures - are not always well grounded into the policy discourse. In the next
section we present the UK policy context that is concerned with U-I linkages
and the specific policy under study. This will help us to build the empirical
hypotheses.
2.2.3 UK policy for U-I interaction: the case of EPSRC re-
search collaborations
From the 1980s onwards it is possible to distinguish three phases of UK
government policy towards U-I knowledge transfer (Lawton Smith and
Bagchi-Sen, 2006). Running from the 1980s until the 1990s, the first phase
was characterised by the government’s intention to push universities
towards the exploitation of the intellectual property rights of their research-
ers. The 1998 White Paper of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI,
1988) particularly signalled this intention, together with the ending in 1985
of the British Technology Group’s right of refusal of inventions arising
from universities’ public funded research. The turning point between the
first and second phase can be traced back to the release of the 1993 White
Paper Realising our Potential (DTI, 1993), which was followed by a series of
initiatives designed with the objective to better exploit the UK’s strengths
in science and technology through partnerships between the science base,
UK industry and government. The following White Paper on Competit-
iveness (DTI, 1995) saw a shift from large R&D programmes to smaller
and targeted schemes aimed at improving U-I interactions and best practice.
The third phase, initiated in 1997 by the new political agendas of the
newly elected Labour government, was about restoring R&D funding
that had previously decreased, and constant commitment to the valorisa-
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tion of research. Moreover, a ‘territorialisation’ agenda was introduced,
assigning to universities and regional development agencies the task of
promoting innovation in a given geographical area (Lawton Smith and
Bagchi-Sen, 2006).1 During this phase, the development and empowerment
of knowledge-based industry became a priority (Lawton Smith, 2003) and
the role of universities for the UK economy was further emphasised by the
2003 Lambert Review of University-Business Interaction, particularly at
the local level (Lambert, 2003). The latter recommended the formation of
both formal and informal networks between the academic community and
businesses, along with a greater role for universities and local institutions
in facilitating interactions at the regional level.
This paper considers U-I collaborative partnerships that have been
funded between 1998 and 2007, hence during the third phase of UK gov-
ernment policy on U-I linkages, by the Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council (EPSRC). The EPSRC is one of the seven UK research
councils responsible for administering public funding for research in the
UK. It distributes more than 20% of the total UK science budget, being
the largest council in terms of the volume of research funded (D’Este
et al., 2013). The EPSRC provides funding to national research through a
wide range of grant schemes. In this paper we consider U-I partnerships
supported through standard grants and through the LINK grant scheme.2
These partnerships are aimed at contributing to joint upstream research
for the creation of new knowledge and, thus, they are far from industrial
applications. They exclude contract research paid by the company to have a
specific, well-defined outcome. Intended benefits for partnering companies
include the provision of financial support for the project, helping com-
panies to develop closer relationships with the science base and creating
the opportunity for recruiting appropriately trained staff at the end of the
1Regional development agencies were established in England between 1998 and 2000,
and abolished in 2012.
2Collaboration from industry is encouraged but not mandatory under the standard
grant schemes, thus we only considers projects where firms are involved. The LINK
scheme instead specifically provided funding for collaborative research between at least
one science-based organisation and one business partner. This was an initiative of the De-
partment for Business Innovation and Skills administered through the UK Research Coun-
cils. Around 70% of the partnerships supported between 1992 and 2007 by the EPSRC were
funded under the Standard Research Grant Scheme (now called Research Base Funding),
followed by the LINK grant scheme (10%).
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project. In each project, UK Higher Education Institutions take the role of
project coordinator (i.e. Principal Investigator) whereas collaborators from
industry, commerce and other organisations work as partners.
As far as the selection process is concerned, the EPSRC receives ap-
plications proposals from the principal investigators and expects that the
participants in a collaborative projects develop an agreement that clarifies
the contribution of each partners; however, it does not get involved in the
negotiation of the agreement, nor in the selection of partners from industry.
U-I collaborative partnerships in engineering and physical sciences
funded by the EPSRC have been the focus of several empirical studies and
reports (see e.g. D’Este and Fontana, 2007; D’Este and Patel, 2007; Ambos
et al., 2008; Bruneel et al., 2009, 2010; D’Este and Iammarino, 2010; Bishop
et al., 2011; Crespi et al., 2011; D’Este et al., 2012, 2013), which uncovered
a number of relevant aspects related to the determinants, typologies and
barriers of collaborations. However, these studies offer little evidence on
the effect of U-I interaction, especially on firms.
One exception is represented by Bruneel et al. (2009), whose report sum-
marizes the results of two extensive surveys carried out in 2004 and 2008,
designed to shed new lights on industry and university researchers’ atti-
tudes to collaborate. The surveys involved university and industry part-
ners that participated to EPSRC collaborative projects after 2000. The re-
port shows that the most important benefit of working with universities for
firms is to create a long-term connection with the latter, followed by the op-
portunity to identify and recruit employees. The main benefits are hence
attributable to developing knowledge and methods and getting access to
highly skilled problem solvers (Bruneel et al., 2009). On the contrary, short-
term benefits, such as cost reduction, turned out to be only marginally rel-
evant for the respondents. Therefore, although not yet tested empirically, it
emerges that UK firms collaborating with universities under the umbrella
of the EPSRC look at universities as a source of ideas and talented people
rather than a low cost pool of research services.
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2.2.4 Hypotheses
The research question addressed in this paper is ‘What is the impact of pub-
licly funded U-I collaboration on firms’ R&D activities in the UK?’. The review
of the literature presented in the previous section shows that scholars have
searched for the impact of U-I collaboration both on firms’ innovative and
R&D activities and firms’ overall productivity. In the first case, both R&D
input (e.g. R&D expenditure) and output (e.g. sales of new products) have
been used as outcome measures, although the former is less commonly
employed than the latter. Results are quite mixed, although there seems to
be agreement on a positive relation between U-I collaboration and firms’
innovative activities.
Turning on the specificities of the EPSRC projects, we highlighted that
their aim is to contribute to pre-competitive and upstream research and,
in practice, they support companies financially, help them to establish a
close relationship with universities and to create the conditions and oppor-
tunities for recruiting highly trained personnel. These aspects, which are
all linked to R&D and innovation inputs, are confirmed by the findings in
Bruneel et al. (2009), who shows that firms declared to find more beneficial
the contribution of university to knowledge creation and recruitment of
personnel rather than to the production of short-term outputs, such as
new products. As a consequence, we argue that the impact of the EPSRC
U-I research projects, because of their pre-competitive nature, should be
searched on firms’ R&D inputs.
Following inter alia Busom (2000), we focus on R&D intramural ex-
penditure and R&D personnel. We argue that U-I collaboration entails
higher firms’ involvement in research activities, both in terms of knowledge
production and financial engagement. In fact, firms contribute to EPSRC
partnerships via cash and in-kind support, the latter including staff time,
access to equipment, provision of data, software or materials.
In the first place, we expect the impact of U-I collaboration to be cap-
tured by differences in R&D equipments and/or costs, mirrored by R&D
expenditure (Busom, 2000). R&D expenditure is one of the firm-specific
determinants that influence the innovative behaviour of firms and it is
commonly used as a measure of R&D input (Becker and Dietz, 2004).
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Therefore, we put forward the following hypothesis:
Hp 1: U-I partnerships have a positive impact on the R&D expenditure per
employee of participating firms.
Secondly, we argue that, through the network of relationships arising
from the partnerships, U-I projects provide both the opportunity of hiring
new R&D personnel at the end of the project and the chance of learning
for existing staff. As stated in the OECD Frascati Manual (OECD, 2002b),
data on the utilisation of scientific and technical personnel provide concrete
measurement of resources devoted to R&D. Moreover, R&D personnel
may mirror the human capital component of R&D that is usually more
permanent (Busom, 2000). We expect that the share of employees working
on R&D related tasks inside the firms increases after participation, hence
we put forward our second hypothesis:
Hp 2: U-I partnerships have a positive impact on the share of R&D employment
of participating firms.
2.3 Data
The empirics of the paper relies on a unique dataset, resulting from the
combination of a dataset of EPSRC U-I partnerships funded between 1998
and 2007, with firm-level data gathered from two databases provided by
the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS). The advantage of our dataset
of U-I partnerships over other similar sources of data is that it provides in-
formation on actual interactions between firms and universities. Moreover,
data are collected by the funding agency, thus ruling out any bias due to
self-reported information, as it is the case for survey-based data. Hence,
we believe that these data may represent a reliable proxy for knowledge
transfer activities between businesses and academia.
The EPSRC dataset includes 4,990 projects involving 3,331 UK firms.
In order to combine it with firm-level data we exploited the information
on firms’ names and addresses provided in the dataset. Firms’ names and
addresses have been matched by the UK ONS to the Inter Departmental
Business Register (IDBR) in order to provide a list of anonymized firms’
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identifiers. Notwithstanding a number of potential matching issues,
such as incorrect spelling of names and addresses, changes of names and
companies stopping reporting any economic activity, a unique identifier
has been retrieved for almost half of the sample (1,488 firms; 45%).3
Through the unique identifier provided by the ONS, we could link our
data to two main sources of data: the Business Structure Database (BSD),
which provides basic information about firms (e.g. employment, turnover,
industry classification codes and location), and the Business Expenditure
on R&D database (BERD), providing R&D data collected through an an-
nual survey carried out by the ONS. The BERD data uniquely provides in-
formation on total R&D expenditure in the UK by business enterprises and
total R&D employment. After we match the data on U-I partnerships to
firm-level data via firms’ unique identifier, we keep non matched observa-
tions with non-missing values in both BSD and BERD variables. The non-
matched observations form the pool of potential untreated firms. Therefore,
linking U-I partnerships with firm-level data allows to work in a situation
that is typical of evaluation studies (with observational data), in which it is
possible to separate firms on the basis of the receipt of the treatment.
2.4 Method
2.4.1 The evaluation problem
The evaluation of publicly funded U-I partnerships should take into
account the potential selection bias of the policy. This arises from the fact
that firms are selected into treatment by the funding agency (hence not
randomly), most likely on the basis of a number of peculiar characteristics
and probably with a ‘picking the winner’ or ‘aiding the poor’ strategy.
In addition, a bias might as well come from the firm side: some firms
can in fact have advantages over other firms to search and find funding
opportunities, either because of their past experience or because of their
intrinsic characteristics, or both. As a consequence, treated and non-treated
3We carried out a sample representativeness analysis by comparing project related vari-
ables between the group of matched firms (1,488 firms) and the initial sample (3,331 firms)
as well as between the former and the group of unmatched firms (1,843 firms). It emerges
that matched firms display very similar or slightly lower figures than the full sample, hence
we are confident that matched firms do not represent a selected sample of the latter. See
Appendix 2.9.1, table 2.13 columns (a)-(e).
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firms would behave differently notwithstanding the treatment, thus the
simple difference in means in their performance after the treatment cannot
be interpreted as causal impact.
The challenge is that it is impossible to carry out a counter-factual
analysis by comparing the performance of participants (or treated) firms
with the case of the same firms not receiving the treatment. Similarly, it
is highly unlikely that researchers are able to carry out an experiment in
which treated and non-treated firms are perfectly randomized and hence
their mean performance can be compared after the treatment. In addition,
very rarely the list of firms that applied to the R&D programme but have
been rejected is available to the researcher.4
As suggested by Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), the best solution at
hand when working with non-experimental data is to work as if we are
in a quasi-experimental setting, in which a potential control group of
non-treated firms is made statistically identical to the group of treated firms
via propensity score matching (PSM). PSM is a matching technique that
attempts to estimate the impact of a treatment by accounting for the factors
that predict the receipt of the treatment (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).
Therefore, in order to assess the impact of EPSRC U-I research projects
on participating firms and tackle the issue of selection bias of the policy, we
first select a control group of untreated firms on the basis of pre-treatment
characteristics via propensity score matching (PSM) and then compare
the performance of treated and untreated firms via ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression. Because of the characteristics of our data, we only use
PSM to select a control group of non-participating firms and, instead of
estimating the impact of the policy via PSM, we employ OLS regression to
do that.5
Although firms may have participated to more than one project, we
are interested in the impact of the first project only. In fact, we believe
that, due to learning processes occurring during the implementation of a
project, firms develop internal capabilities and experience so that following
4This limitation applies to our case.
5Section 2.4.4 provides further information on the reason for employing OLS regres-
sion.
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projects may have an effect on R&D effort that is different from what we
hypotesised. For this reason, we focus only on the impact of the first project.
Each project lasts, on average, three years, hence we estimate the impact
in the year right after the end of each project. Since firms in our sample
may have taken part to a project in any year t between 1998 and 2007,
we have to select an ad-hoc control group on the basis of pre-treatment
characteristics that depends on the year of treatment. More specifically, we
select a control group on the basis of pre-treatment characteristics in year
t − 1 and estimate the impact of the project at t + 3. In other words, we
will estimate the impact of U-I projects that started in 1998 on the basis of
pre-treatment firms’ characteristics measured in 1997, on R&D expenditure
per employee and share of R&D employment in 2001, and so on for every
year until 2007.
To implement our methodology we start by splitting the raw sample of
participating firms (1,488) into 10 subsamples on the basis of the year of
participation and match them to firm-level datasets to collect pre- and post-
treatment variables as well as to attach non-treated firms. The final sample
of treated firms consists of 370 firms who participated at least once to a U-I
project between 1998 and 2007.6 Secondly, we carry out a propensity score
matching on every sub-sample with the aim of selecting ad-hoc controls for
every group of firms. Once this is done, we pull the newly created sub-
samples of treated and selected untreated firms back together. We thus end
up with a pooled cross sectional dataset where a given firm is observed only
in one point in time. We then estimate OLS regressions where the depend-
ent variables are R&D expenditure per employee and share of R&D employ-
ment, and the participation to a U-I project is the independent or ‘treatment’
variable. By controlling for the year of receipt of the treatment, along with
other control variables, we can get a reliable estimate of the impact of U-I
projects on participating firms.
6We carried out a sample representativeness analysis by comparing project related vari-
ables between the group of 370 treated firms and the whole sample of treated (3,331) (see
Appendix 2.9.1, table 2.13 columns (f)-(g)). Treated firms are not different from the whole
sample and, where significant differences exist, these are fairly small.
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2.4.2 Propensity Score Matching
In the recent innovation literature that focuses on the impact of R&D
subsidies, there have been several attempts to address the issue of selection
bias of the subsidies by employing matching estimators (see e.g. Almus
and Czarnitzki, 2003; Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006; Aerts and Schmidt, 2008;
Corsino et al., 2012; Guerzoni and Raiteri, 2012).7
PSM consists of finding a plausible control group of non-treated firms
that are similar to the treated ones in pre-treatment characteristics and using
this group as a substitute for non-observable counterfactuals to estimate
the impact of a given policy (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). Treated ob-
servations are matched with non-treated ones on the basis of the so-called
propensity score, P(X) = P(D = 1 | X), defined as the probability of being
treated (treatment D = 1) given a set of pre-treatment characteristics X. To
consistently carry out a propensity score matching, two assumptions must
be satisfied. The first is the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA),
or unconfoundedness, stating that assignment to treatment is independent
of the outcomes, given a set of observable covariates. In other words, the
observables must account for all the differences related to the outcome
between treated and control units. The second assumption, referred to as
the Common Support Condition, ensures that the vector of covariates does
not perfectly predict whether a firm receives or not the treatment.
The reason for implementing a PSM in our case is twofold. Firstly, after
we combine the data on U-I partnerships with firm-level data, we are in
a situation that is typical for evaluation because we are able to separate
treated and non-treated firms. Furthermore, the group of non-treated is
large enough to draw the control group on the basis of a propensity score.
Secondly, given that a rich dataset of pre-treatment characteristics is avail-
able, we can implement the PSM and assume the CIA to hold.
7Almus and Czarnitzki (2003) apply propensity score matching to find a suitable con-
trol group for a sample of German firms that received R&D subsidies and end up with
a complementarity effect of the subsidy with respect to private R&D. On the same vein,
Czarnitzki and Licht (2006) indicate the additionality of R&D subsidies for Western and
Eastern Germany, Gonza´lez and Pazo´ (2008) show the absence of a crowding-out effect
of R&D subsidies in a sample of Spanish firms, and, more recently, Guerzoni and Raiteri
(2012) show that the interaction of different policies (R&D subsidies and public procure-
ment) has the highest impact on firms’ R&D expenses and innovative turnover.
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2.4.3 Propensity score specification and selection of control
groups
The propensity score measures the probability that a firm enters a U-I
project, given a set of observable characteristics. It is recovered through the
estimation of a probabilistic choice model where the dependent variable is
the treatment variable. Two decisions have to be made at this stage: the
first one concerns the model to be estimated and the second one concerns
the variables to be included in this model. As for the model, since for
binary treatments a probit or a logit usually yield similar results (Caliendo
and Kopeinig, 2008), we decided to implement a probit model, following
existing empirical evidence (Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003). The choice of
the variables to include in the model is very important and more advice
is available in the literature. We refer here to the guidance provided by
Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) as well as to what has been done in the
empirical literature on the evaluation of R&D policy.
The first important caveat is that all variables must be measured before
the treatment takes place, or must be fixed in time, so that we can rule out
the possibility that those are affected by the treatment, hence endogenous.
We first discuss the variables measured before the treatment and then we
illustrate those that are fixed in time.
We start by including in the vector of covariates an important set of
factors that may positively influence both the participation to U-I projects
and the outcome measures, which relate to firms’ size and economic per-
formance. We include in the probit estimation a measure of employment at
t− 1 as well as its square, in order to check for the existence of a quadratic
relationship between size and participation. These variables capture the
different behavior that firms of different size have with respect to R&D
activities. Secondly, we introduce a measure of labour productivity at
t − 1, calculated as the logarithm of sales over employment, as well as
a market share variable that measures competition in the market, calcu-
lated as firms’ sales over industry’s sales, measured on the SIC 5 digits level.
Due to missing values, we are not able to recover any other firm-level
characteristic, such as export and import ratio or capital intensity as it is
done in other works. However, we include a dummy indicating whether
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each firm’s ultimate owner is a non-UK company, which is a proxy for the
existence of linkages with foreign markets, and we control for whether each
firm is a single or multi plant one, which may be informative of capital
intensity as well as overall economic performance. In other empirical works
a variable to control for whether firms carry out R&D is usually included.
However, in our case this is not necessary because we are dealing with a
sample of innovative firms only. In fact, the BERD survey, which represents
our main source of data to build the outcome variables and select the
control groups, only involves UK R&D doers.8 Finally, we control for firms’
age, through a set of dummies for the years of birth of each firm, to account
for the fact that younger firms may be more involved than older firms into
R&D activities, including collaboration with universities.
As for the variables that are fixed in time (all measured at t − 1), we
include a set of 35 dummies to control for industry determinants. We use
the Standard Industrial Classification codes (SIC 1992) at two digits level.9
These should pose no problems in terms of potential changes in time, being
at two-digits. Industry dummies allow to match firms belonging to the
same sectors, hence sharing the same (or very similar) technological base.
We also include dummies for the location of the firms, which are all UK
based. After several trials and considerations, we decided to include 12
regions, these being the nine English regions10 along with Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland. The use of region dummies, rather than smaller
geographical units, reduces problems due to firms that relocate; in fact, it
is reasonable to assume that most of those that relocate are likely to move
within the same region. By including these dummies, we aim at matching
treated firms with non-treated firms that are located in the same region
and thus are subject to similar external factors, such as local economic
shocks. They also allow to account for the presence of universities, research
centers and other institutions in the area where firms are located, which
most likely influences the probability to join a U-I project. As it was un-
8However, the inclusion of performance-related measures together with industry dum-
mies (proxy for firms’ technology and knowledge base), should help capturing the R&D
dimension at least partially, thus reducing concerns related to omitted variables.
9See Appendix 2.9.2.
10London (LON), South East (SE), South West (SW) East of England (EE), Yorkshire
and The Humber (YH), West Midlands (WM), East Midlands (EM), North West (NW) and
North East (NE).
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derlined in section 2.2.3, at the time when the research partnerships under
analysis were funded, a key role was assigned in the UK to universities
and regional development agencies for the promotion of knowledge trans-
fer in regions. Therefore, it is fundamental to take these factors into account.
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 describe the variables used to estimate the
propensity score and refer to the sample of 370 participating firms, summed
up to the raw sample of non-participating firms (126,221) that forms
the potential control groups (Total 370+126,221=126,591). Descriptive
statistics refer to the year before the treatment for each firm (t − 1). We
also test for the difference in means between treated and the raw sample
of untreated firms.11 Treated and untreated firms display statistically
significant differences (both positive and negative) in their size (measured
with employment), market share, foreign links and share of single-plant
firms, whereas no significant differences exist in labour productivity and
firms’ age. The distribution of treated and untreated firms across UK
regions shows some differences too, especially with respect to the South
East, where treated firms are over represented with respect to untreated
ones, and London, where it is the opposite.
As for the distribution across sectors (Figure 2.1), we notice a larger
presence of treated firms in the manufacturing of radio and televisions, of
chemical products and of medical products. Untreated firms are overrep-
resented in service sectors such as wholesale trade, research & development
activities and business activities (e.g. legal, accounting, intellectual prop-
erty rights and other management activities). These descriptives show that
treated firms and the raw group of untreated firms are quite different as
far as their pre-treatment characteristics are concerned, thus supporting the
need to select an ad hoc control group that is as similar as possible to the
treated group.
As previously illustrated, after we split the sample into 10 sub-samples
and attach potential controls on the basis of the year of participation, we
estimate a probit model on each of them. The dependent variable is the
treatment variable, so that what we estimate is the probability of receiving
11We do not report figures for industry dummies but differences between treated and
untreated firms in sectoral composition can be visually analysed in Figure 2.1. The full list
of industry SIC codes and description can be found in Appendix 2.9.2.
103
the treatment, or the so-called propensity score, which we use to select
10 ad-hoc control groups of untreated firms. The results of the probit
estimations carried out on each of the 10 sub-samples are summarised in
table 2.2.12
In the first place, as expected, it emerges that firm size is positively
related to participation to U-I R&D projects since the employment variable
is positive and significant across almost all the estimations. In addition,
a quadratic relationship between participation and number of employees
emerges in some of the estimations, since the coefficient for the square of
the employment is negative and significant. Such relationship implies that
the probability of participation increases with firms’ size, but it decreases
after a given threshold. Therefore, medium-to-large firms arguably have
higher probability of participating than very small and very large firms.
Secondly, the market share of firms positively and significantly affects
the probability of participating to U-I R&D projects only in a few years,
whereas labour productivity does not seem to matter significantly. Non-UK
owned firms display higher probability of participation than UK-owned
firms in few estimations, and single-plant firms seem to have lower probab-
ility than multi-plant ones (although not always significant). With respect
to firms’ age, as expected, older firms have lower probability than younger
firms to participate. As far as sectors are concerned, firms in manufacturing
generally have a higher probability of participating to U-I projects than
firms in service sectors.
Finally, region dummies show quite heterogeneous patterns because
of a mixture of positive and negative signs across years. In spite of the
distribution of economic activities and universities in the UK, EPSRC
funded U-I collaborations seem to involve firms that are spread across the
territory, rather then being agglomerated in some areas.
With the estimated propensity scores at hand we can match treated
and untreated firms. It is possible to implement the pairing of treated to
non-treated firms by using several matching algorithms. All of them are
summarised and discussed by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008). The choice of
12See Appendix 2.9.3 for the full results of the probit estimations.
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a given algorithm with respect to another is a matter of trade-off between
bias and variance of the estimates. In the first place, we implement a 1-to-1
nearest-neighbour matching according to which we match each treated
firm to only one untreated firm, on the basis of similarity in their propensity
score. In addition, we implement a number of different matching pro-
cedures to check the robustness of our findings. We follow Caliendo and
Kopeinig (2008), who suggest that, if there are many comparable untreated
units, it is advisable to use more than one nearest-neighbour to gain preci-
sion in the estimates. Hence, we implement a nearest neighbour matching
with 5 and 10 untreated firms, in which each firm is matched to the 5 or 10
most similar ones in terms of propensity score, and a kernel matching that
uses weighted averages of all (or nearly all) firms in the control group. With
N:5, N:10 and Kernel matching a lower variance (than with 1:1 matching) is
achieved, because more information is used (i.e. more than one control firm
per treated firm), hence the estimates are more precise. On the other hand,
it may be that observations that are bad matches are used, hence leading to
a relatively higher bias.
We implement a 1:1, 1:5, 1:10 and kernel matching on each of the 10
subsamples of firms that start a U-I project in a year between 1998 and 2007,
and we keep only treated firms and untreated firms that have been matched
to them.13 Table 2.3 shows the size of each sub-sample along with the size of
the whole sample that we obtain by pulling everything back together before
we estimate the impact of U-I projects. With 1:1 matching, we end up with
a final sample of 740 observations, of which 340 are treated firms and 340
are untreated firms. We implement the matching without allowing to re-use
the same untreated observation more than once (‘noreplacement’), so that
each untreated firm is matched to only one treated firm. With 1:5 and 1:10
matching, we end up with 1,722 and 3,299 controls respectively. In this case,
we allow for re-using the same untreated firm, hence the number of selected
untreated firms does not round up to exactly 5 (and 10) times the number of
treated because a few untreated firms are used more than once.14 In the case
of kernel matching, the final sample includes 370 treated firms and 55,690
untreated firms, because almost half of the observations of the raw sample
of untreated are selected.
13We use the Stata command psmatch2, developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2012).
14A check of the matching procedure shows that there is no over use of the same controls
in any of the estimates.
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2.4.4 Impact of U-I projects
Once we pull together the 10 matched datasets, we can evaluate the impact
of U-I projects on participating firms. In principle, we would like to rep-
licate the PSM procedure on the whole sample in order to get an estimate
of the average treatment effect on the treated. However, by doing so we
would not be able to control for the participation year, hence this may result
in the wrong pairing of treated firms that participate in a given year with
untreated firms that have been previously selected to be control units for
other years. Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, the best solution
at hand is to run an OLS regression where we control for the participation
year. By doing so, we make sure that each treated firm is compared to
similar pre-selected untreated firm(s) within the same year t.15
In addition, we replicate the regression and add the same controls
that we used to estimate the propensity score, so to make sure to get an
unbiased estimate of the impact of the policy. By mixing propensity score
matching with linear regression we aim at obtaining an estimate of the
treatment effect that is ‘doubly-robust’ (Imbens, 2004). In our case, we carry
out an OLS regression on the matched sample, in which for each treated
firm, one (or more) suitable untreated firm has been previously selected via
propensity score matching.
In the case of 1:1 matching, we run an OLS regression with robust stand-
ard error to account for heteroskedasticity of the error terms, as recom-
mended by Angrist and Pischke (2008). In the case of 1:5, 1:10 and Ker-
nel matching, we carry out a weighted OLS regression, in which we use
the propensity score as weighting variable, so that each untreated firm is
given a specific weight in the regression that depends upon its similarity
to its matched treated firm. Since the propensity score recovered via PSM
represents the probability that each firm is selected, we employ sampling
(or probability) weights, which are weights that denote the inverse of the
probability that the observation is included.16
15Another strategy to carry out the evaluation exercise and solve the selection bias issue
would have been to implement fixed effect estimations. However, since the main data
source for R&D related variables is the BERD survey, administered on a stratified sample
of firms each year, it was very difficult to collect data on the same firm for more than a point
in time. Therefore, the use of propensity score matching, and eventually its combination
with OLS regression, is the best solution at hand.
16pweights in Stata: a robust variance estimation technique is automatically used to ad-
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2.5 Results
2.5.1 Outcome variables
As explained in sections 2.2.4, we expect that EPSRC funded U-I projects
have a direct impact on R&D input of firms. Therefore, we employ a
measure of R&D expenditure per employee (henceforth R&D/empl) in
logarithm, calculated as R&D intramural expenditure on the number of
R&D personnel. Intramural or in-house expenditure refers to the cost of
R&D carried out within the company in the UK regardless of the source of
funding for this work. R&D personnel indicates the number of full-time
equivalent engineers, technicians and other supporting staff working on
R&D related tasks within the company. We also employ a measure of the
share of R&D employment (henceforth shareR&Dempl), calculated as the
ratio of R&D personnel over total employment. To build both measures,
we use data from the BERD survey, which provides information on firms’
R&D activities at the end of each financial year.
Table 2.4 shows the descriptive statistics for R&D/empl and
shareR&Dempl in the four matched samples. We also test the significance of
the difference in means between treated and untreated firms (last column).
The mean value of the log of R&D/empl is in the region of 3.7-3.8, it is
larger for treated than for untreated firms in each matched sample and
the difference (between 0.08 and 0.14) is significant at 1-5% level.17 As for
shareR&Dempl, firms in the whole samples employ, on average, 11.5-13.2%
of their workforce on R&D related tasks, corresponding to 20-22 employees,
and the difference between treated and untreated firms is 3.2-4.3% (signific-
ant at 1% level).
2.5.2 Description of results
The results of the OLS regressions are presented in tables 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and
2.8. For every matching method implemented (1:1, 1:5, 1:10 and kernel)
we estimate two OLS regressions for both outcome variables presented in
just for the design characteristics so that variances, standard errors and confidence intervals
are correct.
17The corresponding non-logged mean is £53,000-57,000 in the whole sample (depend-
ing on the matching implemented), £60,000 in the sample of treated firms and £53,000 in
the sample of untreated firms.
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2.5.1: we first control only for the year of receipt of the treatment (columns
(1) and (3)) and then include all the covariates previously used to estimate
the propensity score (columns (2) and (4)). The overall result is that there
is a positive and significant effect on both R&D/empl and shareR&Dempl
and this is very similar and robust across different matched samples.
The impact of participation to U-I projects on firms’ R&D/empl is in
the region of 0.076-0.118, the lowest being found in the 1:5 matched sample
and the highest in the kernel matched sample. These figures correspond
to an increase in the R&D/empl of treated firms by 7.9-12.5% three years
after the start of the projects.18 Given that R&D/empl of treated firms is, on
average, £60,000, participating to a U-I project has the effect of increasing it
by around £4,740 (7.9%) - £7,500 (12.5%).
The impact of U-I projects on firms’ shareR&Dempl is also positive and
significant: participant firms employ, on average, 3-4% of R&D employees
more than non-participants, three years after the start date of the project.
This means that treated firms have, on average, 0.7-1 employee more after
the treatment, given that 22 is the average number of R&D personnel in
treated firms.
As hypothesised in this work, firms that participate to R&D projects with
universities display higher figures as far as their R&D effort is concerned.
In the first place, the exchange of knowledge and resources with univer-
sity that arises from participation to U-I R&D projects has the effect of in-
creasing R&D expenditure per employee, because it entails a higher firms’
engagement in research, both in terms of knowledge production and finan-
cial engagement. Secondly, through the network of relationships that arise
from the partnerships, U-I projects represent an opportunity for companies
to hire new R&D personnel at the end of the project as well as the chance of
learning for existing staff. Before discussing our findings, we dedicate the
next section to assess the quality of the matching procedure that we imple-
mented.
18The interpretation of the estimated coefficient of a dummy variable in a log-linear
regression is calculated by taking the anti-log of the coefficient and subtracting 1 to that, so
to find the estimated % change in the outcome variable (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980).
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2.5.3 Evaluating the quality of PSM
In this work we implemented a propensity score matching in order to find
a plausible control group of non-treated firms that are similar to the treated
ones in pre-treatment characteristics. As shown in table 2.1 and Figure 2.1,
pre-treatment characteristics differ quite substantially between treated and
the raw group of untreated firms before the matching, hence supporting
the need to select an ad-hoc control group. Therefore, for the matching
procedure to be satisfactory, we expect that the mean values of the two
groups for every single pre-treatment variable do not differ significantly
after matching.
For every matching algorithm that we implement, we carry out a
balance test of the covariates used in the estimation of the propensity
score, by performing a t-test on the hypothesis that the mean value of each
variable is the same in the treatment group and in the control group after
the matching. The results are reported in Tables 2.9, 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 . The
last two columns of each table report the difference between the mean value
of each variable in the treatment and control group and the T-statistics with
the usual significance level.
The balance test on the 1:1 matched sample (Table 2.9) provides the best
results, with the only exception of labour productivity and one of the in-
dustry dummies, which still display significant differences after the match-
ing, but only at 10% level. Instead, it turns out that increasing the number
of selected untreated matches with 1:5, 1:10 or kernel matching does not
produce better matching on the covariates. The more controls are selected,
the more covariates are not well balanced. This may be suggestive of the
fact that observations that are bad matches are used, hence leading to a re-
latively higher bias. Therefore, we only consider the 1:1 nearest neighbour
matching to be satisfactory in achieving a good balance of pre-treatment
characteristics between treatment and control group. The other matching
algorithms implemented yields very similar results in the OLS regressions,
but are not fully satisfactory.
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2.6 Discussion and conclusion
This paper has investigated the impact of university-industry R&D collab-
oration on firms’ R&D effort. We estimate the effect that U-I partnerships
funded by the EPSRC in the UK have on firms’ R&D expenditure per
employee and share of R&D employment. We hypothesise that the ex-
change of knowledge and resources with university has a positive effect
on R&D expenditure per employee and that U-I projects provide the
opportunity to hire new R&D personnel at the end of the project, hence
increasing the share of R&D employment. To investigate this, we use a
novel and unique dataset, made up of data on U-I partnerships combined
with firm-level characteristics. We employ propensity score matching
to select a control group of firms that is as similar as possible to the
group of treated firms in terms of pre-treatment characteristics and we es-
timate the impact of U-I projects via OLS regression on the matched sample.
We find that EPSRC U-I collaborations funded between 1998 and 2007
have a positive impact on both intramural R&D expenditure per employee
and share of R&D personnel employed, three years after the beginning of
U-I projects. This result is very similar across several matching methods
employed for the selection of the control group. The 1:1 nearest neighbour
matching provides the most robust results because it achieves a satisfactory
balance of the pre-treatment characteristics used to estimate the propensity
score. From the OLS regression carried out on the 1:1 matches sample,
it emerges that R&D expenditure per employee of participating firms
increases by 8.37% after taking part to a U-I project, corresponding to
£5,082.19 The share of R&D employment increases by 3.43%, corresponding
to, on average, 1 additional employee working on R&D related tasks after
participation to a U-I project.
The results of this work are in line with previous empirical findings
(see e.g. Becker and Peters, 2000; Becker, 2003; Lo¨o¨f and Brostro¨m, 2008),
as well as with the survey based study of ESPRC collaborations illustrated
in Bruneel et al. (2009). However, they should be interpreted with caution
because they represent average effects. In particular, this study has not in-
vestigated whether the results and their magnitude differ across firms (e.g.
19This is 8.37% of £60,711, that is the R&D per employee in the treatment group in the
1:1 matched sample.
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size-groups and industries) and across time (e.g. short-term and long-term).
Yet, this study provides various contributions to the academic literature.
Firstly, existing empirical evidence attempting to assess the impact of U-I
interactions on firms is often vague about whether such impact should
be traced on innovative activities or on the overall productivity. After
a careful study of policy-related documents, we argue that, in our case,
it is on the former, and in particular on the R&D input side, that an
impact should be searched. This is due to the pre-competitive nature
of the funded projects under study, which are aimed at contributing to
upstream and basic research that is far from industrial application, hence
far from producing R&D outputs. Secondly, we carry out our empirical
exercise, on an original dataset, by combining propensity score matching
and OLS regression in order to reduce the selection bias that is typical
of evaluation studies in quasi-experimental settings, and our results are
consistent across different matching procedures implemented. Although
propensity score matching represents nowadays a standard methodology
for policy evaluation, by combining it with OLS regression we obtain
‘doubly-robust’ estimates. Thirdly, we provide new evidence of the effect
that EPSRC funded U-I research collaborations - extensively studied
as far as their determinants and features are - have on firms, and we
show that they have a positive impact on intramural R&D expenditure
per employee and on the share of employees working on R&D related tasks.
As far as the policy discussion is concerned, our findings are supportive
of the argument that universities are an integral part of the supply chain
to firms to support business growth and economic prosperity both at the
regional and national level. This was particularly emphasised in the UK
policy discourse from the late 1990s onwards (Lawton Smith and Bagchi-
Sen, 2006) and has been recently reaffirmed by the UK Wilson Review of
Business-University Collaboration (Wilson, 2012). In particular, our result
of a positive effect of U-I projects on firms’ R&D employment is in line
with Bruneel et al. (2009), who report that firms declared collaborating with
university mostly to gain the opportunity to recruit appropriately trained
staff. This leads to an important implication for science, technology and
innovation policy. The main benefits of universities are certainly related to
the expertise that they provide to the local economic system and this is often
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embodied in knowledge as well as people. Therefore, it is fundamental to
create or strengthen (where they exist) mechanisms that support the use
of university research as a mean for recruiting appropriately skilled staff,
which are likely to be more useful than mechanisms focusing on research
or recruitment alone (Bruneel et al., 2009).
To conclude, it is worth underlying that this work has some limitations,
paving the way for further research. In the first place, in this study we focus
on the impact of the first project entered by a firm and do not consider
following projects. However, accounting for the number of U-I projects per
firm could shed lights on differences between occasional participants and
recurrent participants, both in terms of what determines participation and
what its impact is. Secondly, it is worth noticing that, by only considering
U-I partnerships funded by the EPSRC, we may only be capturing part of
the story, given that firms generally receive a multitude of public funds
(from different funding agencies) for R&D activities. However, the EPSRC
funds the bulk of R&D activities in the UK (D’Este et al., 2013) and thus,
we are confident that our case is quite representative. In addition, although
we only focus on research collaboration as a channel of knowledge transfer
between university and industry, it is well known that cooperative research
partnerships are among the most typical forms of U-I research collabora-
tions (OECD, 1998; Fontana et al., 2006) and, indeed, they are one of the
most frequent policy instruments towards U-I knowledge transfer put in
place by policy-makers (OECD, 1998, 2002a; Fisher et al., 2009; D’Este and
Iammarino, 2010).
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2.7 Tables
Variable Mean St. dev. Min Max Mean Mean Diff.
(t− 1) treated untreat.
employment 115.13 668.37 0 67,377 367.75 114.36 253.38***
empl sq 459,957 2.49e+07 0 4.54e+09 1,447,509 456,988 990,520
lab. product. 242.61 15,217.2 0 3,044,692 203.05 242.73 -39.67
market share 0.0069 0.0368 0 1 0.0269 0.0069 0.0200***
foreign link 0.2243 0.4171 0 1 0.3159 0.2238 0.0921***
single plant 0.8096 0.3926 0 1 0.6553 0.8091 -0.1537***
birth year 1988.02 9.1905 1973 2006 1986.98 1988.03 -1.0537
East Midlands 0.0766 0.2659 0 1 0.0783 0.0765 0.0017
East of Engl. 0.1090 0.3117 0 1 0.1305 0.1089 0.0215
London 0.1109 0.3140 0 1 0.0731 0.1110 -0.0379**
North East 0.0306 0.1723 0 1 0.0261 0.0306 -0.0045
North West 0.0983 0.2978 0 1 0.0966 0.0983 -0.0017
N. Ireland 0.0212 0.1441 0 1 0.0261 0.0212 0.0048
Scotland 0.0843 0.2778 0 1 0.0731 0.0842 -0.0111
South East 0.1694 0.3751 0 1 0.2454 0.1692 0.0762***
South West 0.0822 0.2747 0 1 0.0652 0.0823 -0.0171
Wales 0.0501 0.2182 0 1 0.0391 0.0501 -0.0109
West Midlands 0.0877 0.2829 0 1 0.0783 0.0877 -0.0094
Yorks&Humb 0.0792 0.2701 0 1 0.0678 0.0793 -0.0114
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics and mean comparison of pre-treatment
characteristics between treated (N = 370) and untreated (raw sample:
N = 126, 371) firms
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Variable Sign and significance
employment positive across all years, significant in most years
employment squared negative across all years, significant in half of the estimations
labour productivity mostly positive sign, never significant
market share positive across almost all years, significant in few of the estimations
foreign link positive and significant in few estimations
single plant mostly negative, not significant
birth year earlier birth years negative and significant
region dummies mixture of positive/negative signs
industry dummmies positive and significant for manufacturing, negative for services
Table 2.2: Summary of probit regressions estimating the probability of treatment
in years 1998-2007
Year (a) Treated (b) Raw (c) 1:1 psm (d) 1:5 psm (e) 1:10 psm (f) Kernel psm
untreat. untreat. untreat. untreat. untreat.
1998 35 7,559 35 167 318 5,257
1999 35 9,586 35 161 307 4,250
2000 61 8,251 61 278 531 6,096
2001 55 9,833 55 252 482 7,007
2002 31 11,148 31 140 272 4,320
2003 28 14,543 28 137 258 4,596
2004 43 17,759 43 195 371 8,479
2005 23 14,743 23 101 198 3,272
2006 39 16,612 39 192 373 7,980
2007 20 16,337 20 99 189 4,163
Total 370 126,371 370 1,722 3,299 55,690
Table 2.3: Distribution of treated (a) and raw untreated (b) firms across years and
matching algorithms (c-d-e-f).
114
Outcome variable Obs. Mean St. dev. Min Max Mean Mean Diff.
treated untreat.
1:1 psm
ln R&D per emplt+3 740 3.89 0.5035 0.4055 7.3455 3.9322 3.8463 0.0858**
share R&D emplt+3 740 0.1323 0.1875 0.0003 1 0.1542 0.1104 0.0437***
1:5 psm
ln R&D per emplt+3 2,092 3.8537 0.4995 0 7.417 3.9343 3.8362 0.0981***
share R&D emplt+3 2,092 0.1193 0.1704 0.0001 1 0.1534 0.112 0.0414***
1:10 psm
ln R&D per emplt+3 3,669 3.8340 0.4977 -1.6094 7.4171 3.9343 3.8227 0.1116***
share R&D emplt+3 3,669 0.1154 0.1668 0.0001 1 0.1534 0.1111 0.0423***
kernel psm
ln R&D per emplt+3 56,060 3.7851 0.4388 -1.6094 9.3115 3.9312 3.7841 0.1470***
share R&D emplt+3 56,060 0.1228 0.1685 1.35e-05 1 0.155 0.1226 0.0323***
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of the outcome variables for every matched
sub-sample (1:1, 1:5, 1:10, kernel)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnR&D/emplt+3 lnR&D/emplt+3 %R&Demplt+3 %R&Demplt+3
Treatmentt 0.0859** 0.0804** 0.0438*** 0.0343***
(0.0367) (0.0330) (0.0136) (0.0118)
Constant 3.723*** 4.038*** 0.174*** 0.0226
(0.0566) (0.186) (0.0334) (0.0672)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Firm-level varst−1 - yes - yes
Birth year dummies - yes - yes
Industry dummies - yes - yes
Region dummies - yes - yes
Observations 740 740 740 740
Adj-R2 0.0163 0.203 0.0198 0.273
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.5: OLS on 1:1 NN matched sample
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnR&D/emplt+3 lnR&D/emplt+3 %R&Demplt+3 %R&Demplt+3
Treatmentt 0.0821*** 0.0762*** 0.0409*** 0.0399***
(0.0280) (0.0247) (0.0119) (0.0099)
Constant 3.687*** 3.719*** 0.170*** 0.170***
(0.0422) (0.211) (0.0283) (0.0618)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Firm-level varst−1 - yes - yes
Birth year dummies - yes - yes
Industry dummies - yes - yes
Region dummies - yes - yes
Observations 2,092 2,092 2,092 2,092
Adj-R2 0.0316 0.201 0.0255 0.292
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.6: Weighted OLS on 1:5 NN matched sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnR&D/emplt+3 lnR&D/emplt+3 %R&Demplt+3 %R&Demplt+3
Treatmentt 0.0949*** 0.0872*** 0.0429*** 0.0393***
(0.0267) (0.0231) (0.0115) (0.0093)
Constant 3.705*** 3.687*** 0.174*** 0.136***
(0.0387) (0.192) (0.0277) (0.0461)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Firm-level varst−1 - yes - yes
Birth year dummies - yes - yes
Industry dummies - yes - yes
Region dummies - yes - yes
Observations 3,669 3,669 3,669 3,669
Adj-R2 0.0311 0.199 0.0291 0.296
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.7: Weighted OLS on 1:10 NN matched sample
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
lnR&D/emplt+3 lnR&D/emplt+3 %R&Demplt+3 %R&Demplt+3
Treatmentt 0.118*** 0.0854*** 0.0358*** 0.0408***
(0.0259) (0.0224) (0.0113) (0.0096)
Constant 3.677*** 3.703*** 0.200*** 0.0730
(0.0354) (0.0851) (0.0270) (0.0474)
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Firm-level varst−1 - yes - yes
Birth year dummies - yes - yes
Industry dummies - yes - yes
Region dummies - yes - yes
Observations 56,060 56,060 56,060 56,060
Adj-R2 0.0445 0.234 0.0342 0.329
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.8: Weighted OLS on kernel matched sample
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Variable Mean treated Mean untreated Diff. T-stat
employment 361.93 309.01 52.92 0.71
empl. squared 1450000 821000 626537 0.86
labour productivity 181.23 115.27 65.96 1.64*
market share 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.28
single plant 0.66 0.70 -0.04 -1.02
foreign link 0.31 0.33 -0.02 -0.55
birth year 1987.08 1986.53 0.55 0.85
East Midlands 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00
East of England 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.11
London 0.07 0.05 0.02 1.41
North East 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.50
North West 0.09 0.10 -0.01 -0.37
North Ireland 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.25
Scotland 0.08 0.08 0.00 -0.14
South East 0.25 0.28 -0.03 -0.91
South West 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.61
Wales 0.04 0.05 -0.02 -1.05
West Midlands 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.72
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.15
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
11 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.58
12 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -1.01
13 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.74*
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.45
18 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
20 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00
21 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.43
22 0.02 0.04 -0.01 -1.11
23 0.02 0.03 -0.01 -0.48
24 0.04 0.02 0.01 1.06
25 0.08 0.06 0.02 1.03
26 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.01
27 0.05 0.07 -0.02 -1.24
28 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.15
29 0.12 0.14 -0.02 -0.66
30 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00
31 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
32 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
33 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
34 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.64
35 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.58
36 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.21
37 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.42
40 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
45 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.00
50 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.00
51 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00
52 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.12
55 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -1.42
60 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.38
61 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.91
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.9: Mean comparison and T-test after 1:1 matching (N treated = 370, N
untreated = 370)
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Variable Mean treated Mean untreated Diff. T-stat
employment 370.76 249.25 121.51 2.71***
empl. squared 1479399 519435 959963 2.59***
labour productivity 205.32 169.54 35.78 0.58
market share 0.03 0.02 0.01 1.79*
single plant 0.66 0.69 -0.04 -1.36
foreign link 0.31 0.31 0.00 -0.01
birth year 1987.00 1986.68 0.32 0.62
East Midlands 0.08 0.08 0.00 -0.08
East of England 0.13 0.14 0.00 -0.19
London 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.05
North East 0.03 0.02 0.01 1.30
North West 0.09 0.10 -0.01 -0.37
North Ireland 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.52
Scotland 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.50
South East 0.25 0.26 0.00 -0.18
South West 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.19
Wales 0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.97
West Midlands 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.63
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.17
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71
11 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.30
12 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.98
13 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.66
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.38
17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.50
18 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.36
19 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.69*
20 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00
21 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.52
22 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00
23 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.27
24 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.62
25 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.59
26 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.71
27 0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.73
28 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.13
29 0.12 0.12 -0.01 -0.32
30 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.71
31 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.40
32 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.39
33 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.19
34 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.48
35 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.39
36 0.03 0.04 -0.01 -0.66
37 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.74
40 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.07
41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13
45 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.46
50 0.11 0.12 -0.01 -0.47
51 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.26
52 0.10 0.10 0.00 -0.09
55 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.66
60 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.56
61 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.48
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.10: Mean comparison and T-test after 1:5 matching (N treated = 370, N
untreated = 1, 722)
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Variable Mean treated Mean untreated Diff. T-stat
employment 370.76 233.03 137.73 3.48***
empl. squared 1479399 484778 994621 3***
labour productivity 205.32 158.05 47.27 0.85
market share 0.03 0.02 0.01 2.63***
single plant 0.66 0.70 -0.04 -1.54
foreign link 0.31 0.31 0.01 0.37
birth year 1987.00 1986.72 0.28 0.57
East Midlands 0.08 0.08 0.00 -0.02
East of England 0.13 0.14 -0.01 -0.28
London 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.30
North East 0.03 0.02 0.01 1.21
North West 0.09 0.11 -0.01 -0.66
North Ireland 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.04
Scotland 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.03
South East 0.25 0.24 0.01 0.47
South West 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.62
Wales 0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.77
West Midlands 0.08 0.08 -0.01 -0.36
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.06 0.07 0.00 -0.12
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99
11 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.20
12 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.55
13 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02
14 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73
15 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.21
16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10
17 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.63
18 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.31
19 0.01 0.00 0.00 1.62
20 0.09 0.09 0.00 -0.31
21 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01
22 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.15
23 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.29
24 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.28
25 0.08 0.08 0.00 -0.01
26 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.55
27 0.05 0.05 0.00 -0.29
28 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.19
29 0.12 0.12 -0.01 -0.35
30 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.35
31 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.62
32 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.12
33 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.33
34 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.79
35 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.58
36 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.30
37 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.63
40 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01
41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22
45 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.55
50 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.34
51 0.11 0.11 0.00 -0.11
52 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.34
55 0.10 0.10 0.00 -0.07
60 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.47
61 0.01 0.02 0.00 -0.67
62 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.08
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.11: Mean comparison and T-test after 1:10 matching (N treated = 370, N
untreated = 3, 299)
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Variable Mean treated Mean untreated Diff. T-stat
employment 332.85 94.55 238.30 10.46***
empl. squared 1131392 193366 938026 1.34
labour productivity 181.65 220.08 -38.43 -0.05
market share 0.02 0.01 0.02 9.47***
single plant 0.67 0.83 -0.16 -8.16***
foreign link 0.32 0.20 0.12 5.57***
birth year 1987.15 1987.86 -0.71 -1.49
East Midlands 0.08 0.08 0.00 -0.23
East of England 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.58
London 0.07 0.11 -0.03 -2.17***
North East 0.02 0.02 0.01 1.02
North West 0.09 0.10 -0.01 -0.39
North Ireland 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.26
Scotland 0.08 0.08 -0.01 -0.55
South East 0.25 0.20 0.05 2.58***
South West 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.04
Wales 0.04 0.04 0.00 -0.28
West Midlands 0.08 0.10 -0.02 -1.28
Yorkshire & Humberside 0.07 0.07 0.00 -0.34
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08
11 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.01**
12 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08
13 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08
14 0.01 0.00 0.01 4.66***
15 0.01 0.02 -0.01 -1.19
16 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.34
17 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.39
18 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.82*
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.73*
20 0.01 0.00 0.01 1.83*
21 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.19
22 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.27
23 0.09 0.05 0.04 3.06***
24 0.03 0.03 0.00 -0.17
25 0.02 0.01 0.01 1.51
26 0.02 0.01 0.01 3.30***
27 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.08
28 0.08 0.09 -0.01 -0.86
29 0.02 0.01 0.01 2.47***
30 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.76
31 0.06 0.02 0.04 4.62
32 0.12 0.06 0.06 5.37***
33 0.03 0.01 0.01 2.08**
34 0.01 0.00 0.01 2.36***
35 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.26
36 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.01***
37 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03
40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18
41 0.03 0.09 -0.06 -4.04***
45 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.34
50 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08
51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34
52 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88
55 0.01 0.00 0.01 3.15***
60 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.20
61 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.18
62 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.27
63 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.11
64 0.11 0.11 0.00 -0.20
65 0.08 0.15 -0.06 -3.50***
66 0.10 0.18 -0.08 -4.02***
67 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.57
70 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.18
71 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.08
72 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.47
73 0.01 0.01 0.00 1.17
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.12: Mean comparison and T-test after Kernel matching (N treated = 370, N
untreated = 55, 690)
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2.8 Figures
Figure 2.1: Distribution of treated and untreated firms across sectors (SIC 1992)
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2.9 Appendices
2.9.1 Appendix: Sample representativeness
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Mean Mean Mean Diff. Diff. Mean Diff.
full sample unmatched matched (b)-(c) (a)-(c) matched (a)-(f)
N=3331 N=1843 N=1488 N=370
Num of prj 1.498 1.544 1.4401 0.1045** 0.0579** 1.5229 -0.0249
Lenght of prj, y 2.7553 2.7972 2.7035 0.0937** 0.0518** 2.6932 0.0621
Lenght of prj, d (ln) 6.8128 6.8336 6.7872 0.0464** 0.0256* 6.7829 0.0299
Funds per firm (ln) 9.6831 9.6957 9.6674 0.0282 0.0157 9.8133 -0.1302*
Share intra reg. U 0.2908 0.2791 0.3049 -0.0255* -0.0141 0.3032 -0.0124
Size of U dept 42.8339 43.3462 42.2029 1.1433 0.631 42.8451 -0.0112
Quality of U dept 2.5496 2.5649 2.5307 0.0342 0.0189 2.5926 -0.043
Significance level: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2.13: Sample representativeness for projects characteristics
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2.9.2 Appendix: Industries
Code SIC 1992 description
10 Mining of coal & lignite, extraction of peat
11 Oil & gas extraction
14 Other mining & quarrying
15 Mfg of food products & beverages
16 Mfg of tobacco products
17 Mfg textiles
18 Mfg of wearing apparel
19 Tanning & dressing of leather
20 Mfg of wood & of products of wood & cork
21 Mfg of pulp, paper & paper products
22 Publishing, printing & reproduction of recorded media
23 Mfg of coke, refined petroleum products & nuclear fuel
24 Mfg of chemicals and chemical products
25 Mfg of rubber & plastic products
26 Mfg of other non-metallic mineral products
27 Mfg of basic metals
28 Mfg of fabricated metal products, except machinery & equipment
29 Mfg of machinery & equipment not elsewhere classified
30 Mfg of office machinery & computers
31 Mfg of electric machinery & apparatus not elsewhere classified
32 Mfg of radio, tv & communications equipment & apparatus
33 Mfg of medical, precision & optical instruments, watches & clocks
34 Mfg of motor vehicles, trailers & semi-trailers
35 Mfg of other transport equipment
36 Mfg of furniture & other not elsewhere classified
37 Recycling
45 Construction
50 Sale, maintenance & repair of motor vehicles & motorcycles; retail sale
of automotive fuel
51 Wholesale & commission trade, except motor vehicles & motorcycles
52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles & motorcycles
55 Hotels & restaurants
60 Land transport; transport via pipelines
62 Air transport
64 Post & telecommunications
65 Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding
71 Renting of machinery & equipment without operator and of personal
and household goods
72 Computer & related activities
73 Research & development
74 Other business activities
85 Health & social work
92 Relational, cultural & sporting activities
93 Other service activities
Table 2.14: 2 digit Standard Industrial Classification 1992 codes and description
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Chapter 3
Organisational-level determinants
of academic engagement with
industry
3.1 Introduction
In the last decades universities have extended their entrepreneurial activity
in many directions, including collaborating with industry in research
projects, patenting and licensing, creating science parks, and promoting
university spin-outs. In the academic literature, there is large evidence
on university intellectual property activity (or commercialization) and
academic entrepreneurship, but it is widely recognized that other types of
U-I interaction are more pervasive, although less traceable (Perkmann et al.,
2013). In particular, ’academic engagement’ refers to inter-organisational
collaboration that links universities with other organisations, especially
firms. Therefore, academic engagement represents an alternative way to
define U-I knowledge transfer, but it differs from the latter in that it is more
focused on the university side.
In this paper, we focus on the factors that bring UK universities to
engage in U-I research collaboration, a specific typology of university
knowledge transfer activity that falls under the definition of academic
engagement as well as under that of U-I knowledge transfer. We study
the case of R&D projects that involve UK universities and firms, which
have been funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council (EPSRC) between 1992 and 2007. These were mainly aimed at
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basic and pre-competitive research activities and often involved financial
contribution from the private partners.
There is an extensive empirical evidence on the determinants of U-I
collaboration (see e.g. Schartinger et al., 2002; D’Este and Patel, 2007; D’Este
and Iammarino, 2010; D’Este and Perkmann, 2011; D’Este et al., 2013),
but very often the focus is on the occurrence and the frequency of U-I
engagement, whereas the volume of financial resources involved is only
rarely accounted for. Instead, the income that universities receive from their
knowledge transfer activities may reflect the value that external partners
place on the knowledge they receive from universities and thus provide a
proxy of the value created through knowledge transfer (Rossi and Rosli,
2013).
One exception in the empirical literature is represented by Perkmann
et al. (2011), who measure different forms of academic engagement with the
amount of funding that UK universities receive by companies. On the same
vein, in this paper we intend to overcome the above-mentioned limitation
by measuring U-I collaboration with the amount of funding that companies
provide to U-I research collaboration led by UK universities. However, in
order to carry out a more fine-grained analysis we focus on the individual
departments engaged in collaboration with firms rather than looking at
universities. In addition, since we analyse the specific case of publicly
funded U-I collaborations, we control for the amount of public funding for
U-I collaboration. Accounting for that is highly relevant for policy because
it helps shedding new lights on the factors that attract private funding for
academic research.
Moreover, the role of individual-level factors is well explored in the
literature, but evidence is scant when it comes to the organisational context
in which academic engagement occurs, especially with respect to the
characteristics and academic quality of university departments involved
(Perkmann et al., 2013). It emerges from some studies that academic en-
gagement is negatively associated with organisation-level research quality
(Ponomariov, 2008), whereas the link is not clear in some other studies. A
negative relationship between quality and academic engagement might
be due to the possibility that the latter acts as a resource mobilization
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mechanisms for high-performing academics at low-ranked institutions
(Perkmann et al., 2013).
As suggested by Perkmann et al. (2013) in their agenda for future
research, studies should also focus on the characteristics and research
standing of teams and departments rather than only on the role of
individual-level determinants. We take on board this suggestion and
intend to shed new light on the role of organisation-level research quality
by answering the following research question: ‘What is the role of department
level characteristics for UK universities’ engagement in U-I collaboration?’
Our analysis exploits a setting that is similar to the one used by
Perkmann et al. (2011), in that we model university engagement with
industry as depending upon research quality along with a number of
features, but we take university departments as our unit of analysis.
Moreover, we exploit a number of additional and crucial information on
both academic engagement and research quality. In the first place, in our
analysis we are able to account for past academic engagement and for
past records of departmental research quality, which allows us to establish
whether research quality plays a role and whether it still matters in the
presence of past collaboration. Secondly, since we study the case of publicly
funded U-I collaboration, we distinguish private and public contribution
for academic engagement and we can thus check whether the relationship
between industry funding and research quality is affected by the existence
of past public funding. We believe this is relevant in light of the argument
that public intervention may enhance or moderate the role of research
quality for attracting private funding for research.
The paper is organised as follows: we review the relevant literature and
develop our empirical hypotheses in section 3.2; in sections 3.3 and 3.4 we il-
lustrate our data sources and methodology respectively; section 3.5 is dedic-
ated to the description of the variables and the empirical results are presen-
ted in section 3.6; finally, we discuss our findings and offer some concluding
remarks in section 3.7.
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3.2 Literature and hypotheses development
3.2.1 The role of universities
In the last decades views changed regarding the role of universities in the
economy: from being seen as ‘ivory towers’ where academics mainly per-
formed research in isolation, universities became an economic organisation
actively engaged with external stakeholders (Freitas et al., 2011). In order to
compensate for the decrease in government funding for military-oriented
research and for a more general reduction of government intervention in
the economy, universities became more interested in collaborating with
companies (Geuna and Muscio, 2009). In addition, due to competition
pressures and increasing speed and complexity of knowledge processes,
as well as declining profits and increasing costs of research, companies
needed to get closer to external sources of knowledge in order to innovate.
As a consequence, industry became increasingly interested in university
research as well as highly skilled personnel to create and exploit new
knowledge (Freitas et al., 2011).
Moreover, universities have assumed a territorial role that manifests
itself in the stimulation of economic development through local spending
on wages and services (Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen, 2012). This argu-
ment rests upon the assumption that university research promotes local
knowledge spillovers which leads to regional innovation processes (Geuna
and Muscio, 2009). In the analysis of knowledge spillovers as a source of
innovation, productivity and growth, several levels of analysis have been
accounted for. In the first place, various seminal contributions focus on
the regional dimension of knowledge spillovers, showing that knowledge
spillovers and innovative performance are geographically bounded (Jaffe,
1989; Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). Secondly, strong evidence emerges
that there is a positive correlation between firms’ geographical concentra-
tion and university location (Varga, 2000; Audretsch and Lehmann, 2005).
Finally, recent literature investigates the effects of spillovers on urban
productivity and city size (Henderson, 2007).
The common trait in all those studies is that firms are regarded as creat-
ive and dynamic agents, searching for knowledge in the local environment
and that the spillovers of knowledge generate positive externalities to
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firms by stimulating innovation activities and productivity (Cassia et al.,
2009). Inter-relations among firms, universities and research centres within
economic systems are hence now considered vital for the generation and
dissemination of new knowledge. Universities that are able to participate
into the flows of knowledge interactions are crucial sources of external
knowledge to firms. In addition, the shift towards the knowledge based
model of economic development together with the paradigm of the ‘en-
trepreneurial’ university (Etzkowitz et al., 2000) legitimate universities to
pursue their own profits, aside acting as a central agent in the process of
knowledge production and generation (Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen,
2006).
As a consequence, nowadays many universities establish and nurture
links with knowledge users, such as firms, and by facilitating technology
transfer. Together with commercialisation activities, such as patenting and
academic spinoffs, universities carry out a wide range of collaborating
initiatives, identified as ‘academic engagement’. As defined by Perkmann
et al. (2013) ‘academic engagement’ refers to inter-organisational collabor-
ation that links universities with other organisations, especially firms, and
includes both formal activities (e.g. collaborative research, contract research
and consulting) and informal activities like networking with practitioners.
Although there is large evidence on university intellectual property activity
and academic entrepreneurship, it is widely recognized that other academic
engagement activities are more pervasive, but less traceable (Perkmann
et al., 2013).
University-Industry collaborative (or cooperative) research is one
specific channel of inter-organisational knowledge flows and potential
spillovers from (and to) academic research aimed at carrying out R&D
projects, mainly involving pre-competitive and basic research and often
subsidized by public funding (OECD, 1998, 2002a; D’Este and Fontana,
2007; D’Este and Iammarino, 2010; D’Este et al., 2013). Cooperative
research partnerships are among the most typical forms of U-I research
collaborations, followed by contract research, research consortia, consulting
and founding of co-operative research centres (OECD, 1998; Fontana et al.,
2006). They also are one of the most frequent policy instruments put in
place by local and national policy-makers to foster pre-competitive research
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and university-business knowledge transfer activities (OECD, 1998, 2002a;
Fisher et al., 2009; D’Este and Iammarino, 2010).
Very often the focus of empirical research is on the realisation of part-
nerships and/or their number, measured by the occurrence and/or the fre-
quency of U-I partnerships, whereas only rarely is the volume of financial
resources deriving from collaborations accounted for. Rossi and Rosli (2013)
argue that the income that universities receive from their knowledge trans-
fer activities can reflect the value that external partners place on the know-
ledge they receive from universities and may provide a proxy for the value
created through knowledge transfer. However, evidence is rather scant with
respect to that. In this paper, we intent to fill this gap and therefore, we
measure U-I collaboration by accounting for the income provided by com-
panies involved in the partnerships, similarly to Perkmann et al. (2011), who
operationalise academic engagement with industry using incomes derived
from different forms of engagement.
3.2.2 The role of academic quality
There is extensive empirical evidence on the determinants of U-I collab-
oration (see e.g. Schartinger et al., 2002; D’Este and Patel, 2007; D’Este
and Iammarino, 2010; D’Este and Perkmann, 2011; D’Este et al., 2013). In
particular, the literature on university-business interactions has devoted
a great deal of attention to the role of research quality. In their seminal
contributions, Mansfield (1995, 1997) and Mansfield and Lee (1996) argue
that academic research excellence is expected to be a strong driver for
companies that are interested in carrying out joint research activities with
universities. In the same vein, Tornquist and Kallsen (1994) show that high
quality universities are likely to produce research with a greater potential
for industrial application. More recently, it has been shown that university
quality together with geographical proximity between businesses and
universities influence the frequency of U-I collaboration in the UK (D’Este
and Iammarino, 2010; Laursen et al., 2011).
Within the literature on the determinants of U-I interaction the role
of individual-level factors is also well explored. Several studies looking
at academic engagement at the level of individual academics show that
the most successful academics are also those who engage the most with
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industry (Gulbrandsen and Smeby, 2005; Bekkers and Bodas Freitas, 2008;
Haeussler and Colyvas, 2011). In fact, academics’ scientific productivity
is generally found to be positively related to engagement with industry.
Similarly, various studies find complementarities between the volume of
funds that scientists raise from industry and government grants (Bozeman
and Gaughan, 2007; Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009).
However, evidence is scant when it comes to the organisational context
in which academic engagement occurs, especially with respect to the char-
acteristics and research quality of the departments involved (Perkmann
et al., 2013). Although academic engagement is clearly associated with
individual academics’ research standing, the same cannot be said when it
comes to the organisation-level. The overall effect of organisation-level aca-
demic quality on participation in U-I collaborative activities has been found
to be negative or mixed, as shown by D’Este and Patel (2007), Ponomariov
(2008), Perkmann et al. (2011). D’Este and Patel (2007) show that scientists
from departments that are poorly rated seem to engage in a wider range
of interactions with industry, but this is only valid in the case of applied
disciplines, whereas Ponomariov (2008) finds that the higher the average
academic quality of an institution, the lower the propensity of individual
scientists to interact with the private sector. Moreover, Perkmann et al.
(2011) find support for a negative relationship between research quality
and applied forms of academic engagement in the social sciences.
A possible explanation of such a negative relationship, contradicting
previous findings of a positive relationship, is that a relatively low resource
availability at lower quality universities may motivate top academics in
these schools to seek industry collaboration in order to acquire research
funds. In addition, the effect of a more prestigious research environment
may be that academics perceive greater incentives to engage in blue sky
research than to engage in interactions with industry. However, existing
evidence has not been, so far, univocal with respect to this. In this paper
we intend to shed more light on the existence of a negative relationship
between research quality and academic engagement, hence, we put forward
the following hypothesis:
Hp1: The lower is department academic quality, the higher is the volume of
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industry funding raised for academic engagement.
Notwithstanding the importance of research quality, this alone cannot
fully explain the occurrence and the level of university-business interaction.
Extant research has extensively focused on several contextual factors that
may have an impact on the involvement of universities with firms, together
with quality, notably geographical proximity, department/university
size and previous experience. With respect to the latter, the attitude of
academics towards industry as well as their collaborative behavior, are
positively influenced by having collaborated in the past with companies
(see e.g. Van Dierdonck et al., 1990; D’Este and Patel, 2007). Moreover, the
likelihood of scientists’ participation in academic engagement activities is
also positively influenced by previous experience in patenting and other
commercialisation activities (Bekkers and Bodas Freitas, 2008).
When previous engagement is measured with the volume of past funds
raised by higher education institutions, it turns out that the ability to mo-
bilise resources is generally positively linked to collaboration with industry
(Perkmann et al., 2011; Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007). This may be due
to the fact that universities’ success in fund raising represents a signal for
businesses, which hence leads to more opportunities and, arguably, more
collaborating activities. This circular phenomenon recalls the so-called
‘Matthew effect’ (Merton, 1968), according to which greater recognition of
merits often accrues to scientists of considerable reputation, whereas such
recognition is withhold from scientists that ‘have not yet made their mark’
(Merton, 1968, pag. 58). In our case, this would imply that departments
that have not yet engaged into collaboration with industry will be less
known and hence, will have less opportunity to do so than departments
who already have past experience.1
However, to the best of our knowledge, evidence on previous experience
as a contextual factor with research quality is very limited. As previously
mentioned, several studies find complementarities between the volume
of government grants and the volume of funding raised from companies
(Lee and Bozeman, 2005; Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007; Link et al., 2007;
1To put it in Merton’s words: ‘centres of demonstrated scientific excellence are alloc-
ated far larger resources for investigation than centres which have yet to make their mark’
(Merton, 1968, pag. 62).
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Boardman, 2009; Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009), but quality is not
accounted for. In this paper, we intend to fill this gap and shed new light on
the role of research quality when past experience is accounted for. We are
interested in the existence of complementarities between past experience,
specifically with government agencies, and department research quality.
Therefore, on the basis of the existence of complementarities between past
government grants and academic engagement, and the hypothesised neg-
ative relationship between the latter and research quality, we hypothesise
the following:
Hp 2: The higher is past public funding, the higher is the impact of quality on
the volume of industry funding raised for U-I collaboration.
In other words, we expect that public funds may enhance the role of
quality, hence attracting higher levels of industry funding. The ability to
raise public resources may be a signal for companies, in spite of quality
levels, of universities and scientists’ capacity to attract funds from govern-
ment agencies, who may look positively at proposals from academic teams
with past experience and that involve industry collaborators (Perkmann
et al., 2013).
3.3 Data
The data for the empirical analysis consists of a set of university-industry
research grants awarded to UK Universities by the Engineering and
Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) between 1992 and 2007,
combined with university and department level information gathered from
the UK Higher Education Funding Councils. In the analysis we focus on
university-industry partnerships funded between 2001 and 2007 (measured
with the amount of industry funding received by university departments
in the whole period) and we study the role of past research quality and
past experience in U-I collaboration (measured with financial contribution
received from the EPSRC in the past) along with a number of other factors.
The EPSRC is one of the UK research councils responsible for adminis-
tering public funding for research in the UK.2 It is responsible for funding
2For further details see section 2.2.3.
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research in the areas of engineering and physical sciences, including all
the engineering fields, chemistry, mathematics and computer science, but
it also welcomes research proposals that span the remits of other research
councils, such as biology, social science or medical-related research. How-
ever, in this paper we restrict the analysis to collaborative grants within
the main remits of the Council. In addition, although project partners
may include companies, government agencies, public bodies, National
Health Service (NHS) Trusts, non-profit organizations, and research and
technology organizations, we only consider projects that involve UK
university departments and companies. The EPSRC data used for the
empirical analysis include information on the number of projects entered
by each department, the size of the grants awarded by the EPSRC and the
amount of cash or in-kind support (or a combination of both) provided by
companies to the joint projects.
We gather information on departments and universities from the 2001
and 2008 Research Assessment Exercises (RAE), an evaluation exercise
carried out in the UK approximately every 5 years, jointly by the Higher
Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE), the Scottish Funding
Council (SFC), the Higher Education Funding Council for Wales (HEFCW)
and the Department for Employment and Learning, Northern Ireland
(DEL). The primary purpose of the RAE is to provide ratings of research
quality to be used by the UK higher education funding bodies in de-
termining the main block research grants for the institutions they fund.
Universities submit the results of their research activity for the assessment
of all or some fraction of the research staff in the selected departments,
within 68 subject research areas. Submission to the RAE is not mandatory
but incentives for participation are high as public research funding depends
on the assessment.
In addition to department ratings the RAE provides a number of other
information, including department size (number of staff) and amount
as well as sources of research funding received during the period under
evaluation.3 The RAE 2001 and 2008 pertain to the periods 1996-2000
and 2001-2007 respectively. Our main data source for the quality profiles
3Quality profiles are produced for the so-called Unit of Assessments, which can be
linked to one or more university departments.
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of university departments is the RAE 2001, since we are interested in
departmental research quality as a determinant of future engagement with
industry (from 2001 to 2008), whereas we collect other information from
both the RAE 2001 and 2008, which we use to form a comprehensive set of
control variables.
To build the dataset, we start by splitting the EPSRC data into two peri-
ods, each pertaining to one of the RAE: in the first one we include all part-
nerships funded between 1992 and 20004 and the second one includes all
those granted from 2001 to 2007.5 Secondly, after collapsing the data at uni-
versity department level, we link each of them to the corresponding Unit
of Assessment of the RAE (2001 and 2008) in order to merge all the rel-
evant information that we need from each RAE. After repeating this for
both periods, we merge the 2001-2007 dataset to the 1992-2000, so to end
up with information on both periods for each university department. The
final dataset includes 280 university departments that took part to at least
one university-business partnership funded by the EPSRC in the first period
(1992-2000) and, in most of the cases, in the second period6 (2001-2007), and
for which we collected data on both periods.
3.4 Method
In this paper we are interested in estimating the determinants of U-I
collaboration. In order to reduce reverse causality issues between our
dependent variables and our independent variables we frame the empirical
empirical analysis in two different time periods: the first period concerns
years 1992-2000 and the second one concerns years 2001-2008. We measure
U-I collaboration with the volume of funding that university departments
receive from companies in the second period (2001-2007). We consider both
the total volume and the average amount of funding per project, calculated
as the former divided by the number of grants obtained in the period
2001-2007. Therefore, we create two dependent variables, IndFundt and
IndFundGrantt, each of the two measuring the extent to which university
4These are 3,332 partnerships. Since only few (17%) have been funded before 1996, we
include them in the first period and gather data from the RAE 2000 for them.
5These are 2,947 partnerships.
6Only 3 departments did not participate in the second period.
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departments engage in U-I collaboration.7
We regress the dependent variables on a measure of department-level
quality in period 1 (t− 1) (independent variable), derived from the quality
profiles published in the RAE 2001. We employ a dummy that takes value 1
if the department has been given a top rating in 2001. In the RAE 2001 each
department submission is rated on a seven-point scale from 1 to 5*, with
5* being the highest score, indicating that research quality has achieved
international excellence in more than a half of the departments’ submitted
activities, and the remaining activities have reached national excellence.8
Hence, we create a dummy called TopQualDept−1, that takes value 1 if a
department has been given one of the two highest ratings (5 or 5*).
It is worth underlying that the use of RAE rankings for the purpose of
evaluating academic quality has both pros and cons. These rankings have
been extensively used in the academic literature focused on UK research
quality (see e.g. McGuinness, 2003; Abramovsky et al., 2007; D’Este and
Patel, 2007; Ambos et al., 2008; D’Este and Iammarino, 2010; Perkmann
et al., 2011). On the one hand, RAE results are considered reliable because
they follow an expert review process conducted by assessment panels,
whose members are nominated by a wide range of organisations, including
research associations, professional bodies and those representing industrial,
business and other users of research. On the other hand, it is arguable
that they only provide partial and imperfect information about the overall
quality of Higher Education Institutions. In the first place, panels’ judg-
ments, although made by experts who command a generally high level
of respect, are subjective and hard to validate. Secondly, and perhaps
more importantly, RAE scores are based on refereed publications, therefore
departments that are more oriented towards the production of publishable
research may be advantaged. On the contrary, departments that are more
focused on teaching activity and/or engaged with private sector activities
7Since both variables are highly skewed and also include a few zeros, we transform
them by taking the zero-skewness logarithm, i.e. each variable is added with a constant
so that the skewness is zero and the logarithm can be taken. In Stata this is done with
lnskew0. The newly created variables are called LnIndFundt and LnIndFundGrantt. We
also replicated our empirical exercise with the log-transformed variables and results do
not change, with the exception of a slightly higher magnitude of some of the coefficients
(see Appendix 3.10).
8The original scale is 1, 2, 3b, 3a, 4, 5 and 5*.
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may be valued less. As a matter of fact, after RAE 2001 results have been
published, some academics felt that their work was validated whereas
others suggested that the RAE failed to account for high-quality strategic
and applied research (Barker, 2007). Moreover, interdisciplinary areas also
seem to have been discriminated against, although it is not easy to find
evidence of this (Barker, 2007). Therefore, RAE based measures, like that
one we will be using, should be always employed and interpreted with
caution, given that they are an imperfect measure of academic standing.
We also include a number of control variables to properly identify the
relationship between quality and academic engagement with industry.
These are either measured at t− 1 (period 1) or at time t (period 2), or are
time-invariant. In the first place, we control for previous experience in U-I
partnerships, using the amount of EPSRC funding awarded in previous
years for U-I projects (LnEsprcFundt−1). This captures previous experience
that departments gain in carrying out research funded by the EPSRC
and, hence, measures their ability to mobilise resources from government
bodies. We are particularly interested in this variable because it helps
understanding whether and to what extent research quality matters in the
presence of previous experience.
In order to account for other streams of funding that each department re-
ceived and that may be related to the volume of funds raised from industry,
we control for the amount of total funding from the private sector (hence
not only for projects funded by the EPSRC) that each department receives in
period 2 (LnIndt) as well as for the overall amount of non-industry funding
received in period 1 (LnNonIndt−1). We expect these to be positively
related to our dependent variables since departments that raise funds from
different sources are also likely to raise higher funds from companies.
We also control for department size by including a continuous variable
(in logarithm) that accounts for the number of research active staff in the
department at the time of the RAE 2001 submissions (LnDepSizet−1) and
we expect larger departments to access higher amounts of industry funding.
We introduce control dummies for the scientific discipline and geo-
graphical location of the departments. As far as the former is concerned, we
group the scientific disciplines into 4 categories and create 4 dummies to be
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included in the regressions: BasicSci for basic sciences (chemistry, physics,
maths and statistics), AppliedSci for applied sciences (all engineering
related sciences9, computer science and environmental sciences), SocSci
for arts and social sciences (arts, architecture, planning, management, and
communication studies), and MedSci for medical sciences (medical and
pharmaceutical studies, and biology). To avoid collinearity we exclude the
prevalent category from the regression, that is applied sciences.
As for the geographical location of the university departments, the
following region level dummies are included: East Midlands, East of
England, London, North East, North West, Northern Ireland, Scotland,
South East, South West, Wales, West Midlands and Yorkshire and the
Humber. These captures region level factors that may affect the level of
academic engagement with industry, including: local exogenous shocks,
such as regulatory changes or the establishment of new companies, which
enlarges the pool of firms to be potentially involved into U-I knowledge
transfer, regional economic conditions, such as local innovative firms’
absorptive capacity, quality of the labour market, and the implementation
of new regional as well as national policies (Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen,
2012).
In the first place, we are interested in the relationship between de-
partment quality in period 1 and the level of academic engagement with
industry in period 2. We posit that there may be a negative relation-
ship, because top ranked departments (TopQualDep = 1) may need to
attract industry funding to a lesser extent than low ranked department
(TopQualDep = 0), due to their higher degree of resources availability
(Perkmann et al., 2013). Moreover, academics in top universities may per-
ceive greater incentives to engage in basic research than to engage in in-
teractions with industry. In other words, for low-ranked departments U-I
collaboration can be seen as a means to acquire research funds. Hence we
estimate the following model:
Yit = α+ β1TopQualDepit−1 + γXi + ei (3.1)
where Yit is IndFundt or IndFundGrantt, TopQualDepit−1 is a dummy
9General, chemical, civil, electric, mechanic, and metallurgy and materials engineering.
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that equals 1 for top departments and Xi indicates the set of control
variables previously illustrated.
In the second place, we are interested in a moderating or enhancing ef-
fect of public funding on quality, which we test by adding an interaction
term between TopQualDept−1 and LnEsprcFundt−1. We argue that the ef-
fect that quality has on industry funding depends on the amount of previ-
ous public funding that each department receives from the EPSRC for U-
I collaboration. The ability to raise public resources may be a signal for
firms, of universities and scientists’ capacity to attract funds from govern-
ment agencies, beyond academic research quality. In addition, firms may
expect that funding agencies look positively at proposals from academic
teams with past experience and that involve industry collaborators. There-
fore, we expect that past experience enhances the effect of quality, and we
estimate the following model:
Yit = α+ β1TopQualDepit−1 + β2LnEpsrcFundsit−1+
β3TopQualDeptit−1 ∗ LnEpsrcFundsit−1 + γXi + ei
(3.2)
where TopQualDeptit−1 ∗ LnEpsrcFundsit−1 is the interaction term in
which we are interested and every other variable is as described in model
(3.1).
We estimate both models with Ordinary Least Square regression with
robust standard error to account for potential heteroskedasticity of the error
terms (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). In addition, we test for the presence
of multicollinearity using Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) for all model
specifications and the results are satisfactory. The VIFs are always fairly
low (below 2) with the exception of the interaction and interacted terms.10
In addition to the main estimations, we carry out a number of robustness
checks. Firstly, we use a different measure of departments’ past experience,
namely the number of past collaborative grants funded by the EPSRC,
instead of the volume of funding. We do so to verify whether our main
results hold. Secondly, we replicate our analysis on the subsamples of
departments that belong to basic and applied disciplines respectively, in
10An individual VIF greater than 10 or an average VIF greater than 6 typically indicate
problems of collinearity. In our case, both individual and average VIFs are always below
2 with the exception of the interaction terms, which display high values because these are
correlated with the interacted regressors.
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order to check whether and to what extent the scientific domain matters in
the relationship between research quality and academic engagement.
With respect to the correlation among regressors, we pay particular
attention to the link between research quality and past EPSRC funding. The
latter may be obviously related to quality because better departments may
have higher interaction with public funding agencies, hence capturing a
very similar effect to that of TopQualDep on industry funding. On the other
hand, it may also be that the quality rating of each department is positively
influenced by having participated to EPSRC projects. However, we believe
this not to be a major concern because of the ways public funding for
research is allocated to UK universities.
Public research funding in UK higher education is administered under
a ‘dual support’ system, according to which higher education funding
councils provide the so called block grant funding to support the research
infrastructure, and the Research Councils as well as other entities (e.g.
charities, the European Union and government departments) provide
grants for specific research projects and programmes. The block grant
funding is allocated on the basis of research quality, as evaluated by the
higher education funding councils themselves in the Research Assessment
Exercise (now Research Evaluation Framework).11 Ad-hoc grants for
specific projects are instead allocated on the basis of different criteria. In
particular, Research Councils employ independent expert peer review,
consisting in the assessment for scientific quality by senior academics or
peers from the UK and overseas.12
Therefore, in our case the amount of EPSRC funding that each depart-
ment received between 1992 and 2000 is supposed to be independent from
research quality in those years, as evaluated by the RAE 2001. Correlation
will certainly exist between these variables. As a matter of fact, the statistical
correlation between the two is 0.34. However, it is highly unlikely that this
implies that research quality and the volume of EPSRC funds both meas-
ures academic standing and would be, hence, directly related to each other.
Moreover, the RAE ratings have been published in 2001, whereas we only
11https://www.hefce.ac.uk/
12http://www.rcuk.ac.uk/research/peerreview/
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include EPSRC funding received up to 2000 as a proxy for past experience.
3.5 Descriptive statistics
The list of variables along with their description is reported in table 3.1,
and table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics for all of them. Whenever
a variable is log- or lnskew- transformed, we report both the level and
logarithm. The total amount of funding from industrial partners within
the EPSRC collaborations in period 2 (IndFundt) is 1,5 million pounds, on
average, per department, but it ranges from 0 (3 departments) to 15 million
pounds; on average, each department gets 114 thousand pounds per project
(IndFundGrantt), peaking at 1,3 million pounds and each department
received on average 10 grants during the years 2001-2008.
There are 280 university departments in our sample, 147 (52.5%) of
which had a score of 5 or 5* in the RAE 2001 and 133 (47.5%) had a score of
2 to 4.13,14 The number of people employed is between 1 and 167 (the mean
is 28). The mean volume of funding received from the EPSRC in period
1 (EpsrcFundt−1) is 2 million pounds, and the overall amount of industry
funding, hence not only under the EPSRC projects, is on average 1,6 million
pounds, peaking at 21 million for one university department only. As for
funding received from public sources in period 2, the average is 1,1 million
pounds.
As for the geographical distribution of university departments, 14.6%
of them are in the Greater London Area, followed by 14% in Scotland and
12% in the South East. Instead, the regions with the smallest presence of
departments involved in EPSRC U-I collaboration are the North East of
England and Northern Ireland. The majority of departments are those
of applied disciplines (60%), primarily engineering, and basic disciplines
(32%), whereas only 7% belong to social sciences or medical sciences.
Table 3.3 shows the cross tabulation of the number of EPSRC U-I projects,
industry funding (for EPSRC projects) and EPSRC funding (all at depart-
13In the full sample of 327 RAE 2001 Unit of Assessments that belong to the same dis-
ciplines as those in our sample, the percentage of departments that has been rated 5 or 5*
is 41.
14None of the departments has been given the lowest rating (1).
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ment level) per funding period along with the percentage change between
periods. Interestingly, non top departments experience a quite large in-
crease in the amount of industry funding received between funding periods,
namely a 107% increase, and this is larger than for top quality departments
(84%). This is supportive of the idea that lower ranked departments may
attract industry funds for research to compensate for low quality.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Main results
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the main findings of this work. In the first table
we present the results of the OLS regression on the total volume of funds
that university departments receive from companies under the umbrella
of the EPSRC funded projects (dependent variable: LnIndFundt). In the
second table, the dependent variable is the mean volume of funding per
project (LnIndFundGrantt). In both tables, the first column includes only
the full set of control variables. In the second and third column, the dummy
for top schools (TopQualDept−1) and the amount of EPSRC past funds
(LnEsprcFundt−1) are introduced respectively, whereas both of them are
there in the fourth column. Finally, the interaction term as in model (2) is
added in the last column.
In table 3.4 we notice that quality is positively related to industry
funding in column 2 and 4, whereas it has a negative coefficient in the last
column. The coefficient is only significant at the 10% level in column 2 and
at 5% level in column 5. Therefore, the relationship between quality and
academic engagement remains partly ambiguous and the hypothesised
negative effect of quality finds only partial confirmation in the data. As
expected, the volume of funds that university departments receive from the
EPSRC at t− 1 (pre-2001), measuring past experience, is a strong predictor
of the amount of involvement with industry at time t, during the period
2001-2007: the coefficient of LnEsprcFundt−1 is positive and significant at
1% level in all the estimations. This means that the larger is the amount of
financial involvement with the EPSRC (public funding) in period 1, the lar-
ger is the amount of industry funding attracted by university departments
in period 2. Furthermore, when both past experience and research quality
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are considered (column 4), the latter loses significance. Therefore, quality
does not seem to play a predominant role for academic engagement when
past experience is accounted for.
Out of the other explanatory variables, the most relevant factors that
predict U-I engagement include: department size, which is positively
related to the dependent variable, although significant in the first three
regressions only; the overall volume of industry funding LnTotIndt, which
is always positive and significant; as expected, the dummy for Social
Sciences is negative and significant with respect to the baseline category of
Applied Sciences; finally, the location dummy for West Midlands is positive
and significant, implying that university departments located there display
higher levels of involvement with industry with respect to the baseline
region, which is London.15
In the last column, the interaction term TopQualDep*LnEsprcFund is
added to test whether the effect of quality on academic engagement with
industry depends upon the amount of EPSRC funding received in the past
by departments (model (3.2)). The coefficient of the interaction term is
positive and significant (at 5% level), confirming our second hypothesis
that public funds enhance the role of quality. In addition, the coefficient for
TopQualDept−1 becomes negative and significant (at 5% level), supporting
the existence of a negative relationship between quality and industry fund-
ing. The coefficient of LnEsprcFundt−1 is now smaller but still significant
at 1% level. The additional effect of EPSRC funding on industry funding
for departments of high quality is 0.31, or an additional 3.1% increase in
industry funding due to a 10% increase in EPSRC funding. Overall, low
quality departments experience a 4.3% (0.430) increase whereas top qual-
ity departments experience a 4.3%+3.1%=7.4% increase in industry funding.
The results presented in table 3.5, in which the dependent variable is
the mean per grant volume of industry funding, show very similar results
to table 3.4, although slightly smaller in magnitude. Quality has a negative
and significant coefficient in column 5, but positive in columns 2 and 4, al-
15This result is somehow unexpected given the distribution of university departments
in our sample across the UK (see table 3.2) It may be due to the participation of some
top departments from West Midlands universities that attract high levels of funding from
private partners through U-I collaboration.
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though not significant. Therefore, a negative relationship with the volume
of mean industry funding is only partially confirmed. The interaction
term is positive and significant, indicating that top quality departments
experience a 0.7%+2.5%=3.2% increase in industry funding due to a 10%
increase in past EPSRC funds, whereas non-top ones have a 0.7% increase.
In addition, the volume of past EPSRC funds does not significantly predict
the mean value of industry funds in the full model in column 5. As for the
other controls, only the location dummy indicating departments located
in the West Midlands display a positive and significant relationship with
mean industry funding, as it was the case in the previous set of regressions.
The results obtained from the interaction terms can be better interpreted
if pictured on a diagram. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the predictive margins of
TopQualDept−1 for LnIndFundt (Figure 3.1) and LnIndFundGrantt (Figure
3.2), on the whole range of values of LnEsprcFundt−1 (horizontal axis), as
obtained from the regressions in column 5 in table 3.4 and 3.5 respectively.
The interaction term that we introduce in our regressions allows the effect
of an additional unit of past EPSRC funding to differ for top quality and
non-top quality university departments.
In figure 3.1, for lower levels of past EPSRC funds, low quality depart-
ments receive higher industry funds than top quality ones, as shown by
the fact that the blue line predicting values for non top-quality depart-
ments (TopQualDept−1 = 0) lies above the red line for top departments
(TopQualDept−1 = 1). In other words, an additional unit of EPSRC funding
in period 1 results in a higher amount of industry funding in period 2
for non-top university departments than for top departments. Therefore,
EPSRC funds have an enhancing effect on quality, most likely because they
act as a signal for departments to attract higher volumes of funding from
industry. However, this is untrue for higher levels of EPSRC funds, where
top quality departments receive higher levels of industry funds than low
quality ones. In fact, after a threshold, an additional unit of past EPSRC
funds has a larger impact on the volume of industry funding received
by top quality university departments than non-top ones, shown by the
fact that the predicting line for TopQualDept−1 = 0 lies below that one
for TopQualDept−1 = 1. In figure 3.1, the threshold is at a volume of
EPSRC funds of around 520 thousand pounds, at which both top and non
148
top schools’ predicted value of total industry funding in 2001-2008 is 300
thousand pounds.
Figure 3.2 shows a similar pattern since low quality departments get
higher mean industry funding than top ones. However, this holds for al-
most the whole range of values of past EPSRC funding. In fact, the trend is
the opposite only after a threshold of past EPSRC funds of around 900 thou-
sand pounds, resulting in a predicted value of mean industry contribution
per project of 60 thousand pounds for both top and non top departments.
3.6.2 Robustness check and further results
In order to check the robustness of our results and get additional insights
from the data, we carry out three sets of regressions. In the first place,
we replicate the analysis using a different proxy for departments’ past
experience with the funding agency. We choose the number of EPSRC
U-I collaborative projects in period 1 (1992-2000) to measure the extent to
which each department has been involved with the EPSRC in the past.
With respect to the amount of money received by the EPSRC, the number
of projects has the advantage to be less concentrated in a small number
of departments. Moreover, it is less prone to measurement error due to
misreported figures.
Secondly, in light of the fact that the relationship between research
quality, as well as other factors, and academic engagement with industry
may depend on the scientific field (Perkmann et al., 2011), we replicate
our analysis on two subsamples of university departments that belong to
basic and applied disciplines respectively. After excluding departments
that fall under the social sciences and medical sciences, hence restricting
the analysis on EPSRC related remits, we split basic and applied disciplines
departments. By doing so, we wish to uncover different patterns in
the relationship between department-level determinants and academic
engagement with industry that depend upon the specific disciplines.
As far as the first set of regressions is concerned (see table 3.6), the
results on both total industry funding per department and average funding
per project per department are very similar to the previous findings of
this work. The number of past projects funded by the EPSRC has very
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similar coefficients to those for the amount of funding received. Moreover,
the results are confirmed as far as the interdependence between quality
and past experience are concerned. Overall, this check supports the main
finding of this paper, namely that the relationship between quality and
academic engagement remains partly ambiguous, and that past experience
enhances the role of quality.
Table 3.7 shows the results of the regressions carried on the subsample
of university departments in basic sciences (N = 92), including maths,
physics, chemistry and statistics, whereas table 3.8 presents the results for
applied sciences departments (N = 167), including all engineering-related
fields. Interestingly, there is a difference in the role played by academic
quality across the two subsamples. For departments in basic disciplines
(table 3.7), quality displays always a negative relationship with industry
funding, though not always significant16, whereas for departments in
applied disciplines (table 3.8) the relationship remains ambiguous, being it
positive and negative across different estimations.
The existence of a negative relationship between quality and industry
funding in the basic sciences could be explained by the fact top departments
that mainly carry out basic research are less likely to get involved into U-I
interaction and attract industry funding. Similarly, firms may be reluctant
to engage in research activities with departments mostly doing research that
is less likely to be commercially viable. On the contrary, engineering-related
disciplines are by definition closer to the business community and thus, it is
reasonable to expect a positive link between academic quality and industry
engagement.
3.7 Discussion and conclusion
This paper has investigated the relationship between university depart-
ments’ characteristics and academic engagement with businesses in the
form of university-industry (U-I) collaboration. In this paper, we focus
on the role of the quality profile of academic departments for the level
of engagement with industry. The latter is measured with the amount of
16It is also significant in a model with research quality and controls, without past exper-
ience.
150
industry funding that each university department receives when parti-
cipating to U-I collaboration. We study the case of U-I partnerships that
have been funded by the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research
Council (EPSRC) in the UK and we hypothesise that a negative relationship
between academic research quality and industry funding for academic
engagement may exist, supported by the argument that industry funding
compensates for low department quality. In addition, we investigate
whether this relationship is influenced by departments’ past experience in
publicly funded U-I collaboration, measured with the amount of public
funding received in the past.
The data consist of a set of university-industry research grants awarded
in the UK by the EPSRC, combined with university and department level
information gathered from the UK Higher Education Funding Councils. In
the empirical analysis we focus on university-industry partnerships funded
between 2001 and 2007 and we study the role of past research quality along
with that of past experience and the interaction between them, plus a set of
control variables.
Our findings only partly confirm the hypothesised negative relationship
between quality and private funding for academic engagement because the
coefficient has negative and significant sign in only some of the models
that we estimate. On the one hand, lower quality departments may seek
additional funding from business partners in order to compensate for low
public resources - due to the lower quality of the research produced. On the
other hand, academics in prestigious departments may be more incentiv-
ized to engage in basic research rather than engaging in collaboration with
companies. However, further analysis is needed to confirm this.
Moreover, past experience with the funding agency, measured with the
past volume of EPSRC grants for U-I collaboration, is positively linked to
collaboration with industry. This may indicate that universities’ ability to
mobilise public resources represents a signal for businesses, which hence
leads to more opportunities and, more generally, more collaborating activit-
ies. Therefore, similarly to previous studies (Bozeman and Gaughan, 2007;
Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009), we find a complementarity between the
past volume of public grants for U-I interaction and the volume of funding
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raised from companies.
To test our second hypothesis of an enhancing effect of past experience
on research quality, we introduce an interaction term in the regression,
between quality and past EPSRC funds, so to allow the effect of an ad-
ditional unit of past EPSRC funding to differ for top quality and non-top
quality university departments. The results confirm the hypothesis, since
the coefficient is positive and significant. We further analyse the results
by plotting the predicted values of industry funding for top and non-top
quality departments and it turns out that only low levels of past EPSRC
funds have a boosting effect on quality. In fact, for low levels of past EPSRC
funds, low quality departments receive higher industry funds than top
quality ones, whereas the opposite happens for high levels.
We also check the robustness of our results by using a different proxy for
past experience with the funding agency. The results are quite satisfactory
in that the coefficients are all very similar in magnitude and significance.
Moreover, we carry out further analyses on university departments that are
closely related to the EPSRC remits, namely basic and applied disciplines.
It turns out that academic quality and industry funding display a negative
relationship for departments in basic disciplines, which provides support
for our first hypothesis. However, further research would be needed to
shed more light on this.
This work has some limitations that is worth noticing. Although we
frame our empirical analysis in two different time periods so to reduce
reverse causality concerns, it is still questionable whether some factors
are omitted in our econometric specification. If so, it would raise some
endogeneity concerns. In addition, our study considers only one specific
channel of U-I knowledge transfer activity, thus perhaps providing only a
partial picture of the whole range of U-I activities in which universities are
involved. Nonetheless, it is worth underlining that U-I research collabor-
ations are extremely widespread in many advanced countries and are one
of the most frequent policy instruments to support U-I knowledge transfer
activities (OECD, 1998, 2002a).
Yet, this paper offers some contributions to the literature. In the first
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place, we bring new evidence on university-industry knowledge transfer
activities and on their value by measuring them with the volume of in-
dustry funding and by exploring the role of department-level determinants.
We attempt to show whether research quality displays a negative rela-
tionship with the volume of engagement with industry, but our findings
are only partly conclusive. However, we show that research quality is
interdependent with department past experience, since the latter may
represent a signal for companies and boosts the effect of quality on the
amount of resources raised from companies. More importantly, we show
that past experience, measured with the volume of funds obtained for U-I
collaboration by the funding agency, is a stronger and more significant
predictor than quality. This finding suggests that public policy should
substantially support university knowledge transfer, especially in light of
the increasing costs of research for universities and companies, so to allow
the best match of resources by both sides. Moreover, policy-makers could
consider a division of labour among universities whereby some specialize
in advanced research and others in business engagement.
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
IndFundt 280 1,517,703 2,688,188 0 1.51E+07
LnIndFundt 280 13.0581 1.6585 10.01 16.5342
IndFundGrantt 280 114,807.6 166,213.5 0 1,301,250
LnIndFundGrantt 280 11.2108 1.0041 8.9998 14.085
NumPrjt 280 10.525 10.9763 1 88
LnNumPrjt 280 1.8495 1.075 0 4.4773
TopQualDept−1 280 0.525 0.5002 0 1
EsprcFundt−1 280 2,043,875 2,851,427 19,959.77 2.36E+07
LnEsprcFundt−1 280 13.7867 1.3219 9.9014 16.9765
TopqualXepsrc 280 7.4671 7.1755 0 16.9765
DeptSizet−1 280 28.1571 22.6616 1 167
LnDeptSizet−1 280 3.10357 0.6853 0 5.1180
TotIndt 280 1,609,736 2,718,991 0 2.11E+07
LnTotIndt 280 13.3307 1.4960 10.92 16.867
TotGovRct−1 280 1,135,152 2,871,275 0 4.48E+07
LnTotGovRct−1 280 13.3487 1.1337 11.3563 17.619
eastmidu 280 0.0821 0.2750 0 1
eastengu 280 0.0535 0.2255 0 1
londonu 280 0.1464 0.3541 0 1
noreastu 280 0.0392 0.1946 0 1
norwestu 280 0.0821 0.275 0 1
noirelau 280 0.025 0.1564 0 1
scotlanu 280 0.1392 0.3468 0 1
southeau 280 0.1214 0.3272 0 1
southweu 280 0.0785 0.2695 0 1
walesu 280 0.0535 0.2255 0 1
westmidu 280 0.0714 0.258 0 1
yorkhumu 280 0.1071 0.3098 0 1
AppliedSci 280 0.5964 0.4914 0 1
BasicSci 280 0.3285 0.4705 0 1
SocSci 280 0.0535 0.2255 0 1
MedSci 280 0.0214 0.1450 0 1
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics
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1992-2000 % 2001-2007 % Both periods % change
bw periods
Projects 3,332 100% 2,947 100% 6,279 -12%
top dept 2,278 68% 2,015 68% 4,293 -12%
non top dept 1,054 32% 932 32% 1,986 -12%
Industry funding 224 100% 425 100% 649 90%
(million £)
top dept 167 75% 308 73% 475 84%
non top dept 56 25% 117 27% 173 107%
EPSRC funding 572 100% 951 100% 1,523 66%
(million £)
top dept 418 73% 697 73% 1,115 67%
non top dept 154 27% 254 27% 408 65%
Table 3.3: Volume of U-I projects, Industry funding and EPSRC funding per
funding period
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES LnIndFundt LnIndFundt LnIndFundt LnIndFundt LnIndFundt
TopQualDept−1 0.360* 0.175 -4.070**
(0.190) (0.173) (1.637)
LnEsprcFundt−1 0.594*** 0.583*** 0.430***
(0.0780) (0.0792) (0.106)
Topqual ∗ EpsrcF 0.309**
(0.119)
LnDeptSizet−1 0.556*** 0.462*** 0.246* 0.206 0.204
(0.168) (0.176) (0.138) (0.144) (0.140)
LnTotIndt 0.430*** 0.416*** 0.187** 0.184** 0.159*
(0.0744) (0.0748) (0.0776) (0.0788) (0.0808)
LnTotGovRct−1 0.149 0.150 0.0726 0.0745 0.0590
(0.0959) (0.0964) (0.0802) (0.0810) (0.0789)
eastmidu 0.395 0.475 0.481 0.518 0.464
(0.345) (0.351) (0.348) (0.354) (0.352)
eastengu 0.121 0.226 0.310 0.358 0.373
(0.375) (0.362) (0.280) (0.277) (0.284)
noreastu 0.234 0.268 0.0623 0.0823 0.119
(0.561) (0.541) (0.471) (0.461) (0.451)
norwestu 0.156 0.198 0.230 0.249 0.223
(0.354) (0.357) (0.312) (0.314) (0.301)
noirelau -0.0300 0.0668 0.386 0.425 0.420
(0.530) (0.509) (0.393) (0.392) (0.402)
scotlanu 0.0927 0.150 0.0392 0.0680 0.0929
(0.342) (0.340) (0.301) (0.298) (0.291)
southeau 0.0451 0.0793 0.147 0.162 0.122
(0.285) (0.287) (0.259) (0.261) (0.255)
southweu 0.216 0.269 0.343 0.366 0.377
(0.299) (0.308) (0.308) (0.312) (0.302)
walesu 0.203 0.265 0.0827 0.115 0.140
(0.485) (0.477) (0.476) (0.475) (0.479)
westmidu 0.611* 0.626* 0.611* 0.618* 0.580*
(0.360) (0.367) (0.327) (0.331) (0.330)
yorkhumu 0.369 0.365 0.233 0.233 0.234
(0.348) (0.350) (0.296) (0.297) (0.296)
BasicSci 0.0470 0.006 0.0026 -0.0165 0.0126
(0.214) (0.209) (0.183) (0.182) (0.181)
SocSci -0.697** -0.651** -0.655* -0.633* -0.698**
(0.302) (0.297) (0.345) (0.351) (0.353)
MedSci -0.961 -0.817 -0.424 -0.363 -0.469
(0.622) (0.631) (0.603) (0.609) (0.590)
Constant 3.461*** 3.708*** 0.475 0.651 3.242**
(1.152) (1.174) (1.048) (1.058) (1.568)
Observations 280 280 280 280 280
R-squared 0.358 0.367 0.479 0.481 0.493
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: OLS regression. Dependent variable: lnskew0 of IndFundt
157
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES LIndFundGt LIndFundGt LIndFundGt LIndFundGt LIndFundGt
TopQualDept−1 0.0663 0.00267 -3.500***
(0.133) (0.132) (1.256)
LnEsprcFundt−1 0.201*** 0.201*** 0.0746
(0.0576) (0.0586) (0.0759)
Topqual ∗ EpsrcF 0.255***
(0.0903)
LnDeptSizet−1 0.192* 0.175 0.0870 0.0864 0.0847
(0.112) (0.120) (0.104) (0.110) (0.106)
LnTotIndt 0.130** 0.127** 0.0471 0.0470 0.0258
(0.0511) (0.0508) (0.0564) (0.0563) (0.0578)
LnTotGovRct−1 0.0866 0.0867 0.0608 0.0608 0.0481
(0.0665) (0.0668) (0.0637) (0.0639) (0.0625)
eastmidu 0.282 0.296 0.311 0.311 0.267
(0.243) (0.247) (0.252) (0.256) (0.251)
eastengu 0.261 0.280 0.325 0.326 0.339
(0.226) (0.227) (0.209) (0.211) (0.216)
noreastu 0.469 0.475 0.411 0.411 0.441
(0.313) (0.309) (0.302) (0.302) (0.297)
norwestu 0.248 0.255 0.273 0.273 0.251
(0.243) (0.244) (0.236) (0.237) (0.229)
noirelau 0.0758 0.0936 0.216 0.217 0.213
(0.334) (0.333) (0.310) (0.310) (0.319)
scotlanu 0.255 0.265 0.237 0.237 0.257
(0.238) (0.240) (0.229) (0.231) (0.227)
southeau 0.104 0.110 0.138 0.139 0.106
(0.214) (0.216) (0.213) (0.214) (0.209)
southweu 0.209 0.219 0.252 0.253 0.261
(0.223) (0.224) (0.232) (0.232) (0.222)
walesu 0.483 0.494 0.442 0.442 0.463
(0.399) (0.400) (0.398) (0.402) (0.404)
westmidu 0.584** 0.587** 0.584** 0.584** 0.552**
(0.259) (0.262) (0.260) (0.260) (0.260)
yorkhumu 0.330 0.330 0.284 0.284 0.285
(0.241) (0.242) (0.227) (0.228) (0.226)
BasicSci 0.0018 -0.0057 -0.0131 -0.0134 0.0106
(0.150) (0.148) (0.142) (0.141) (0.140)
SocSci -0.130 -0.122 -0.116 -0.116 -0.169
(0.248) (0.253) (0.281) (0.284) (0.279)
MedSci -0.0144 0.0121 0.168 0.168 0.0812
(0.608) (0.614) (0.619) (0.624) (0.617)
Constant 7.493*** 7.538*** 6.482*** 6.485*** 8.624***
(0.830) (0.831) (0.849) (0.846) (1.153)
Observations 280 280 280 280 280
R-squared 0.126 0.127 0.164 0.164 0.187
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5: OLS regression. Dependent variable: lnskew0 of IndFundGrantt
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES LnIndFundt LnIndFundt LnIndFundGt LnIndFundGt
TopQualDept−1 0.187 -0.526 0.0139 -0.490*
(0.180) (0.341) (0.134) (0.280
LnNumPrjt 0.620*** 0.470*** 0.188** 0.0812
(0.0983) (0.114) (0.0725) (0.0856)
Topqual ∗ numPrj 0.367** 0.259**
(0.148) (0.115)
LnDeptSizet−1 0.273* 0.259* 0.117 0.108
(0.145) (0.140) (0.112) (0.108)
LnTotIndt 0.190** 0.150* 0.0585 0.0304
(0.0836) (0.0870) (0.0574) (0.0594)
LnTotGovRct−1 0.108 0.0972 0.0743 0.0663
(0.0859) (0.0848) (0.0654) (0.0650)
eastmidu 0.533 0.492 0.314 0.285
(0.340) (0.345) (0.249) (0.250)
eastengu 0.292 0.311 0.300 0.314
(0.291) (0.293) (0.214) (0.216)
noreastu 0.187 0.229 0.451 0.480
(0.473) (0.463) (0.308) (0.307)
norwestu 0.215 0.216 0.261 0.261
(0.335) (0.335) (0.244) (0.244)
noirelau 0.367 0.382 0.185 0.195
(0.423) (0.426) (0.320) (0.324)
scotlanu 0.0812 0.116 0.244 0.269
(0.310) (0.301) (0.233) (0.229)
southeau 0.135 0.0945 0.127 0.0987
(0.268) (0.260) (0.215) (0.210)
southweu 0.327 0.349 0.237 0.252
(0.322) (0.310) (0.232) (0.224)
walesu 0.142 0.182 0.457 0.485
(0.498) (0.504) (0.411) (0.416)
westmidu 0.555 0.533 0.566** 0.550**
(0.354) (0.358) (0.264) (0.266)
yorkhumu 0.252 0.247 0.295 0.292
(0.313) (0.310) (0.233) (0.232)
BasicSci -0.0201 0.0219 -0.0136 0.0161
(0.190) (0.188) (0.144) (0.142)
SocSci -0.689** -0.770** -0.133 -0.191
(0.344) (0.351) (0.278) (0.280)
MedSci -0.419 -0.498 0.133 0.0767
(0.542) (0.533) (0.591) (0.602)
Constant 6.751*** 7.687*** 8.459*** 9.120***
(1.246) (1.318) (0.897) (0.947)
Observations 280 280 280 280
R-squared 0.451 0.462 0.148 0.163
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.6: Robustness check. Dependent variables: lnskew0 of IndFundt and
IndFundGrantt
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES IndFundt IndFundt IndFundt IndFundGt IndFundGt IndFundGt
TopQualDept−1 -0.145 -6.602** -0.368 -7.015***
(0.382) (3.059) (0.306) (2.165)
LnEsprcFundt−1 0.669*** 0.342 0.354*** 0.0165
(0.167) (0.253) (0.124) (0.180)
Topqual ∗ EpsrcF 0.474** 0.488***
(0.227) (0.162)
LnDeptSizet−1 0.414* 0.326 0.350 0.0937 0.125 0.150
(0.217) (0.222) (0.214) (0.154) (0.163) (0.156)
LnTotIndt 0.352** 0.100 0.0895 0.0827 -0.0518 -0.0631
(0.134) (0.138) (0.141) (0.0949) (0.103) (0.106)
LnTotGovRct−1 0.325* 0.0299 0.0179 0.179 0.0192 0.007
(0.192) (0.164) (0.156) (0.132) (0.124) (0.120)
eastmidu 0.729 0.442 0.192 0.438 0.181 -0.0756
(0.508) (0.431) (0.393) (0.273) (0.300) (0.291)
eastengu 0.334 0.701 0.541 0.785* 0.912** 0.747*
(0.604) (0.542) (0.543) (0.413) (0.415) (0.401)
noreastu 1.343* 0.906 0.670 1.114** 0.889 0.646
(0.766) (0.901) (0.915) (0.529) (0.629) (0.641)
norwestu 1.622** 1.293** 1.109** 1.002** 0.734 0.545
(0.721) (0.639) (0.532) (0.491) (0.468) (0.383)
noirelau 2.354*** 2.106*** 2.106*** 1.734*** 1.471*** 1.471***
(0.433) (0.422) (0.379) (0.345) (0.352) (0.400)
scotlanu 1.641** 1.164** 1.162** 1.234** 0.917** 0.915**
(0.664) (0.554) (0.530) (0.474) (0.459) (0.437)
southeau 0.954* 0.703 0.591 0.686* 0.510 0.395
(0.525) (0.466) (0.450) (0.388) (0.382) (0.355)
southweu 1.263** 1.086* 0.964* 0.937** 0.776* 0.650*
(0.577) (0.567) (0.529) (0.415) (0.447) (0.369)
walesu 0.976 0.499 0.476 0.939 0.574 0.550
(1.080) (1.186) (1.212) (0.911) (1.026) (1.042)
westmidu 1.402* 1.100 0.849 1.075** 0.843 0.584
(0.786) (0.690) (0.677) (0.530) (0.514) (0.475)
yorkhumu 1.063 0.650 0.590 0.922* 0.661 0.600
(0.775) (0.629) (0.637) (0.546) (0.474) (0.482)
Constant 1.746 0.335 5.067* 6.603*** 5.920*** 10.79***
(1.894) (1.572) (2.627) (1.491) (1.363) (1.856)
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R-squared 0.366 0.489 0.513 0.183 0.272 0.328
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.7: Robustness check. Subsample of basic sciences departments
160
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES LIndFundt LIndFundt LIndFundt LIndFundGt LIndFundGt LIndFundGt
TopQualDept−1 0.403** -2.131 0.294** -0.129
(0.199) (1.848) (0.138) (1.382)
LnEsprcFundt−1 0.532*** 0.464*** 0.120* 0.109
(0.0900) (0.111) (0.0614) (0.0775)
Topqual ∗ EpsrcF 0.183 0.0305
(0.134) (0.0983)
LnDeptSizet−1 0.738*** 0.206 0.185 0.358*** 0.190 0.187
(0.208) (0.208) (0.210) (0.130) (0.140) (0.141)
LnTotIndt 0.496*** 0.228** 0.206* 0.169*** 0.0907 0.0869
(0.0983) (0.101) (0.104) (0.0644) (0.0678) (0.0683)
LnTotGovRct−1 0.0494 0.0736 0.0741 -0.0078 -0.0006 -0.0006
(0.119) (0.0996) (0.101) (0.0726) (0.0714) (0.0718)
eastmidu 0.646 0.926** 0.919* 0.615** 0.727** 0.726**
(0.447) (0.466) (0.468) (0.279) (0.291) (0.290)
eastengu -0.0043 0.367 0.403 0.0626 0.216 0.222
(0.471) (0.339) (0.347) (0.276) (0.251) (0.253)
noreastu -0.0755 -0.0987 -0.0499 0.377 0.398 0.406
(0.677) (0.535) (0.525) (0.355) (0.328) (0.327)
norwestu -0.376 -0.273 -0.252 0.0639 0.0934 0.0969
(0.383) (0.348) (0.357) (0.261) (0.261) (0.265)
noirelau -0.955 -0.167 -0.181 -0.412 -0.205 -0.207
(0.640) (0.415) (0.417) (0.345) (0.312) (0.313)
scotlanu -0.633 -0.391 -0.364 -0.0357 0.0506 0.0552
(0.408) (0.375) (0.373) (0.269) (0.267) (0.269)
southeau -0.301 -0.0897 -0.0986 -0.0564 0.0090 0.0076
(0.349) (0.326) (0.323) (0.253) (0.253) (0.254)
southweu -0.182 0.115 0.132 0.0871 0.193 0.196
(0.354) (0.398) (0.392) (0.256) (0.271) (0.271)
walesu -0.181 -0.110 -0.0604 0.250 0.280 0.288
(0.519) (0.489) (0.494) (0.392) (0.386) (0.390)
westmidu 0.271 0.399 0.421 0.495* 0.514* 0.517*
(0.353) (0.373) (0.386) (0.281) (0.306) (0.310)
yorkhumu 0.127 0.170 0.191 0.172 0.172 0.175
(0.393) (0.333) (0.330) (0.253) (0.239) (0.239)
Constant 3.646** 0.828 2.079 7.826*** 7.441*** 7.649***
(1.559) (1.551) (1.921) (0.990) (1.094) (1.308)
Observations 167 167 167 167 167 167
R-squared 0.453 0.566 0.570 0.237 0.279 0.279
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.8: Robustness check. Subsample of applied sciences departments
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3.9 Figures
Figure 3.1: Interaction on LnIndFundt
Figure 3.2: Interaction on LnIndFundGrantt
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3.10 Appendix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES LogIndFundt LogIndFundt LogIndFundt LogIndFundt LogIndFundt
TopQualDept−1 0.331 0.101 -4.937**
(0.229) (0.209) (2.122)
LnEsprcFundt−1 0.696*** 0.690*** 0.509***
(0.0958) (0.0968) (0.128)
Topqual ∗ EpsrcF 0.366**
(0.152)
LnDeptSizet−1 0.579*** 0.493** 0.208 0.186 0.186
(0.208) (0.218) (0.172) (0.180) (0.176)
LnTotIndt 0.499*** 0.487*** 0.215** 0.214** 0.182*
(0.0948) (0.0956) (0.0981) (0.0991) (0.101)
LnTotGovRct−1 0.157 0.157 0.0691 0.0698 0.0534
(0.125) (0.126) (0.106) (0.107) (0.104)
eastmidu 0.403 0.479 0.500 0.523 0.455
(0.444) (0.452) (0.447) (0.452) (0.448)
eastengu 0.207 0.307 0.432 0.460 0.472
(0.420) (0.410) (0.320) (0.321) (0.325)
noreastu 0.253 0.289 0.0488 0.0617 0.100
(0.668) (0.648) (0.569) (0.561) (0.545)
norwestu 0.0624 0.105 0.147 0.159 0.124
(0.478) (0.481) (0.426) (0.425) (0.410)
noirelau 0.0624 0.155 0.549 0.572 0.562
(0.603) (0.585) (0.452) (0.452) (0.462)
scotlanu 0.105 0.167 0.0281 0.0476 0.0651
(0.437) (0.435) (0.387) (0.383) (0.377)
southeau 0.177 0.210 0.318 0.327 0.274
(0.354) (0.360) (0.319) (0.321) (0.313)
southweu 0.371 0.424 0.519 0.534 0.542
(0.368) (0.377) (0.374) (0.377) (0.365)
walesu 0.248 0.308 0.107 0.127 0.153
(0.603) (0.598) (0.592) (0.595) (0.600)
westmidu 0.798* 0.815* 0.798** 0.803** 0.754*
(0.426) (0.433) (0.388) (0.391) (0.389)
yorkhumu 0.390 0.390 0.230 0.231 0.228
(0.443) (0.444) (0.382) (0.383) (0.381)
BasicSci -0.0042 -0.0382 -0.0623 -0.0721 -0.0414
(0.261) (0.255) (0.224) (0.222) (0.220)
SocSci -0.771* -0.727* -0.723 -0.710 -0.788*
(0.401) (0.397) (0.444) (0.449) (0.452)
MedSci -1.571 -1.436 -0.950 -0.915 -1.042
(1.114) (1.132) (1.111) (1.122) (1.105)
Constant 2.136 2.364 -1.366 -1.264 1.787
(1.514) (1.547) (1.427) (1.449) (2.010)
Observations 277 277 277 277 277
R-squared 0.324 0.329 0.441 0.442 0.453
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.9: OLS regression. Dependent variable: natural log of IndFundt
163
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES LogIndFundGt LogIndFundGt LogIndFundGt LogIndFundGt LogIndFundGt
TopQualDept−1 0.0267 -0.0657 -4.543**
(0.168) (0.167) (1.792)
LnEsprcFundt−1 0.272*** 0.276*** 0.116
(0.0753) (0.0769) (0.0945)
Topqual ∗ EpsrcF 0.326**
(0.127)
LnDeptSizet−1 0.210 0.203 0.0649 0.0798 0.0796
(0.143) (0.152) (0.132) (0.138) (0.134)
LnTotIndt 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.0609 0.0615 0.0334
(0.0655) (0.0655) (0.0710) (0.0706) (0.0729)
LnTotGovRct−1 0.0984 0.0984 0.0639 0.0635 0.0489
(0.0875) (0.0877) (0.0827) (0.0826) (0.0806)
eastmidu 0.305 0.311 0.343 0.329 0.268
(0.338) (0.342) (0.348) (0.352) (0.345)
eastengu 0.362 0.370 0.449* 0.431 0.442*
(0.278) (0.280) (0.259) (0.262) (0.265)
noreastu 0.563 0.566 0.483 0.475 0.509
(0.386) (0.383) (0.370) (0.373) (0.364)
norwestu 0.162 0.165 0.195 0.187 0.156
(0.377) (0.379) (0.363) (0.364) (0.353)
noirelau 0.145 0.152 0.335 0.319 0.310
(0.406) (0.406) (0.377) (0.375) (0.384)
scotlanu 0.350 0.355 0.320 0.307 0.322
(0.306) (0.307) (0.293) (0.295) (0.291)
southeau 0.206 0.208 0.261 0.255 0.208
(0.279) (0.281) (0.275) (0.275) (0.268)
southweu 0.340 0.344 0.398 0.388 0.395
(0.281) (0.281) (0.292) (0.291) (0.278)
walesu 0.550 0.555 0.495 0.482 0.505
(0.497) (0.499) (0.495) (0.502) (0.504)
westmidu 0.744** 0.746** 0.745** 0.741** 0.697**
(0.321) (0.322) (0.320) (0.319) (0.317)
yorkhumu 0.398 0.398 0.336 0.335 0.332
(0.314) (0.315) (0.295) (0.295) (0.293)
BasicSci -0.0411 -0.0438 -0.0637 -0.0574 -0.0301
(0.191) (0.188) (0.180) (0.178) (0.175)
SocSci -0.147 -0.144 -0.128 -0.137 -0.206
(0.322) (0.325) (0.363) (0.363) (0.358)
MedSci -0.429 -0.418 -0.186 -0.209 -0.323
(0.979) (0.989) (0.994) (1.000) (0.991)
Constant 6.459*** 6.477*** 5.091*** 5.024*** 7.735***
(1.143) (1.154) (1.197) (1.210) (1.538)
Observations 277 277 277 277 277
R-squared 0.122 0.122 0.164 0.165 0.187
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.10: OLS regression. Dependent variable: natural log of IndFundGrantt
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